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Preface 
After the Communist regime started crumbling in 1989, the official foreign 
policy of Poland has been redefined. A central characteristic in this process 
has been Polish involvement in the process of European integration and an 
application for membership in the European Union. These policies have not 
been undisputed in Polish political debates. Analyses of Polish European 
policy tend to concentrate on the official foreign policy of Poland and the 
strategies of cooperation and integration proposed by EU member states. 
What they seem to forget is that debates on Europe and what shape the rela-
tions between Poland and Europe should take exist within Poland as well. 
This thesis is an attempt to fill in this gap. The central question is what kind 
of Europe do Poles promote?  
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Oslo, November 2000 
Supporting the road of Poland to the [European] Union we are not lead by emoti-
ons, we are not making use of neither pathos nor doubts. […] the SLD [Demo-
cratic Left Alliance] conceives common Europe as an answer to the present chal-
lenges of civilization and as the protector of a high standard of democracy and 
human subjectivity (980319/ 017).1 
 
I think that the old Rzeczpospolita [Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth] was in a 
miniature scale the prefiguration of the European community – in the Polish 
landscape there was a place for the Catholic Church, as well as the temple of the 
Greek Catholics, the liturgy of the Orthodox, Jewish synagogues and Tartar 
minarets. This should also be the pan-European vision (Foreign Minster 
Bronisław Geremek in Wprost 1998). 
 
Entering the European Union does not bring about the rejection of our national 
and Christian identity. The Holy Father John Paul II said during his Homily in 
Gniezno in 1997 that the framework of European identity is built on Christianity. 
I would like the Polish contribution to the process of European integration be the 
reminder of these fundamental principles  (990908/ 004). 
 
We will teach Europe what a Christian nation is, a nation that does not allow 
itself to be forced into financial slavery, one that is capable of managing its own 
affairs. With this we will contribute to the collapse of world globalism, just as 
we halted the expansion of the Germans, the Mongols, the Swedes, the Turks, 
and the Soviets. It may be in Poland that the fall of the New World Order will 
begin (Nasz Dziennik 1998). 
1.0 Introduction 
The theme of this thesis is the preconditions for Polish European policies. 
The Polish Communist regime pmoterod a foreign policy that was defined 
by “fraternal neighborly Polish-Soviet relations”. It represented the West 
(Western Europe and the USA) as an antagonist to the idea of a socialist 
Europe and maintained that by counterworking socialism the West attempted 
to “push our country into the abyss of chaos and anarchy”. Only a socialist 
Poland could “remain on the map of Europe as an independent and sovereign 
state” (Gomułka quoted in Bromke 1967: 120).  
While the Communist regime produced such statements, the opposition 
made other statements that related Poland to Europe and with such practices 
reproduced alternative policies. These policies surfaced as the Communist 
regime crumbled and allowed for a policy change and ultimately for Polish 
participation in the projects of European integration. In this thesis I argue 
that there are always alternative policies that attempt to subvert the dominant 
one(s) and that policies are sustained, modified or crushed, in social interac-
tion. 
The epigraphs above are recent statements of central Polish politicians. 
They reveal that there are a number of different ideas in Poland of what 
shape the European political project should take. Moreover the epigraphs 
                                                     
1  References to debates in the Polish Parliament take the following pattern: (year month 
day/number of speaker).  
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disclose that there are different ways of defining Poland’s role in relation to 
the Europe that is promoted. This thesis argues that foreign policies are con-
ditioned by the ways in which certain concepts are represented in discourse. 
Its purpose is to present you with an overview of the existing Polish Euro-
pean policy positions, analyze the representations on which they rest and, on 
the basis of the analysis, draw some conclusions about the preconditions of 
Polish European policies and make some tentative predictions for they may 
develop in the future. The purpose of the analysis is thus both explanatory 
and predicative.  
Discourses are closely related to the discourses that precede them. I be-
lieve that a background study of Polish discourse during Communism is an 
important background study in order to explicate the foundations of today’s 
discourse. I will therefore devote a considerable part of the thesis to the dis-
course of this period. Polish European policy debates also reveal that history 
is continuously kept alive in the shape of extensive references to historical 
facts and events. We may say that history functions as a catalogue of resour-
ces when Poles set out to discuss Europe and Poland. Some even argue that 
history is of particular importance in Poland and that no analysis of Polish 
politics can be performed satisfactorily if the historical heritage is not taken 
seriously. This thesis devotes a significant number of pages to the pre-his-
tory of the present discourse. It studies in what ways it has parallels in the 
past and demonstrates how history is and has been actively evoked in Polish 
European policy debates.  
When Poles set out to discuss Europe and their relations to Europe, they 
also discuss the nature of their own community. We may say that Polish 
European policy and Polish identity are mutually constitutive phenomena. 
This makes Polish identity an important aspect of Poland’s relations to Eu-
rope and a factor with explanatory power. In this thesis I will study the rela-
tionship between these phenomena in the discourse on Poland and Europe in 
Poland. Doing this I will not only look into how Europe is thought of in 
terms of difference from Polish identity, but also consider how Europe is in-
cluded into Polish identity. 
In the following section I will identify and elaborate on the central ques-
tion of the thesis. I will introduce the theory and method on which I base my 
analysis so that I may formulate the questions of research and specify a 
model of the central concepts of the study as well as the proposed relation-
ships between them. I will conclude with some remarks on delimitation. The 
subsequent sections will discuss theory and method in more detail and illu-
strate how I will apply it in this particular case. I will finish the introduction 
with an outline of the chapters. 
1.1 The Question 
In my view Poland is a country that has a central political location in Europe 
and the potential of becoming an important actor on the European political 
scene. Polish European policy is an important field of study because it may 
influence the developments of Europe as a political project. A central ques-
tion in this respect is: What kind of Europe do Poles promote? A more pre-
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cise formulation of the question necessitates a brief introduction of the theo-
retical and methodical approaches.  
1.1.1 Theoretical approach 
In recent years the discipline of International Relations (IR) and the sub-dis-
cipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) have experienced a surge of inter-
est in identity and identity formation. The behavioral schools of neorealism 
and neoliberalism have traditionally dominated IR and FPA. When identity 
is brought into the analysis, these schools treat it as just another independent 
variable that has a measurable effect on foreign policy. The ontological sta-
tus of the identity is not questioned and the possibility that the relationship 
between identity and foreign policy may be of another nature is not investi-
gated. I believe that the alternative approach of constructivism gives a richer 
understanding of the relationship between identity and foreign policy and 
will apply this approach to study the question.  
Constructivists question the ontological status of identities and argue that 
instead of being objective realities they are subjects to individual interpreta-
tion and evaluation. Identities are studied as socially constructed phenomena 
that both influence and are influenced by foreign policies. The theoretical as-
sumption that is made is that foreign policies and identities are mutually con-
stitutive phenomena. Another theoretical assumption is that foreign policy 
actors stand in a mutually constitutive relationship to the social context in 
which they appear. The identities of the actors and the foreign policies they 
pursue both affect and are affected by the environment in which they act.  
This thesis will base the analysis of Polish European policy on theories of 
identity construction and constructivism and look into how Polish identity 
and Polish European policy stand in a mutually constitutive relationship to 
each other and to the institutional and cultural environment to which they re-
late. The institutional and cultural environment in which these identities ap-
pear is Europe.  
1.1.2 Method of Analysis 
A common criticism directed at constructivist work is that the presumptions 
on which it rests imply that identities, foreign policies, and institutional and 
cultural environments are in the process of constant change. This compli-
cates any study of them. This problem may be partially solved by the appli-
cation of a particular method of discourse analysis.  
Discourse analysis concentrates on language and the primary units of 
study are statements. Language is not treated exclusively as an unproblema-
tic system of concepts that refers directly to reality, it is also treated as a so-
cial system that has its own logic and that contributes to the constitution of 
different realities (Neumann 2000: 8). Bartelson (1995: 70–71) argues that 
statements cannot be studied in isolation as they  
 
form discourses that are held together by regularities exhibited by the relations 
between different statements; discourse is a system for the formation of state-
ments. […] While autonomous and primary, discourse is caught up in a web of 
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practices; its primacy in relation to them depends on its ability to organize them 
systematically as being essentially discursive practices, that is, systems of state-
ments for the organization of practices.  
 
In other words, discourse may be defined as a particular kind of social sy-
stem that is inherent in language and that conditions what can be meaning-
fully said. On the other hand, statements are organized as discursive practi-
ces that uphold a certain discourse.  
Neumann (2000) defines institutions, representations, and positions as 
central concepts of discourse analysis. The institutionalization of a discourse 
is the formalization of a set of statements and practices that it consists of. 
Institutions endow discourse with materiality and regularity that appear in a 
set of social relations. By inscribing themselves into certain institutions and 
appearing as more or less normal, discourses constitute reality for their bear-
ers. Representation appears between the physically given world and our per-
ception of it, and is the way in which the world appears. More specifically, a 
representation in discourse analysis is the definition of the most important 
set of reality claims that the discourse is comprised of. When the carriers of 
the same representation institutionalize, they make up a position in dis-
course. Representations have to be reproduced by discursive work that con-
sists of the production of statements and practices that confirm the represen-
tations. When a representation obtains a status of being comparatively un-
challenged in discourse, so unchallenged that it appears ‘normal’, there is a 
condition of hegemony.  
The definition of discourse as a system for the formation of statements, 
and the presumption that discourses organize practices as discursive practi-
ces, imply that discourses condition foreign policies. Foreign policies have 
to be organized as discursive practices upholding a certain reality. The writ-
ers of the Copenhagen School argue that the key political ideas that consti-
tute the concepts of state and nation will form the basis of institutionalization 
when the collective self partakes in political cooperation (Neumann 1999: 
30). The principal scholar of the Copenhagen School, Ole Wæver (1998; 
1999), argues that the possible set of European policies that may be put into 
practice is conditioned by domestic discourses on the concepts of state and 
nation, as well as how these concepts relate to domestic discourses on 
Europe. He assumes that state, nation and Europe, that are collective identity 
concepts, are the most central concepts and that they are more stable than 
other concepts that appear in this particular discursive space. Applying this 
method on the Polish case I will look for representations of state, nation, and 
Europe, and how these representations are tied together in discourse.  
1.1.3 The Model 
At the outset I asked the question of what kind Europe do Poles promote? In 
the light of the theory and method I have introduced above, the more precise 
formulation of this question is what are the Polish European policy positions 
and how is the discourse of which they are constitutive parts structured? 
Engaging myself in an analysis of the Polish discourse on Europe I will theo-
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retically be able to explain Polish European policies and be able to make 
some predictions. 
An important element in the Polish discourse on Europe is Polish iden-
tity. In this thesis Polish identity is defined as Polish representations of state 
and nation. Polish representations of state and nation relate to Polish repre-
sentations of Europe. Polish European policy positions are conditioned by 
the structures of these discourses. In order to perform the analysis I will have 
to give an answer to the following research questions: What are the different 
representations of state, nation and Europe in Polish discourse and how do 
these concepts relate? What Polish European policies does the discourse on 
Europe depict?  
At this point I may specify a model that defines the relationships between 
the key concepts that have been identified in the discursive space:  
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1.3 
 
Polish identity, defined as Polish representations of state and nation (box A), 
and Polish representations of Europe (box B) are mutually constitutive enti-
ties (box 1). These constellations have an impact on Polish ideas of what 
kind of political project Europe should be from which the actual policy posi-
tions get their substance (box 2). The relationship between box 1 and 2 is 
recursive. European policy positions do not only affect the processes of re-
presenting state, nation and Europe indirectly through the impact they have 
on the European political construct, but also directly. Note that box A refers 
to the first layer of the discursive space, the layer of Polish identity, and that 
box B refers to the second layer, the relational layer. Box 2 refers to the third 
layer, the layer where we find the Polish policy positions that are derived 
from layer one and two. These are in turn recursively related to box 3 that is 
Europe as such, the environments to which the actors relate. Europe is in its 
turn mutually influenced by the practices of representing the concepts of Eu-
rope, state and nation in Polish discourse.  
1.  
A. Polish repre-
sentations of state 
and nation 
2. Polish 
European 
policy posi-
tions (Polish 
ideas of the 
political 
shape of 
Europe and 
Poland’s 
place in it) 
3.
 
 
 
 
Europe 
B. Polish repre-
sentations of 
Europe 
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1.1.4 Delimitation 
I will not specify nor investigate in detail all the relationships in figure 1. 
The main focus of this study is how the constellations in box 1 put restricti-
ons on the set of options in box 2. I do not deny that other factors influence 
the variables in the model or suggest that the other relations in the model are 
not relevant for the analysis. I just delimit my area and my field of interest to 
the one described above. 
Engaging myself in the analysis of the different and changing meanings 
conveyed by certain concepts, I need to keep other concepts stable. The con-
cept of Catholicism probably conveys a different meaning in Poland today 
than it did only a hundred years ago and at present there may be different 
ways of representing Catholicism in Poland. The same applies for example 
for the concept of Communism. I will nevertheless not engage myself in the 
discourse on other concepts than state, nation and Europe, because this 
would confuse the analysis. 
When I study the policy positions I will concentrate on policies concern-
ing Polish relations with the European Union (EU) as a European political 
project. The political processes within the EU include a wider range of pol-
icy areas, if compared to other European projects, like NATO, OSCE and the 
WEU. In addition the concept of Europe seems widely connected to the EU 
in Polish discourse and is often used synonymously to the EU (Mach 1997: 
43).  
When used in this thesis, the notion of identity is always referring to col-
lective identities. Individual identities are not considered relevant for the 
analysis. I also exclusively speak of political identities because it is the ways 
in which identities are politically constructed in discourse that is relevant to 
my analysis. 
 I have delimited the study thematically to an analysis of Polish European 
policy. The format is too small to provide a full discussion of the Polish rela-
tions with Europe throughout the entire history. I therefore have to delimit 
the time focus of the study. I will concentrate the analysis to the period after 
1989. This year marks a definite shift in Polish European policy and the 
opening of a public debate on Polish integration with European political 
institutions in general, and with the EC/ EU in particular.  
As already suggested, I dedicate a significant amount of time and space 
to the pre-history of the contemporary discourse – to historical representati-
ons of state, nation, and Europe and the policy positions that were derived 
from these. This is a necessary exercise because the discourses of today 
always build upon, and thus cannot be detached from, the discourses of yes-
terday. A discourse analysis that fails to include how certain realities have 
been represented in history, may lose important aspects that might be signifi-
cant for the outcome of the study.  
1.2 Theory 
The following section looks into the theory on which I base my analysis in 
more detail. The first part of the section gives an account of the theories of 
identity formation on which constructivism and discourse analysis base their 
assumptions. I will delimit the part on theories of identity formation to three 
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main assumptions: Identities are constructed, identities are relational, and 
identities are contextually dependent.  
The second part of the section concentrates on constructivist theories of 
identity and foreign policy. It gives a brief presentation of constructivist 
literature on the relationship between identity and foreign policy and points 
out weaknesses and strengths. It argues that foreign policy may be defined as 
a way of constructing boundaries, that identities and foreign policies are 
mutually constitutive, and explains how identities and foreign policies may 
be looked upon as contested projects that deconstruct and displace one 
another. It is argued that all these assumptions have to be taken seriously in 
an analysis of Polish European policy. 
1.2.1 Theories of identity formation 
Theories of identity formation that are applied in FPA and discourse analysis 
build on the tradition of a vast literature from several scholarly traditions. 
Here I will concentrate on theories of particular relevance to foreign policy 
and relate them to the theme of this thesis. The common denominator of 
these theories of identity formation may be summed up by the postulations 
that identities are constructed, relational, and contextually dependent pheno-
mena.   
1.2.1.1 Identities are constructed 
An individual that identifies herself with a certain community rarely has 
direct access to this group. She may feel that she belongs to the Polish nation 
even if she does not know all its constituents. Her identification with the Pol-
ish nation is based on her own subjective evaluations and generalizations. 
She is capable of making such evaluations and generalizations because she 
takes part in social interaction. From what she experiences and absorbs 
through such social interaction she constructs a representation of the Polish 
nation.  
Benedict Anderson (1996) has argued that collective identities, like nati-
ons, are imagined communities that are endowed with meaning through the 
continuous coupling of identity to certain material factors. He calls this 
exercise an act of representing, because factors that initially have a history 
of their own are presented in light of the history of the ‘self’. The process of 
constructing an identity thus presupposes a representation of what makes up 
the ‘self’. An example may be provided by what is called presentism (but it 
might as well have been called representism), which is the art of writing 
“history in terms of the present” (Bartelson 1995: 55). Examples of presen-
tism may be found in history books written after the emergence of modern 
nation-states in the 19th century. Such books often refer to the history of the 
Middle Ages in terms of the modern concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ and may 
be regarded projects of representing history in terms of modern categories in 
order to construct national identities (imagined) and couple them with the 
existence of a state (material factor).  
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1.2.1.2 Identities are relational 
You cannot have an identity without knowing what you are not (Friis 1998: 
132). We say that identities are relational because they do not exist in them-
selves but only in the identity’s relation to difference (Connolly 1991). Put in 
another way: representing a certain self always involves representing a cer-
tain ‘other’. Representations of the ‘other’ are central in the process of selec-
ting the criteria that characterize representations of ‘us’ and that construct 
‘our’ identity (Friis 1998: 133).  
Barth (1969) suggests that the nexus of self and other should be studied 
in terms of the boundary markers of identity. Such boundary markers appear 
in the shape of dichotomies made up of mutually exclusive categories that he 
calls diacritica. Examples of diacritica are Orthodox/Catholic and Polish 
speaker/foreign speaker. The reproduction of boundaries by such markers is 
looked upon as an essential part of identity construction because this is what 
provides identities with substance. In the following analysis we will se seve-
ral examples of how diacritica are constructed as a way of marking a border 
between the Polish ‘self’ and the European ‘other’ as well as between the 
European ‘self’ and various ‘others’.   
Wæver (1998: 104–105; 1999: 36–38) argues that studying identity in the 
shape of self/other relations is less fruitful than if more differentiated sys-
tems of difference are applied. When studying Polish identity and Polish 
European policy one should not only investigate how Polish identity is con-
structed in relation to Europe as the other, but also how Europe as a concept, 
vision and project is included into the Polish ‘we’. We should also study Pol-
ish European identities – how Poles represent Europe as a part of the Polish 
identity. Studying identities in this way also have a normative aspect because 
it does not fire up under antagonisms but rather concentrate on the features 
that unite. 
1.2.1.3 Identities are contextually dependant 
Identities depend on the context in which they appear. Different identities 
are activated in different situations. When relating to Germans and French, a 
Polish identity might be activated. When relating to people from Russia, a 
European identity may override the Polish one. Analyzing identities also in-
volve the investigation into what identities that gain predominance in differ-
ent contexts (Neumann 1998: 53).  
I have already delimited the context of this analysis to the European. 
However, as discourses change, the content of Europe changes, and the con-
text in which the actors appear will never be exactly the same. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the predominance of Polish and European identi-
ties may vary through the time scope of the analysis.  
1.2.2 Constructivism 
Constructivists dedicating themselves to the study of the relationship 
between identity and foreign policy define foreign policy as a way of con-
structing boundaries; a “political practice that makes ‘foreign’ certain events 
and actors” (Campbell 1998: 61). The boundary produced in the making of 
foreign policy is a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. If this boundary had 
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not been continually reproduced, ‘we’ would cease to exist because there 
would be nothing that differentiated ‘us’ from the rest; it would be impos-
sible to locate ‘our’ particular identity. 
The Culture of National Security (Katzenstein: 1996) is an important con-
tribution to constructivist FPA that explores a theoretical framework where 
environmental structures (predominantly institutional and cultural elements) 
are related to the actors’ identities, interests, and policies. A problem with 
the theoretical model on which this volume bases its analysis, a problem that 
seems to apply for most constructivist work, is that the it does not include 
the possibility that foreign policies may reproduce a certain identity directly 
– foreign policies may only change identities indirectly if they succeed in 
changing the environment – the context – to which the actors relate.  
In Writing Security (1998), David Campbell provides a genealogy of the 
mutual relationship between American foreign policy and American identity. 
He argues that foreign policy is not something that is subsequent to the state 
or the interstate system, but integral to its constitution. It is not the bridge 
between two distinct realms, but something that both divides and joins the 
inside and outside, the state and the interstate system (ibid.: 60). Campbell’s 
book provides a genealogy of the dominant representation of American iden-
tity and the foreign policies that reproduce this identity. The problem is that 
his approach does not allow for competing identities. In this way there is no 
room left for studying the processes whereby identities change (Neumann 
1999: 27).  
I will base this analysis on the assumption that identities and foreign pol-
icy are not monolithically constructed projects. On the contrary I believe 
they emerge in a process of discursive battles with other identity and foreign 
policy projects that struggle, clash, deconstruct and displace one another. 
Looking into these battles one may detect how identities are constructed in 
order to subjugate other identity projects. Making this assumption opens up 
the possibility of change. In the next chapter I will explain how this may be 
studied in practice. 
1.3 Method of analysis 
This section explains how I will carry out the analysis and put theory into 
practice. The first part argues that a combined approach of genealogy and 
subjugated knowledges may prove fruitful. The second part takes the three 
steps of discourse analysis proposed by Neumann (2000: 32–60). The third 
part shows how I expect the Polish discursive system to appear and explains 
how I will proceed in order to analyze it. In the fourth part I argue that if we 
want to open up the possibility that discourses change, not only as a result of 
a change in the relative power distribution between a set of positions, but 
also as a result of changing practices of representing, we will have to supply 
the structurally founded framework of the Copenhagen School with a post-
structuralist feedback-loop that consists of institutions, values, and realities 
that uphold the realities of the positions. This approach includes the materi-
ality of discourses into the analysis as an additional factor that endows dis-
courses with stability. Neumann suggests this as a possible fourth step in dis-
course analysis. To take this step adds a poststructuralist critique of the 
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structural conditions of the Copenhagen School to the analysis. The fifth part 
argues that the most appropriate way of locating the discourse is in public 
texts. The sixth and final part of this section discusses the aspects of validity 
and reliability.  
1.3.1 Genealogy and subjugated knowledges 
Milliken (1999) provides an overview and evaluation of different ways of 
performing discourse analysis. Her article concludes that two methodical 
approaches, genealogy and subjugated knowledges, have the greatest poten-
tial in “leading readers to question orientations and actions that they ordinar-
ily take for granted” (ibid.: 243).  
The discursive approach of subjugated knowledges explores alternative 
positions in depth, showing that they are enabled by a discourse that does not 
overlap substantially with the dominant discourse (ibid.: 243). All discourses 
are looked upon as “unstable grids, requiring work to ‘articulate’ and ‘rearti-
culate’ their knowledges and identities (to fix the ‘regime of truth’) and 
open-ended meshes, making discourses changeable and in fact historically 
changing” (ibid.: 230). Scholars working from this position often try to ex-
plain how the alternative accounts are excluded or silenced by a hegemonic 
discourse. 
The genealogical method examines the contingency of contemporary dis-
cursive practices through historical studies of past discursive practices.  
 
[H]istory is not interpreted as a progression leading to the present, but as a series 
of discursive formations that are discontinuous, breaking with one another in 
terms of discursive objects, relations, and their operationalization. Genealogical 
studies thereby emphasize that dominating discourses, including contemporary 
ones, involve relations of power in which unity with the past is artificially con-
served and order is created from conditions of disorder (ibid.: 243).   
 
This study applies a combination of the genealogical method and subjugated 
knowledges. The reason why I want to look at alternative discourses instead 
of sticking to the dominant one is twofold: First, if there is a dominant dis-
course we cannot trust that it will stay dominant. It is therefore important to 
study subjugated discourses in order to know what the alternatives are if the 
dominant discourse loses its dominance. Second, an important concern of 
mine is to investigate the rhetorical weapons the actors use as they try to 
subjugate other discourses and gain dominance. One strategy is to try to 
break down the representations of the challenging discourses. Another is the 
continuous representation of their own realities and, for example, attempts at 
representing them in a way that constructs a unity with the past. Third, some-
times representations in discourse are built on misinterpretations of history 
or representations appear with a hostile bias. An important analytical project 
is to point out such representations and present alternatives that already 
exist, or lie latent, in the discursive space. 
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1.3.2 Three steps in discourse analysis 
Discourse is the sphere that supplies language, such as the concepts of Eu-
rope and Poland, with meaning. I assume that foreign policies take the shape 
of discursive systems that have a certain structure where the identity related 
concepts are the most important. The structures within discursive systems 
condition possible policies. By studying discourse I may derive the actual 
European policy positions and detect the foundations on which these positi-
ons are built.  
Neumann (2000: 32–60) argues that there can be three important steps in 
performing discourse analysis. First you have to select and delimit the dis-
course, second, you have to make an inventory list of the representations that 
exist in the chosen discourse, and third, you have to investigate how the lay-
ers in discourse are structured in relation to each other. In the following I 
will take these steps. 
1.3.2.1 Step one: selection and delimitation of the discourse 
I have already taken the first step proposed by Neumann, that involves limit-
ing the field of study in time and space. I have limited the analysis to the 
study of Polish European policies, more specifically to studying the relation-
ship between Polish identity and Europe, and the main focus is on the period 
between 1989 and 1999, although, as I have argued earlier, a historical back-
ground analysis will be necessary in order to enrich and understand the ana-
lysis of the selected period, to locate the sources of the representations, and 
show how they have developed through history. 
1.3.2.2 Step two: The representations of the discourse 
Step two involves the making of an inventory list of the representations that 
exist in the chosen discourse. Discourses reproduce certain realities, so 
another word for these representations are realities. The chosen discursive 
field will often contain one dominant representation of reality and one or 
more alternative representations. In my case this step involves making a list 
of the existing representations of Europe and the representations of state and 
nation that are linked to them. Doing this I will work in what Milliken (1999: 
234) calls a “grounded way”. I will not selectively choose data according to 
a priori theoretical categories, but build my own categories via empirical 
study and abstraction. On the basis of new data I will see whether these cate-
gories fit and, if necessary, reformulate the categories so that they become 
empirically valid.   
1.3.2.3 Step three: The discursive layers  
Step three concerns the layers in discourse. The question I have to ask here is 
if all the traits of a given representation are equally persistent; how the layers 
are structured in relation to each other. If some traits unite and some traits 
differentiate, it is reasonable to assume that the traits that unite are more dif-
ficult to change.  
Ole Wæver (1998; 1999) divides discursive practices into the following 
categories: The discursive space is the field in time and space sharing a dis-
cursive system. The system is a layered set of key concepts that are socially 
constructed. At each layer, a particularly dense and powerful constellation is 
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defined which he calls a structure. These structures condition possible poli-
cies. The deeper down in the system the layers appear, the more solidly sedi-
mented are they, and the more difficult is it to politicize and change them.  
Wæver suggests a layered model where the concepts of state and nation 
are located at the first and most sedimented layer. The relational position of 
state and nation to concepts of Europe makes up the second layer. This layer 
is assumed to be less sedimented than the first layer, but the structure is rela-
tively stable. The structures of the first and second layers condition the struc-
ture of the third layer that consists of concrete policy positions that tell us 
what political European project that is promoted. In this case the structure 
may be illustrated like this: 
 
Table 1.3.1 
 
3.The policy layer Polish ideas of Europe; concepts related to the content of 
Europe; proposed relations between Poland and Europe 
2.The relational layer Relational perception; how Europe is represented in 
relation to Poland; moral assessments 
1. The identity layer Representations of the state; representations of the 
nation; varying relations between the concepts of the 
nation and the state 
Layer                                    Concepts 
 
Ole Wæver proposes a special set of questions that he suggests one should 
pose in order to analyze the discursive system, its layers, and the relations 
between the different concepts. In the following part I will present these in 
detail and relate them to the Polish case.  
1.3.3 Analyzing the discursive system 
Ole Wæver bases his examples mainly on the French and the German cases; 
however, there should be no difficulties in adapting the framework to the 
Polish case. The following parts will look into the different layers of the dis-
cursive system, as Wæver believes they tend to appear in general in the 
European case, and go through the tools and the questions he believes are 
important to apply in the analysis of each of the layers. 
1.3.3.1 The layer of Polish identity 
The first layer of the discursive system consists of the basic constellations of 
state and nation. Analyzing this layer of Polish identity I have to answer the 
following questions: What is the idea of the Polish nation? What is the idea 
of the Polish state? How are these two concepts tied together?  
Drawing on a long scholarly tradition, Ole Wæver (1999:55–62) suggests 
that two ideal constructions of state and nation may be used as measure 
instruments: The German and the French. The French identity layer consists 
of a fusion of state and nation. The French nation is a political nation and the 
state is the central institution that the nation spins its identity around. There 
is no specific concept of the nation and no specific concept of the state. The 
two stand in a mutually constitutive relationship and cannot be separated. 
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The German basic constellation is quite different from the French. The 
nation and the state are thought of as units that rest in themselves. As con-
cepts they may be thought of independently. The German nation has its 
emphasis in culture, myth and blood. In order to become a member of the 
nation one has to be born into the Kultur-nation. When it comes to thinking 
about the state, in the German case it spins around the Hegelian idea of the 
‘power-state’ that finds it expression in external power projection and raison 
d’état reasoning. German identity is constructed on a foundation where the 
nation is culture and the state is power.  
Wæver suggests we use five main tools when analyzing level one. 
“Firstly, one may ask whether the country in question spins its identity 
around a tight coupling between the nation and the state, as in the French 
case, or whether the two can be thought of independently, as in the German 
one” (ibid.: 59). The second question concerns the criteria of national mem-
bership, or the construction of the nation: “is there trace of a Kultur-nation 
where membership is dependent on birth and culture, or is it a political 
nation which is open, at least in principle, to assimilating new members?” 
(ibid.: 59). For the third, one may look into how the state is constructed 
along two dimensions: the external and the internal one.  
The external part of the state-idea refers to the state’s projection of itself 
onto the world while the internal dimension refers to its projection ‘back-
wards’ onto its constituency. Concerning the external dimension Wæver 
makes a rough distinction between the Hegelian power state, which “sees 
itself as engaging in classical balance of power politics and raison d’état 
logic”, and the negation of this: the anti-power state, which makes “foreign 
policy either a moral enterprise leading to for example peace-keeping and 
support for development policies, or an absence of engagement” (Wæver 
1999: 60). Examples of the internal dimension are the welfare state, the 
liberal-capitalist state, and the socialist state.  
Fourthly, Wæver recommends looking for ‘attachments’ to the idea of the 
nation. Such ‘attachments’ are constructions that are underpinning and sup-
porting the construction of the nation as well as the constellation of the state 
and the nation. In the French case, for example, the patrie is such a concept 
that refers to the emotional bond to the past and cultural roots. Finally, one 
might find other concepts that describe the actual linkages being made 
between the state and the nation, or the nation and its ‘attachment’, such as 
society or the people.  
I will argue that in the Polish case there is a dominant constellation that 
resembles the German Kultur-nation as Wæver describes it. I will call this 
culture nation/power state. However, there is also a challenging constella-
tion that looks more like the French. I will call this political nation–centra-
lized state.   
1.3.3.2 Relational layer 
The second layer is made up of relational perceptions of Poland vis-à-vis 
representations of Europe. Here I have to investigate how the basic constel-
lations from level one are related to representations of Europe. Wæver 
regards the relation between the constellation at level one and the representa-
tion of Europe as comprised by two moves. The first entails a particular 
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articulation of the constellation at level one. This move underpins that 
“while the basic construction of state-nation is providing a highly structuring 
impact on the discourse on Europe, it is not without room for maneuver; 
there is often flexibility or ambiguity connected to the way in which the 
constellation has been fused” (ibid.: 62). Going from level one to level two 
may therefore require revisions in the first layer. The second move concerns 
the relationship established between the particular articulation of the state-
nation construction at level one and representations of Europe. 
I will argue that the statements in this analysis show that when the culture 
nation/power state constellation relates to representations of Europe, it 
involves rearticulating layer one either strengthening or a weakening power 
and/or culture as a way of self-expression on the international arena. I 
believe there are four main ways that the culture nation/ power state relates 
to representations of Europe. One relates to a Europe as a meeting place of 
values and de-emphasizes both power and culture. Another relates to a 
Europe whose values are under constant threat and involves the 
rearticulating layer one in terms of culture as a way of self-expression. The 
third relates to a Europe that is decadent and in decay. This activates both 
power and culture. The fourth relates to Europe as a power, something that 
activates power as a way of self-expression. 
1.3.3.3 The policy layer 
The third layer is made up of the more specific policies pursued by specific 
groups of actors, often political parties. This is the most concrete and per-
haps most important layer of analysis for a number of reasons. Wæver 
argues that it is at this level concrete political actors are found and, secondly, 
that it integrates a dynamic element into the structural model. He suggests 
that actors contest each other in three important ways:  
 
firstly, by arguing that their opponents fail to offer an appropriate construction of 
level one, that they offer a misleading – or even dangerous – interpretation by 
not paying sufficient attention to, for example, the cultural identity of the nation, 
or the necessary bond between the state and the nation. Secondly, the actors 
argue that the ‘Europe’ their opponents construct will pose a threat to the proper 
construction of the state-nation constellation. And thirdly, they claim that their 
opponents’ interpretation of the character of the EU is out of touch with the real-
ity of the EU, that the competing position, in principle, operates with a proper 
construction of the basic state-nation constellation, and that there is, again, in 
principle a sufficient correspondence between this construction and its ‘Europe’, 
but that this is an unrealistic construction given the character of European inte-
gration (ibid.: 64–65). 
  
By studying the discourse at this level we will be able to identify the realities 
the statements reproduce on all layers and thus discover certain European 
policy positions in discourse that define what kind of European political pro-
ject that is promoted and what role Poland should play in it. 
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1.3.4 The materiality of discourse 
As I have suggested earlier, the meaning conveyed by the concepts in dis-
course is in flux. The Copenhagen School solves this problem by suggesting 
that some concepts are more stable and that some layers are more sedimen-
ted than others. The scholars perform a variant of discourse analysis based 
on structural assumptions. The result is that there is little room left for 
explaining how discourses change; how the different identity projects clash 
and coincide, how the discursive practices work not only to perceive the re-
presentations that they uphold, but also how they modify these realities. The 
works of the Copenhagen School supply us with the existing policy positions 
in discourse and the discourse on which they rest, but it is not left any room 
for how the representations change, or even terminate. It is, for example, a 
fact that in Polish discourse today there is no such representation of the na-
tion that defines it exclusively as the nobility. This representation has ex-
pired. In order to enrich the study with this important aspect I will supply it 
with an analysis of the institutions in discourse. 
As I have argued before, the regularities of discourses are being held up 
by social practices. Such systems of rules may not only be discovered in lan-
guage, but they also have a materiality in e.g. institutions. Institutions add 
materiality to discourse in establishing discursive practices that resist 
attempts to change the reality they reproduce. Representations in Polish dis-
course are thus likely to have some kind of social resonance, in one shape or 
another, which makes social practices reproduce them. This adds yet another 
stable element to discourse. Drawing on the work of Janice Bially (1998) 
and Iver B. Neumann (2000), I suggest that these processes may be thought 
of as a feedback-loop.  
The feedback-loop is made up of a certain representation of reality, e.g. a 
certain representation of Poland. Another element is the values that carry this 
reality, e.g. certain notions that differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’, or Europe 
from Poland, e.g. that a Pole is against abortion. These values are reproduced 
socially in a series of practices that coagulate around certain institutions that 
make up the third cluster, e.g. the Catholic Church. These institutions lend 
materiality to the particular reality of Poland represented by e.g. the Catholic 
Church. Resonance enters the picture when subjects act according to repre-
sentations, values and institutions existing in the field (Neumann 2000: 56). 
The example may be illustrated with this feedback-loop: 
 
 
 
 
                                 
  
 
Figure 1.3.4 
 
Institutions (e.g. the 
Catholic Church) 
 
Reality (e.g. Poland) 
 
Values (e.g. against free 
abortion) 
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Reality is always changeable. What it means to be a Pole will always be in a 
state of flux and ‘we’ do not even have to continue being Poles. The feed-
back-loop above may work as an example to illustrate this. To be against 
free abortion may be considered a value that according to a certain position 
represents a Pole. One of the notions that differentiate ‘us’ (Poland) from 
‘them’ (Europe) is to be against abortion. The representation of a Pole in 
terms of being against abortion is provided with materiality by certain insti-
tutions (e.g. the Catholic Church). If alternative structures manage to break 
the feedback-loop presented above, for example that Poles are Europeans 
and liberal defenders of the right of free abortion, the Catholic Church will 
receive some serious hits that will threaten its institutional status as a repro-
ducer of this specific reality. Another scenario is that the Catholic Church 
modifies its values and reproduces a modified version of reality where Poles 
may be defenders of free abortion.  
I argue that in the kind of discourse analysis I will carry out in this thesis, 
it is important to show how values, institutions, and realities are ordered in 
relation to each other. Such a project opens up the bracket of individual 
agency, as well as it opens up for the possibility of change – not only as the 
result of a redistribution of power between a structurally defined set of posi-
tions, but through the process in which the representations in discourse 
change internally. Furthermore, as one of my objective goals is to provide 
you with tentative predictions of future developments in Polish European 
policy, it is important to be able to point out how the positions may change 
internally, not only how the discourse may change as a result of changing 
power between the positions.  
In order to assess the persistence of the positions in discourse I will locate 
the values, institutions, and realities of different positions in discourse and 
look into how the different positions attempt to displace the values, instituti-
ons, and realities of other positions. I will in particular concentrate on politi-
cal parties, but also certain periodicals, organizations, and the Catholic 
Church. I will argue that what kind of relationship that is promoted between 
Poland and Europe at the policy layer depends in particular on the values 
that assess Polish identity in relation to Europe at the second layer. If there is 
a border that is created between the two identities, with diacritical markers, 
the assessment of these markers defines the relationship. If the position re-
produces Polish identity as a European identity, the markers that define this 
common identity will define the promoted relationship. In most cases there 
are combinations of Polish European identities and exclusive Polish identi-
ties. But the exclusive identities may also involve notions that are related to 
Europeanness. For example, as this thesis will show there is a position in 
Polish discourse that represents Poland as more European than the rest of 
Europe and as a ‘bulwark’ against the threats against European values. This 
thesis will show that the relationship with Europe is promoted in a way that 
reproduces the values that define the constellations at layer one and two and 
that in order for the position to change, these are the values that have to be 
modified or crushed.  
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1.3.5 The textual approach 
Covering an entire domestic discursive space is in principle impossible. It is 
therefore necessary to apply certain measures that limit the texts to the ones 
that are highly relevant for the study. It will probably be helpful to start with 
secondary literature (Neumann 2000: 30). Reading this literature it will be 
possible to discover some texts that are canonical in the sense that they are 
often cited and referred to. These texts will be more important for the analy-
sis because they have large reception and hence reproduce reality or change 
the all over frames of reference. Examples of such texts from IR discourse in 
the 1990s are for example Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History?” or Samuel 
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”. In the Polish case the Books of the 
Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage by Adam Mickiewicz ([1832] 1946) 
and the article “A New Evolutionism” by Adam Michnik ([1976] 1985) are 
examples of texts that we might say are canonical.   
Secondly, texts by politicians acting in their official function, but also by 
others who contribute to shaping public discourse, e.g. intellectuals or re-
searchers, will be highly relevant. When reading politicians it is more fruitful 
to select interventions in heated debates where they need to mobilize rhe-
toriccal power, and consequently draw on those semiotic structures that 
generate most meaning for their purpose, instead of negotiated blurred state-
ments like party platforms (Wæver 1998: 115). Empirical research conveys 
that parliamentary debates seem to provide very clear representations of con-
structions of the key positions (Wæver 1999: 68). I will therefore devote a 
large share of the analysis to the study of Polish parliamentary debates and 
supply with articles from newspapers and journals.    
Who are the actors in discourse? In discourse analysis everything that in-
volves the medium of language is looked upon as actions (Neumann 2000: 
29). The actors are therefore everyone who participates in discourse. Proces-
ses that go on in the minds of individuals are difficult to integrate into a for-
eign policy approach and in discourse analysis this is not what is at stake. 
Discourse analysis works on the structural condition and endeavors to derive 
the options among which choices are made. What interests us is which codes 
are used when actors relate to each other. 
In order to analyze politics through discourse I have need of cultural 
competence. I need to be able to read texts in the original language and have 
to be familiar with certain cultural and political rules and codes (ibid.: 29). I 
have studied Central and Eastern European politics with a special focus on 
Poland for the last four years, including one year at the Jagiellonian Univer-
sity in Krakow in Poland. I believe I am familiar enough with Polish culture 
and Polish language to consider myself competent for the task. 
1.3.6 Validity and reliability 
What is the validity of making the concepts state, nation, and Europe 
operational through textual contributions? Could important representations 
be excluded from the analysis due to the textual approach? I have already ar-
gued that representations got to have a certain reception if they shall be able 
to make a difference in discourse. Representations communicated through 
electronic media, through direct speech, or in art, will also, if they have a 
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certain room of resonance in the public, make themselves visible in textual 
contributions. I therefore believe that all relevant constructions may be loca-
ted in text. 
What about the reliability of the data? What if the actors that make the 
statements lie? What if they do not really mean what they say? In discourse 
analysis it is not the truth claim that is crucial when it comes to reliability – 
it is the resonance of the text that is important. To question reliability one 
has to evaluate the resonance of the texts among the public (because it will 
be impossible to cover all texts) and question if all representations are inclu-
ded. I will study texts from various environments and presume that this will 
suffice to cover the whole field. I will emphasize texts written by opinion 
makers and people that are well known in cultural and political life.  
I consider to have analyzed a sufficient amount of texts (the analysis can 
be said to be validated) at the moment when the theoretical categories I have 
generated work for new contributions (Milliken 1999: 234). In this respect it 
is important to announce that if, after my analysis is completed, someone 
brings me a contribution that may not be included into one of my categorical 
sets of representations, I will have to revise it. 
1.4 The chapters 
Discursive practices are historically constructed and confined. History is 
therefore an important analytical instrument. Chapter two provides the pre-
history of the present discourse and presents you with the facts and events 
that are central for the understanding of today’s proposed relationships be-
tween Poland and Europe. It sets out with some general remarks on historical 
analysis and it is argued that one has to read historical analysis critically. 
This is because historical studies are ingredients of institutionalized discur-
sive practices. Historical analyses thus manifest certain positions in dis-
course that sustain certain realities by reproducing particular values and link-
ing them to a certain representation of reality. The main part of the chapter is 
a reading of the Polish history endeavoring to locate the representations of 
state, nation, and Europe that today’s discourse build on and suggest some 
policy positions. The Communist period will be treated in depth, as this per-
iod is closer in time to the more recent discourse, and because I believe it 
may serve as an example of how a discourse, the Communist one, was silen-
ced by discursive practices of actors that institutionalized other representa-
tions. 
Chapter three provides the identity layer and the representational layer in 
the shape I believe they emerge in Poland in the most recent years. The cate-
gories I end up with are based on the constellations I have discovered in the 
material I have studied from the period from 1989 to 1999, but I argue that 
all these categories have roots in history. At the identity layer there are two 
constellations; one that resembles the German one and one that resembles 
the French. I call them culture nation/power state and political nation–cen-
tralized state respectively. I argue that the political nation–centralized state 
has only one way of relating to Europe, a relation in which Europe is repre-
sented as a teacher that teaches Poland how to become European. The cul-
ture nation/power state relates to Europe in four different ways and each of 
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the relations involve either a weakening or a strengthening of power and/or 
culture as a way of self-expression on the international arena.   
The categories are good tools to relate to in chapter four which is an ana-
lysis of the discourse between 1989 and 1999. This chapter locates the con-
stellations presented in chapter three in the most recent discourse, and stu-
dies how these condition the concrete and proposed Polish European policies 
with emphasis on the EU. It is searched for continuity and brakes with his-
tory and investigated how continuance is kept and how breaks occur. It is 
also examined which values certain institutions, mainly political parties, 
reproduce that contribute to the reproduction of the realities in question: 
Poland and Europe. The process in which positions clash and coincide – how 
representations and positions change as a result of the reformulation of val-
ues, realities, and institutions – is also treated. It is argued that the most 
important values that the European policies have to reproduce – the most 
crucial values that the positions have to reproduce in order to sustain the 
position – are those who define how the different constellations of nation 
and state promote themselves on the European (international) arena. These 
feedback-loops are identified and make examples of how the positions may 
change internally. The analysis also provides an example where a position 
has changed in the course of the decade. 
The fifth and last chapter summarizes the main findings of the analysis 
and makes some concluding remarks. 
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2.0 The heritage 
 
The foreigners speak of us as obsessed with our past. Even if they somewhat 
exaggerate, we ourselves tacitly admit to a slight infatuation with Clio, particu-
larly when she is clothed in white and red. History is an important and serious 
concern among us – it is present in the everyday life of the people and citizens, 
the society and the nation. [It] is everywhere in our country and it pulses with 
authentic life (Lepkowski 1984). 
 
All statements are implicitly depending on history and on the discourses that 
precede the contemporary one. The language used in the present is always 
affected by the language of the past. A good discourse analysis can therefore 
not ignore the pre-history of the discourse in question. Another methodical 
argument for dedicating a whole chapter to history is that I have decided to 
take a combined approach of subjugated knowledges and genealogy, and 
genealogy is exactly the investigation into how the power of a certain dis-
course depends on how it conserves a certain unity with the past. There is 
also an empirical argument. In the epigraph it is suggested that history is of 
particularly great importance in Poland. Andrzej Walicki (1990: 21) main-
tains that the Poles are living “with the entire burden of history on our shoul-
ders, without being able to forget about the past, or liberate ourselves from 
its omnipresent influence”. Because of this, he argues, little analysis on Pol-
ish politics and society can be done without taking the historical dimension 
into account. Statements like these are flourishing in Poland and suggest that 
there is a central representation of Poland where historical consciousness is 
an important value.  
All kinds of discursive practices are selections of facts and events. Facts 
are accepted truths. It is a fact that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
was multicultural. When this fact is evoked in the present, it anchors the tra-
dition of the Polish state in multiculturalism. It is also a fact that the popula-
tion of the Kingdom of the Piast dynasty was relatively homogeneous in the 
cultural sense. When this fact is evoked in the present, it links the Polish 
state to a homogeneous population.  
An event is a happening that may be represented in different ways. When 
the event that the Pope baptized Mieszko of the Piast dynasty is evoked in a 
statement on Poland’s relation to Europe, it becomes part of a distinct discur-
sive practice of representing Poland and Europe, and the relations between 
them, in terms of the common value of Christianity. If the statement evokes 
the event of the Warsaw uprising in 1944, it becomes part of a discursive 
practice of representing Europe in terms of fraud, because the dominant 
representation of this event is that in the Warsaw uprising Europe failed to 
come to Poland’s rescue. Discursive practices are in other words shaped by 
the ways in which an event is and has been coupled to material factors in 
order to endow it with meaning; the ways in which it is represented and has 
been represented through history.  
As this chapter will reveal, when the modern conception of state and 
nation developed in the 19th century, Poland as a territorial entity did not 
exist. What used to be the Polish lands belonged to three partitioning pow-
ers: the Russian, the Habsburg/Austro-Hungarian, and the German empires. 
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The partitioning powers were, and are still, often represented as repressive 
and foreign systems that deprived the Poles from their independence, sover-
eignty and freedom. The same applies for certain representations of the 
Communist regime. Much thinking on state and nation in Poland has there-
fore been dedicated to explaining why the Poles were deprived of their free-
dom, how the nation should be organized in order to regain sovereignty and 
independence, as well as how to resurrect Polish statehood. Such thinking 
has formed the basis of different historical schools and literary movements, 
like idealism, realism, romanticism, Messianism, and positivism. These 
schools and movements are examples of institutionalized discursive practi-
ces that uphold certain realities by reproducing particular values and should 
be studied as such. 
This chapter provides you with facts and events from Polish history that 
are relevant for today’s discourse on Europe. It also presents you with the 
legacy of Polish representations of state, nation, and Europe. I have chosen 
to start my presentation of Polish history with the baptism of Mieszko, as 
this is the first juncture where I have managed to find an intersection 
between the concepts of Poland and Europe in the material on which I base 
my analysis. 
2.1 The roots of the Polish state and nation 
Today, the dominant representation of the Polish state seems to trace its 
beginning back to the baptism of Mieszko in 966. Mieszko was the chief of a 
tribe called Polanie2 whose members are commonly represented as the pre-
decessors of the Polish nation. Most history books ignore the periods before 
966, or treat them only in brief with some remarks on climate and topo-
graphy, and maybe a few references to the various  tribes that inhabited what 
later became the territory of the Polish Kingdom. It should be clear, how-
ever, that in this period we speak neither of a Polish state in the modern 
sense of the word nor of a Polish nation. Neither was Europe a concept that 
was in common use in this period. 
In the following section I will present you with what we may call the pre-
history of the representations of the Polish state and nation, the concept of 
Europe, and Polish relations to Europe. As I do not have direct access to ori-
ginal material from this period, and as one of the purposes of my thesis is to 
show you how history is represented, I base the first section of the chapter on 
how Polish history is commonly represented in recent books and articles on 
Polish history. In later sections I will also bring contemporary statements 
into the analysis, and all the way I will attempt to take a critical approach to 
the material and try to distinguish the representations and the positions they 
suggest. 
                                                     
2  Polanie and Poland are believed to come from the Slav word pole meaning plain. 
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2.1.1 Piast 
Mieszko was a member of the Piast3 dynasty and his son, Bolesław the 
Brave, became the first crowned king of Poland in 1025. The administration 
was centralized and Christianity was consolidated. Although the early Piast 
kings ruled an autonomous kingdom, they were under considerate pressure 
from the Holy Roman Empire of Germany that they both cooperated with, 
especially in the ecclesiastical sphere, and fought numerous wars against. 
During a period of fragmentation and feudal divisions (1138–1295) the 
Polanian princes fought the Teutonic order that had established itself as a 
power in the northern realm. Blessed with the papal mission to convert the 
Lithuanians, the order made far more success conquering land. In addition to 
this menace, the Polanian princes faced threats from the east and the west. 
The Mongols, who invaded the Polanian territories in the 13th century, de-
storyed many cities and murdered large shares of the population. This 
opened up for the Drang nach Osten that involved the rebuilding of de-
stroyed cities under German auspices and the introduction of German law. 
Added to the economic power of the Hanseatic League, this strengthened 
German influence in the Polish territories.  
The kingdom of the early Piasts was linguistically relatively homogene-
ous, with the exception of Jewish and German settlements in the towns. 
After the period of feudal division, a centralized administration was restored. 
Kazimierz the Great (king 1333–1370) freed himself for expansion to the 
east by resigning Silesia to the Luxembourgs, and by the time of his death in 
1370 he had gathered large parts of Ruthenia under Polish rule, thus regain-
ing in the east what he had lost to the west. Ruthenians and other Slav min-
orities were incorporated into the kingdom. The Jewish community in-
creased as the kings encouraged Jewish refugees from the German Empire to 
settle in Poland.  
Historical analyses of this period seem to agree that the main threat came 
from the Holy Roman Empire of Germany and the Teutonic knights4. The 
administration of the Polish Kingdom was rather centralized and the popula-
tion predominantly Catholic and Polish speaking. To the extent we may talk 
about clear borders, they were located about where they are today. A study 
made by Kristian Gerner (1998) shows that the legacy of the Piast dynasty, 
as well as the heritage of the subsequent Jagiellonian dynasty, that will be 
presented in the following part of this section, have been cemented in Polish 
discourse as concepts describing specific traditions of thinking about the 
Polish state in relation to Europe. While the Polish state traditions of the 
Piast dynasty is based on a western orientation, a location at Europe’s core, a 
centralistic state structure, the acceptance of subordination, Catholic religion, 
and a relatively homogenous population, the Jagiellonian tradition is based 
on an eastern orientation, a location at Europe’s frontier, a federal state 
structure, a position of dominance, as well as on pluralism and multicultural-
ism.  
                                                     
3  Piast was probably an authentic person and is believed to have been a farmer, but the 
name is believed to be a later construction derived from the Polish verb piastować, mean-
ing to “cradle in ones arms” (Borucki 1998: 10).  
4  In discourse the multinational Teutonic power is often represented as a predecessor of 
Prussia and Germany. 
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2.1.2 Jagiełło 
Lithuania accepted Catholicism from Poland in 1386 with the marriage 
between Queen Jadwiga of Poland and Prince Jagiełło of Lithuania. The Pol-
ish Kingdom and the Duchy of Lithuania were considered equals partners of 
a personal union. The event may be interpreted as a common need to gather 
forces against the Teutonic knights (Borucki: 33; Davies 1991: 116) and in 
this respect it was indeed a success. The victory at the battle of Grunwald in 
1410 contained the expansion of the Teutonic knights and a good hundred 
years later King Zygmunt (1506–1548) turned the Teutonic realm into a se-
cular fief of the Polish Kingdom.   
Jagiełło established the Jagiellonian dynasty under which the Polish-
Lithuanian Union became a major force ruling territories stretching from the 
Baltic to the Black and the Adriatic seas. The Polish-Lithuanian Union made 
up the largest empire of Christendom at the time, and emerged as a leading 
force in the fields of science, literature, and learning. There was a burst of 
economic activity and material wealth flourished.  
The Polish-Lithuanian Union was populated by a multicultural and multi-
lingual mass of people. Less than 50% were Catholics, about 30% were 
Uniates and the rest were Jews, Orthodox and, after the Reformation, Prote-
stants (Davies 1991: 162). The largest language communities were the Pol-
ish, the Ruthenian, the Lithuanian, and the German. This multiculturalism is 
often used as an explanation of the great religious tolerance that supposedly 
existed in the Kingdom.  
2.1.3 The emergence of a national consciousness 
During the period of feudal divisions, regional assemblies had been held in 
order to advice the Polanian princes. When a central authority reemerged in 
the early 14th century, the king gave up his absolute powers and started to 
consult a general assembly, the Sejm5, in order to increase his support. When 
Poland joined Lithuania in a union, the monarch was to be elected. In reality 
the title was hereditary until the death of the last Jagiellonian king. The lead-
ing role in the Sejm was played by the szlachta6, the Polish nobility. Every 
nobleman had the right to own land, enjoyed reduced tax obligations, was 
eligible to the Sejm as well as to the throne, and had the right to vote. These 
political rights were embodied in the notion Natio Polonica to which every 
nobleman belonged regardless of confession, ethnic origin, or language. 
With time, the nobility developed a common identity based on their political 
privileges. In other terms, we may say that the Polish nation was a political 
community where loyalty to the Polish political tradition was the central ele-
ment. 
The Polish-Lithuanian Union was decentralized. The regional Sejmiki7 
decided all matters of local importance and elected and instructed their own 
representatives to the Sejm. The Lithuanian nobility had their own political 
system, but matters concerning both countries were settled jointly. Besides 
                                                     
5  The Polish word Sejm comes from a Slav term that means ‘big rally’. 
6  The Polish word szlachta is believed to come from the German slecht that means kinship; 
family. 
7  Sejmik is the diminutive of Sejm and literally means a small Sejm. 
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proclaiming laws the Sejm fixed taxation, controlled the administration and 
the finances of the kingdom, and received reports from foreign ambassadors 
and envoys. It also decided on important foreign policy issues, especially on 
questions concerning peace and war. The king was prohibited from declaring 
war, because it was believed that this right could make him pursue personal 
or dynastic ambitions. In 1505 the Sejm codified a parliamentary practice 
called Nihil Novi (Nothing New), a resolution that obliged the king to refrain 
from introducing any changes in the established system without the agree-
ment of the Sejm. Nihil Novi drastically reduced the powers of the monarch 
and opened for a system of noble democracy. 
With the Union of Lublin (1569), Lithuania and Poland were united as 
the Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów (The Commonwealth of Two Nations), 
a name that emphasized the equality of the Polish and Lithuanian nations 
(defined as the Polish and Lithuanian nobility). English texts on Polish his-
tory commonly replace Rzeczpospolita with “republic”; however, the direct 
translation of the word is “common good”. Historians who choose to trans-
late Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów with “the Commonwealth of two Nati-
ons” thus provide a better understanding of the meaning this word seems to 
have expressed in this period. In the Rzeczpospolita Poland and Lithuania 
were joined under a common foreign and security policy coordinated by a 
jointly elected ruler and a joint Sejm, but kept a set of dual administrative 
offices on all levels. They had a joint customs and monetary union, but kept 
their own treasuries. Although Poland and Lithuania per definition were equ-
als of a federation, Poland was the stronger part when it came to political 
power and cultural influence. Polish was increasingly used as the administra-
tive language of the Rzeczpospolita and the Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobil-
ity in the eastern territories adopted Polish language in order to distance 
themselves from the local peasants (Törnquist-Plewa 2000: 13). 
The resolutions of the Sejm were enacted according to the principle of 
consensus – each representative had the right to liberum veto. The right to 
veto was based on the belief that an individual member of the Sejm had the 
moral duty to resign private or minority interests for the benefit of the com-
mon good of the Polish nation. If he had the courage to use the right of free 
protest to rule out the will of the majority, it was assumed that his motivation 
emerged from the conviction that the proposed law would inhibit the realiza-
tion of the common good, and his veto had to be respected. The same idea 
justified the right to form a confederation, which was an expression of the 
individual nobleman’s right to oppose the Sejm and the king. A confedera-
tion took the shape of an armed association of men, sworn to pursue their 
grievances until justice was obtained, and was a kind of legalized form of 
civil war undertaken in the name of the common good; by nobles acting in 
the defense of the law and conscious of its protection.  
The political system of the period may be thought of as the institutionail-
zation of a set of discursive practices upholding a hegemonic representation 
of the nation where anti-authoritarianism and egalitarian principles were cen-
tral values. The king, the members of the Sejm, and the rest of the nobility, 
were considered equal members of the Polish nation. Every member of the 
nation was eligible to the Sejm and also had the theoretical possibility to be 
elected king. Each individual member had the right to pursue overthrowing 
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the king and the Sejm, institutions that today are part of the state concept, if 
he thought they were menacing the common good of the nation. It was ex-
pected that all members of the nation would give up personal or minority 
interests for the sake of the common good of the nation. The rights to veto 
and confederate were rarely practiced during the 15th, 16th and 17th century. 
Against this background we may say that the political system of the 
Rzeczpospolita succeeded in reproducing a set of values that represented the 
Polish nation as a moral community.   
2.2 A Catholic Poland in a Christian Europe 
The following section will look into the period from the end of the 16th cen-
tury to the partitions that found place in the end of the 18th century. It is 
common to perceive the end of the 16th century as the beginning of a Polish 
time of troubles. A combination of a difficult political situation both inter-
nally and externally was accompanied by economic difficulties and a relative 
decline in political power.  
In this period we see a consolidation of a representation of Europe as a 
Christian community. Christianity also becomes a part of the representation 
of the Polish nation, as well as the belief that the nation has a mission in 
Europe defending its Christian values. Towards the end of the period these 
thoughts are contested by the representation of Europe that was introduced 
with the Enlightenment and the definition of a certain nation as the people 
inhabiting a certain state.  
2.2.1 Bulwark 
We may trace the political differentiation of a Christian community back to 
the Middle Ages. This project necessitated the construction of a border, the 
definition of a sui generis frontal zone, separating Christianity from heathen, 
Moslem, and schismatic countries (Olszewski 1992: 72). As Christianity 
progressed, new countries joined the Christian community and became so-
called finis (bordering states) or antemurales (bulwarks) christianitatis (of 
Christendom). This status proved that the country was involved in the con-
stant defense of the Christian community against invasion by pagan neigh-
bors. Wars waged against pagan invaders were not only justified as wars 
defending the frontier country, but also as wars protecting states lying deep 
inside the community (Krzyżaniakowa 1992: 3). 
Europe as a term began to be used frequently and took on political impor-
tance only after Christendom had been politically fractured under the strain 
of the Ottoman onslaught (Neumann 1999: 44). In the 16th century the 
dominant representation of Europe in Polish discourse was as a Christian 
community and Poland was commonly represented as a “bulwark” (przed-
murze) of Christendom. This representation could theoretically have worked 
in an integrating manner with room for all variants of Christianity, but in 
practice the representation seems to have been predominantly reproduced by 
the institutions of the Polish Counter-Reformation and thus involved the 
safeguarding of Catholicism (Olszewski 1992: 72–73). This representation 
brought with it a strong anti-Russian rhetoric: Moscow was regarded as a be-
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trayer of the Roman Catholic Church and an uncertain partner in the family 
of Christian states. The Turks were characterized as enemies of the Holy 
Cross and the adversaries of the whole of Christianity (Sejm resolutions 1690 
and 1634 cited by Olszewski 1992:76). 
Poland was involved in many wars during the 16th and 17th centuries and 
all of them were in one way or another legitimized as wars to fight paganism 
and reactivate Catholicism (Cyrnarski 1992: 33). Zygmunt III Wasa (King 
1587–1632) planned to establish a close alliance with the Habsburgs in order 
to jointly fight for the reactivation of Catholicism in Northern and Eastern 
Europe. A period of 60 years of warfare between the Poles and the Swedes 
followed, culminating in what is called the Deluge (Potop). One of the few 
strongholds of resistance against the Swedes was the monastery at Jasna 
Góra in Częstochowa. Within the walls of the monastery was an icon of 
Virgin Mary famous for its miraculous powers. After the war she was 
ascribed the miraculous capacity of saving Poland from oppression by for-
eign powers and the king organized a ceremony in which he declared Virgin 
Mary ‘Queen of Poland’ (Törnquist-Plewa 1992: 34). Through the 17th cen-
tury many kings tried to organize crusades against Turkey, and in 1621, after 
the successful battle against the Turks at Chocim, Pope Urban VIII is sup-
posed to have proclaimed that Poland was an antemurale christianitas 
(bulwark of Christendom) (Wilamowski et al. 1998: 113). The bulwark 
metaphor is actively used today and, as I will argue in subsequent chapters, 
the idea that Poland is the protector of European values still defines a posi-
tion in Polish discourse.  
2.2.2 Sarmatism 
In the 16th century a theory was launched purporting that the szlachta was 
descending from Sarmatians who had enslaved the peoples inhabiting the 
areas around the Wisła and the Volga rivers. While other peoples interming-
led with slaves, prisoners and aliens, the Sarmatians allegedly managed to 
keep themselves of pure ethnic stock (Prizel 1998: 43).  
Sarmatism represented the Polish nation and the Polish state as superior 
to the rest of Europe and the noble republic as a perfect political system of 
God designated by him to the Polish nation. The author Andrzej 
Maksymilian Fredo (1620–1679) claimed that the creation of the political 
system of the Rzeczpospolita was ascribed to God, that God had designed a 
different model of existence for the Poles and therefore protected their faith 
(Cynarski 1992: 34). Poland was represented as the granary of Europe and 
the Sarmatian nobility adopted the representation of Poland as a bulwark of 
Christian Europe. It was argued that the Western monarchies did not present 
a threat. On the contrary they would rather protect Poland, as they were con-
sciously aware of the fact that the Rzeczpospolita defended them from 
assaults of the infidel (Walicki 1994a: 11).  
The Sarmatic representation of the Polish nation was more exclusive than 
the political definition, making Polish language and Catholicism imperative 
values. It was believed that the Polish nation was unique because of its faith, 
courage, and love of freedom. Any reform aiming at changing the contempo-
rary political system would destroy these values. The Rzeczpospolita was 
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believed to be different from other European countries that had instituted the 
principle of absolutist monarchy or were experimenting with revolutionary 
ideas of bringing the masses of the people to power. When the thoughts of 
the Enlightenment established a firm basis among the Polish political elite, 
they constituted a serious challenge to the Sarmatist representations.  
Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the differences within the noble 
estate had been rapidly increasing. In the 18th century political power 
seemed to be concentrated to a handful of nobles called magnates. On some 
occasions the magnates appeared to have more loyal subjects in their service 
than the king himself and they often made decisions going against the king’s 
preferences. Such ventures at times took the shape of confederations backed 
by foreign powers. Foreign powers also bought votes from the nobles in 
order to paralyze the Sejm. The extensive use of the right to confederate and 
veto impeded political reforms and produced a political deadlock.  
2.2.3 The Polish Enlightenment 
The thoughts of the Enlightenment were in many ways opposed to Sarmat-
ism and politicized the identity layer as it brought about different representa-
tions of Europe, state, nation, and the relations between these concepts. The 
values, realities, and institutions of the Polish Enlightenment challenged the 
representations of the Sarmatist nobility. The Enlighteners often made fun of 
the Sarmatist nobility, like Stanisław Kostka Potocki, who in Podróz do 
Ciemnogrodu (A Journey to Ignoranceville) accused it of being ignorant, 
backward and full of prejudice against the outside world (Jedlicki 1999: 15). 
Enlightenment thought was rationalistic and promoted relativism and 
humanism. This undermined the representation of Poland as the frontier wall 
of Christendom as well as the representation of Europe as a Christian com-
munity. Industrialism was opposed to the belief in the centrality of agricul-
ture. The definition of the nation as all the inhabitants threatened the privi-
leged position of the nobility. The definition of freedom as something rely-
ing on an enlightened form of constitutional monarchy was in contrast to the 
values of noble democracy where the concept of freedom was coupled with 
the noble privileges. The Polish Enlightenment may in part be thought of as 
the institutionalization of a set of discursive practices aiming at breaking the 
feedback loop of Sarmatist values, institutions, and realities.   
The enlightened elite tended to represent Europe as a civilization of mod-
ern thought and development. They blamed what they perceived as Polish 
backwardness in relation to the rest of Europe on the Sarmatist szlachta 
because they believed that this group preserved a regime that denied Poland 
access to Europe; to development in pace with the civilization to which 
Poland really belonged. The institution of law was regarded as a guarantee 
for the freedom among nations and peoples and it was argued that only if the 
natural rights of man were made universal, peace and prosperity would pre-
vail. The Polish Enlighteners described the nation in terms of land, language, 
and historic relics while “governments, laws, arms, customs, education and 
sciences – together with reason and civilization – are shared by all nations” 
(Staszic quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 27). The process of reform would have to 
be accompanied by the construction of a strong national identity among all 
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the inhabitants of the state. This necessitated an educational program that in 
addition would homogenize the population culturally and linguistically.  
The Polish Enlightenment represented a different relationship between 
the state and the nation. The nation was defined in a broader sense as all 
those inhabiting the Polish state. It was contended that the state first had to 
be strong and centralized under a hereditary monarch in order to integrate 
the nation as a political entity, but the goal was that the people would be 
enlightened so that they could become active and responsible citizens with 
political rights and duties. Europe was represented in terms of civilization 
and constitutional law regulating the relationship between the state and the 
nation. 
The Polish Enlighteners believed that Poland, surrounded by strong and 
powerful neighbors, was too weak to stand on its own feet without the sup-
port of one of the surrounding powers. Stanisław August Poniatowski, a 
protégée of Empress Catherine II of Russia, was elected king in 1764 and 
while accepting Russian influence he aspired to maximize independence in 
internal affairs. Together with his advisors and the Monitor8 group, he made 
efforts to carry out reforms that would remove the most obvious disadvan-
tages of the system of magnate oligarchy, the most important perceived as 
the abolishment of the liberum veto, strengthening the monarchical institu-
tion and making it hereditary, and helping Poland out of economic and cul-
tural backwardness (Jedlicki 1999: 4 and 46). 
In 1772 large shares of Polish territory were distributed between Russia, 
Austria and Prussia in the first Polish partition. In 1791, on 3 May, a new 
liberal Constitution was enacted that removed the liberum veto, made the 
throne hereditary, limited the influence of the magnates, extended burghers’ 
rights, and put the peasants under legal government protection. The text of 
the document emphasized the “unity of the nation” and replaced the concept 
of “the two nations” (Poland-Lithuania) with the “Polish nation”, thus aban-
doning the idea of federalism for the idea of a unitary state-nation (Walicki 
1989: 72–73). The conservative faction of the nobility opposed the Constitu-
tion and some of them confederated at Targowica. Until today Targowica 
stands as a symbol of treason when Poles, following their own private inter-
ests, allied with a foreign power and brought about the disintegration of the 
Polish state.  
With the blessing of the Russian Empress the Targowica confederates 
succeeded in banning the reforms of the enlighteners. In 1793 Poland was 
partitioned for the second time. In 1794 reformists as well as revolutionary 
groups joined forces in the Kościouszko uprising, supported by Stanisław 
August, aiming at restoring Polish independence. Russian forces brought 
down the uprising, the Constitution of 3 May was abolished, and Poland was 
wiped off the map by a third partition in 1795. 
2.3 Partitions 
The period of partitions lasted from 1795 to 1918. This is the same period in 
which the modern concepts of state and nation were defined and consoli-
                                                     
8  Monitor (1765–1785) was a Warsaw journal propagating the philosophical and moral 
ideas of the Enlightenment. 
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dated in European discourse. The Polish discourse was influenced by these 
thoughts and was characterized by battles over what kind of Poland that 
should be revived when independence was reestablished. 
Enlightenment thought was mixed with an idealistic and revolutionary 
movement in the Polish legions. The Polish legions reproduced a representa-
tion of Europe as the guarantor of universal law and national freedom. The 
National Romantic Movement opposed the representation of Europe as the 
guarantor of universal law and instead represented it as a sphere of regress 
and a threat to Christianity and Polish values. The positivist movement that 
emerged in the 1870s revitalized the representation of Europe as a progres-
sive civilization and promoted Polish association with European civilization 
as a precondition for Polish national existence. The romantic trend was invi-
gorated towards the end of the 19th century and sustained the representation 
of Europe as a sphere of decadence and decay moving towards the edge. 
2.3.1 A Europe of national freedom  
The Polish legions fought for the freedom of all European nations under the 
banner za wolność wasza i nasza (for your freedom and ours). The legions 
were institutions representing Europe in terms of universal values manifested 
by Enlightenment thought with national freedom as the core value. The 
legionnaires believed in a universal revolution in which all the nations of 
Europe, including Poland, would be freed from slavery. It believed that 
Poland would receive help from the rest of Europe in resurrecting national 
freedom, in terms of the resurrection of Polish statehood, and that this would 
be achieved in a European revolution against absolutism.  
The hymn of the legions operating in Italy under the auspices of 
Napoleon later became the Polish national anthem. The text is a good illu-
stration of the credo of the freedom fighters: Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła, póki 
my żyjemy (Poland is not yet lost, as long as we live). In other words, as long 
as the nation is alive and the will to fight for national freedom lasts, Poland 
will also exist. We see that at this moment in time there had been a separa-
tion between the concepts of state and nation. The existence of a Polish 
nation did not require the existence of a Polish state; it was the will of its 
people that counted. This may of course be interpreted as a result of the fact 
that Poland as a state did not exist at the time and that the only possibility of 
preserving the reality of a Polish nation was a redefinition of the relationship 
to the state. We may say that there was a need to institutionalize the values 
that depicted the reality of the Polish nation in another shape than the state. 
Representing the nation as an entity that justified itself on the international 
arena by promoting European values did this.  
The legionnaires’ representation of Poland as a nation fighting for the 
freedom of other nations was easily adapted to the representation of Poland 
as a defender of Christian Europe as well as to the historical legacy of the 
wars of the 16th and 17th centuries when Poland was represented as the 
defender of Christian Europe against the onslaughts of the infidels. The dif-
ference was that this time Europe was not represented in terms of Christian 
values. Europe was first and foremost represented as the defender of univer-
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sal law and national freedom. Europe was a bastion of Enlightenment and 
rationalism. 
2.3.2 Bridge 
The representation of Europe as the guarantor of national freedom had a 
variant that took a more reformist approach than the legionnaires. Prince 
Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861) believed in the institutionalization of 
the universal principles of the Enlightenment in “a supra-national institution” 
in which all nations will have their representatives and whose aim would 
consist in mediating and arbitrating in international conflicts. This would 
start out as an all-European organization whose first task would be to liqui-
date all kinds of national oppression. Czartoryski did not believe in revoluti-
ons or national insurrections. In contrast he thought that European integra-
tion could only be reached in understanding with the empires and in this pro-
cess Poland could serve as a “bridge between the East and the West” (quoted 
in Walicki 1994b: 85). 
Czartoryski’s statement shows how the West and the East served as 
representations of the civilized and the less civilized, but also that he regar-
ded both these spheres as parts of Europe. The metaphor of Poland as a 
“bridge between the East and the West” could be amended to the previous 
representation of Poland as a country spreading European values to the East 
in terms of Christian values. The reformist approach of Czartoryski and the 
metaphor of Poland as a bridge have, as we will see later, remained in Polish 
discourse up till today and defines a position in the Polish discourse on 
Europe. 
2.3.3 Pagan Europe 
In the beginning of the 19th century it became increasingly popular to repre-
sent the Polish nation as a “Christ of Nations” suffering for the sake of 
Europe. The martyr image and the allusions to Poland as a Messiah of 
Europe characterized a Polish romantic tradition called Messianism. Adam 
Mickiewicz explicitly formulated the representation in 1832 in his Books of 
the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage (Ksiengi narodu polskiego i 
pilgrzymstwa polskiego). “In the beginning there was only one God and 
there was freedom in the world”, but then the rulers of Europe created new 
idols for their people to worship; the French bowed to “Honor”, or the 
Golden Calf; the Spaniards to “Political Power”, or Baal; the English to “Sea 
Power and Commerce”, or Mammon. God sent them the greatest punish-
ment, which was slavery. Surrounding Poland, the only nation that had not 
resigned the one and only true God and thus was the embodiment of “Free-
dom”, was a “satanic trinity”. This trinity decided to slay and bury “Free-
dom”.  
 
But the Polish nation did not die. Its body lies in the grave; but its spirit has de-
scended into the abyss, that is into the private lives of people who suffer slavery 
in their country. But on the third day the soul shall return again to the body, and 
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the Nation shall arise, and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery 
(Mickiewicz [1832] 1946: 42).    
 
The statement represented Europe in terms of absolutism and decay. It fused 
the Sarmatian image of the Polish nation as morally, culturally, and politi-
cally superior to other nations with the idea that it had the sacred mission to 
protect the freedom of Europe. This freedom could only be secured by the 
return to the universal law of Christianity. The European powers were repre-
sented as morally and culturally corrupt and only Poland, which had kept 
itself pure, had the potential to bring freedom back to Europe in terms of a 
salvation. The statement represents the historical event of the partitions in 
terms of a spiritual mission given to the Polish nation. 
It is worth noting that Mickiewicz represents the Polish state, the body, as 
the worldly part of a higher substance, the soul, which represents the nation. 
The state and the nation are one but at the same time separated. The state-
ment idealizes the Polish state as it had been before the partitions. “Free-
dom” symbolizes the noble republic and it is suggested that Poland should 
be resurrected with “two souls in one body”, the other soul representing the 
Lithuanian nation.  
National romanticism propagated a definition of the nation that de-
emphasized the empirical in favor of the spiritual and moral. Maurycy 
Mochnacki wrote that the “essence of the nation is not a collection of people 
living on a territory defined by certain borders, but rather the collection of 
their own ideas, feelings, and thoughts” (quoted in Porter 2000: 20). Poland 
existed because the Polish people existed, but the representation of the 
nation also worked on a deeper level: the nation was fundamentally the 
representation of a moral principle. Mochnacki believed that the nation pos-
sessed a coherent existence that transcended the disparate accumulation of 
ideas, feelings, and thoughts; the nation was moving towards the realization 
of an inner telos, towards greater perfection. The nation was the representa-
tion of a universal ideal (Porter 2000: 21).    
Among the national romanticists there was a tendency to reject the 
thoughts of the Enlightenment, especially those of universal laws and rules 
of government, as foreign elements that interrupted Polish national history 
and impeded the nation from realizing its own biography and identity 
(Jedlicki 1999: 18–20). Joachim Lelewel, one of the most important political 
ideologues of the national romantic movement, created a myth asserting that 
ideas perceived as the foundations of European freedom, equality, and frater-
nity, as well as republican democracy, originated in the traditions of the Pol-
ish nation and the Polish Rzeczpospolita, thus the Poles could claim priority 
over the French and the English (Jedlicki 1999: 33). Poland had nothing to 
learn from the West. On the contrary, the contemporary West, decayed as it 
was, should learn from Poland. The position of Lelewel was ‘the Polish 
way’; Poland should restore the political system as it had been before the 
partitions and should keep itself clean from influence from the West. The 
primary threat against the nation was the collapse of the original national 
features that had developed from within. 
The romantic tradition modified the Sarmatist representations of the nati-
on and the state. Some still maintained that only the nobility comprised the 
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nation up to the 20th century, but with time they allowed for other layers of 
society to be included into the concept of the nation as well. This may be ex-
plained as a result of the dissolution of the szlachta as an institution repro-
ducing the nation. The romantic tradition tended to represent Europe as a 
Christian community, only that today, it was claimed, Europe was decadent 
and decayed. 
2.3.4. Uprisings 
The Polish patriots, understood as those striving for the resurrection of a Pol-
ish state, both Enlighteners and romanticists, joined forces on several occasi-
ons during the 19th century. In 1830 they united in the November uprising 
that was brought down by the Russians in 1831. In the 1830s, with the out-
break of the uprising, a delegate to the Sejm stated:  
 
Europe is looking at us. Yes, Europe may admire us, but it will also judge us. 
[…] European critics will observe, scrutinize, and judge all our steps. […] We 
are still novices in constitutional education, but the degree of statute in the hier-
archy of the civilized nations will depend on or statute of national representation 
(quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 16).  
 
The delegate represented the relationship between Poland and Europe as that 
of learning. The representations of Poland as a ‘novice’ and Europe as a 
‘teacher’ were common during the Polish Enlightenment. We will see such 
metaphors invoked in recent statements in the following chapters and I will 
argue that they define a position that resembles that of the Enlighteners.   
Many had expected Western help in the uprising, and the fact that this 
was not provided was a hit against the representation of Europe as the defen-
der of national freedom. On the other hand it fired up under martyr images of 
Poland as a nation suffering under Europe’s sins. In 1848 Mickiewicz orga-
nized a small legion fighting for the liberation of Northern Italy from Austri-
an rule and in the same year Poles were engaged in the Rumanian and the 
Hungarian revolutions. The “Springtime of Nations” ended with the victory 
of reactionary forces and erased Polish hopes of freedom. In 1863 Polish 
patriots joined forces in the January uprising. The uprising failed and the 
West did not intervene with support. 
2.3.5 Positivism 
The school called positivism emerged in the 1860s and claimed that Europe 
had ceased to exist as a political idea, but that it continued to exist as a vital 
civilizational idea into which subjugated and backward peoples would have 
to enter or alternatively perish (Jedlicki 1999: 225). Industrialization was the 
only way to ensure active membership in this civilization and was also 
necessary in order to ensure national survival. The features of the previous 
regime of noble democracy were discredited and the necessity of a strong 
authoritarian government was put in its place.   
The positivists represented the nation as an entity that justified itself 
through its produce, not through any metaphysical mission or higher goal:  
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Let us forsake the illusory thought that we are an indispensable condition for 
European equilibrium, an indispensable dam checking the waves of Asian bar-
barity […]. We should try to justify the Poles’ right to existence not by claiming 
that Europe cannot sleep peacefully without them, that they are the most faithful 
guardians of Europe’s barns and granaries, but by the fact that they exist for 
themselves and by themselves, that they form a separate quite numerous nation 
that has its own, reasonably developed civilization which adds to mankind’s pro-
gress and enriches it with significant original elements. Those, whose right to life 
stems from these sources, will be understood and finally respected by the whole 
world (Świętochowski quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 224). 
 
So far, Poland did not deserve respect as it had not adopted a modern scale 
of values and remained “perhaps the least democratic nation in Europe.” 
Poland still cultivated the cast system that allowed for the separation of 
“aristocracies of birth, of money, of rank, and of learning.” Because of this 
Poles were disliked in Europe and it was not without reason that the nation 
was ridiculed as a “long obsolete anachronism” (ibid.).  
The positivist tradition may be regarded an attempt to break the realities, 
values, and institutions of the romantic and the idealist tradition. According 
to the positivists the Polish nation existed in itself and it expressed itself 
through its abilities to develop and modernize. The positivists represented 
Europe as a civilizational idea and the nation justified itself as a modern nati-
on by adapting to European standards. Being European signified a certain 
status that one had to qualify for and Poland did not qualify. Poland was re-
presented as inferior that had to learn from Europe. 
2.3.6 Neo-Romanticism 
Towards the end of the 19th century the representation of Europe as a sphere 
of decay and decadence was revitalized and reinforced. The journalists of the 
daily newspaper Czas (Time) compared the contemporary European monar-
chies with ancient Asian states “which likewise rested exclusively on materi-
al power and overthrew each other successively, and left no historical legacy 
behind” and the European development with the worship of the Golden Calf 
and the tower of Babel, the only difference being that this tower “sank deep-
er and deeper into the ground in order to oppose its earthly power to that of 
heaven” (quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 216–217).  
Młoda Polska (Young Poland) was a neo-romantic literary movement 
that existed from 1890 to 1918. Its members suggested that Europe was close 
to catastrophe and criticized what they perceived as a decadent form of con-
temporary social-political life. Młoda Polska contested the positivistic ideas 
of resurrecting Poland through modernization and adoption to the standards 
of European civilization as well as the ideas that the nation manifested itself 
through its produce. Młoda Polska turned to the glorification of the national 
uprising as the demonstration of the will to exist as a nation. 
In the romantic drama Wesele (The Wedding) from 1901 Stanisław 
Wyspiański (1869–1907) combines the tragic history of Poland’s demise 
with a hope that the intelligentsia (the groom, the poet) and the peasants (the 
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bride) will join forces and regain Polish independence through an uprising. 
But first, the national spirit of the people has to be awakened.  
 
Bride: But where is this Poland, where? Do you know? 
Poet:  You may search, dear Bride, all over the world for Poland, and never ever 
find it. […] But there is one small cage – Jagusia, place your hand on your 
breast. […] - - - there beats?   
Bride: […] My heart-!-? 
Poet: Well, that is Poland [A to Polska właśnie] (Wyspiański 1956: 192–193)  
 
The dialogue is an example of how the Romantic Movement tended to de-
scribe the Polish nation in metaphysical terms – as a concept that existed in 
the hearts of the people. The metaphor of the sleeping nation that has to be 
awakened resembles the idea of Christ that lies in the grave and waits to 
arise. In the end of the play, a peasant is supposed to blow a golden horn so 
that the nation will wake up and take part in a glorious and successful upris-
ing. The attempt ends in tragedy. The peasant loses the golden horn and the 
nation remains in its sleep. 
The neo-romanticists perceived the industrial, social, and scientific revo-
lution of 19th century Europe as the antithesis of the Polish values that re-
produced the national reality of the romanticists and the proposed relation-
ship was no relationship. Some turned to the trend of international socialism. 
Others stayed with the tradition of internal insurrections. The neo-romanti-
cists also redefined the representation of the nation replacing the noble 
nation with the whole people of the Polish lands, but the values were the 
same and continuance with the noble traditions was kept.   
2.3.7 National Democracy 
The literary positivist and realist tradition inspired and supported Dmowski 
and the National Democrats, to whom I will turn to in a moment. In The Tri-
logy the Nobel laureate Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846–1916) described the bat-
tles of the 17th century that led to Poland’s demise as a powerful European 
state. The work is filled with descriptions of noble heroism and courage, but 
reveals clear suspicion towards the noble democracy of the time. On the 
other hand the Polish king is always described as a strong, but simultaneous-
ly a caring and loving man – as the father of the nation and a gathering sym-
bol:  
 
The King is our Father, and the Rzeczpospolita our mother. The King is a just 
and merciful man, but those kinglets [the magnates] are another matter! There’s 
no way for a man to live with them and their rents and their tithes and taxes…It’s 
their tyranny that supports the Jews who squeeze blood out of this land like 
water from a cheese!” (Sienkiewicz [1884] 1999: 92).  
 
The bias against the magnates and the Jews is easily detectable. The works 
of Sienkiewicz sought to rebuild loyalty to the state institutions. They also 
contributed to the construction of other Polish enemy images in the shape of 
foreign prototypes, like Teutonic knights, Tartars, Turks, and Swedes, in 
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contrast to the Catholic Poles acting as the civilizing defenders of Christen-
dom and freedom (Giergielwicz 1968: 82–83). Nation building was impor-
tant for the positivist and realist traditions. Stefan Żeromski (1864–1925) 
quested for great ideas that could endow life with meaning and he rejected 
one after another until only the nation remained: 
 
I prefer to die for a holy idea. That heart, that great unknown will no longer be 
god [sic], because I do not know him, not religion, because I despise it, not a 
future life, because I doubt [its existence] – it will be a collective soul, the visible 
god, the tangible religion and the life of centuries: the fatherland [ojczyzna] 
(quoted in Porter 2000: 115). 
 
Ojczyzna is a notion, derived from the word ojciec, the Polish word for 
father, which may be translated into English by fatherland. The concept 
ojczyzna appeared in Polish culture already in the Middle Ages, but it was 
only in the period of the partitions that it was represented as non-dependant 
of the concept of a Polish Kingdom, independent of the existence of a Polish 
state (Bartmiński 1993: 23). The positivists tended to represent the ojczyzna 
in concrete terms, as earth, national territory, as a collection of people, the 
nation, as a family, and as a collection of values. The romantic tradition ten-
ded to represent the fatherland more metaphorically, as they represented the 
nation, as an idea. They also tended to personify it as a mother, a lover, or a 
Godlike creature, that was suffering and bleeding. 
Roman Dmowski (1864–1939) and the National Democrats promoted the 
construction of a new nation that could act in a world plagued by the unend-
ing war of all against all. They used the rhetoric of power and struggle to 
justify the need for a homogenous nation and rejected the thought that his-
tory had generated, or would generate the nation, of its own accord. They re-
pudiated the slogans “for our freedom and yours”, and the belief in universal 
ideals of ethics and moral that stood above the national struggle, denied that 
history was progressive and leading somewhere, and instead insisted on 
authority, homogeneity, and discipline, and the resurrection of a centralized 
state as the only way of surviving as a nation. In 1905 Dmowski wrote: 
 
Only a strong national organization, based on a deep respect for tradition, is cap-
able of guaranteeing human society moral health over the centuries […] Thus 
national ethics is the foundation of interpersonal ethics […] Wherever [these eth-
ics] perish, all of social life will gradually dissolve, society will atomize, all 
moral bonds will be broken, mutual obligation will disappear, and we will reach 
the state of homo homini lupus (quoted in Porter 2000: 194).   
 
The paraphrase of Hobbes anchored Dmowski in realism. His idea was to 
organize the nation socially in a strong nation-state, a Leviathan, Hobbes’ 
repository of individual autonomy, that would bring the lost, atomized, sav-
age, human race out of the lex naturalis.  
Dmowski represented Catholicism as the core value of the Polish nation:  
 
When we examine the elements in our souls that make us today a modern Euro-
pean nation we can find their roots in both our ancient ethnic origin and the exi-
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stence over centuries of the Polish state, as well as in our millennium-old attach-
ment to Catholicism. Catholicism is not an adjunct to Polishness, merely color-
ing it in some special way, but is inherent in its very core and to a large extent 
constitutes its very essence. Any attempt to divide Catholicism and Polishness, to 
separate the Nation from the religion and the Church, then, strikes at the very 
essence of our nation (quoted in Hall 1987: 231). 
 
Dmowski represented contemporary Europe as a bourgeois society that had 
turned away from the honest Christian faith to a brutal egoism emancipated 
from all moral standards. But socialism, as proposed by a large share of Pol-
ish society, was not the solution to the disorder that threatened society. On 
the contrary the quest for order, beauty, and faith within a just society culmi-
nated in “socialist decadence”, wrote Dmowski. This false (in his view) reso-
lution to the crisis of modernity was the product of humanitarianism, which 
he linked to an imagined feminization of Polish culture (Porter 2000: 195). 
These statements were direct attacks on the romantic tradition as well as on 
the camp of his greatest opponent, Józef Piłsudski, who was an affiliate of 
the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). I will return to him later. 
The National Democrats formed the foundation of a cultural nation/ pow-
er state with strong ties between them and a strong emphasis on both power 
and culture as means of self-expression. In order to maximize power the 
state had to be culturally homogeneous and strongly organized. Dmowski 
favored Poland with the borders of the Piast era and accused the nobility that 
had “neglected the Western core of the Polish lands, the cradle of the Piast 
dynasty, where the masses were ethnically Polish” (quoted in Crampton 
1997: 9). The Kingdom of the Piasts was represented as a prefiguration of 
what an independent Polish state should look like. Catholicism was an im-
portant feature of national culture and Europe was a Christian community; 
however, European society at the present was degenerating, turning away 
from its core values for the sake of brutal egoism emancipated from moral 
standards.  
The National Democrats saw Germany as the chief threat to Polish 
nationhood and argued that only a strong and healthy Poland could contain 
further German expansion. They sought to regain Polish independence 
through legal means and advocated conciliation with the Russians.  
2.3.8 Piłsudski 
Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) remained faithful to the idealistic-romantic pro-
ject of reviving Poland through an insurrection against the partitioning pow-
ers. He cultivated the myth of the former uprisings as heroic patriotism: 
“each generation must demonstrate with its blood that Poland is alive and 
that she will not reconcile to foreign bondage” (quoted in Bromke 1967: 26). 
He promoted the recreation of Poland in its historical shape as a huge federa-
tion, rejoining the peoples of Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania in one nation 
that could cordon off Russia from the rest of Europe. Russia was to Piłsudski 
an “Asian beast, concealed behind a European façade” (quoted in Bromke 
1967: 24) while Europe was first and foremost the protector of law regulat-
ing the relationship between the state and its citizens.  
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Piłsudski represented the nation as those inhabiting the Rzeczpospolita of 
the pre-partition period. To him Polish values were first and foremost pro-
moted through the state. Piłsudski and his associates promoted the construc-
tion of a state-nation in pace with the European traditions that Dmowski was 
opposed to. This was fist and foremost thought of in terms of a constitution 
securing the rights of national minorities and integrating different cultures 
into a republican state as citizens.    
2.4 The Second Rzeczpospolita 
Poland regained status as an independent state as a result of the peace trea-
ties after the First World War. The Versailles treaty designated the new Pol-
ish state with a far narrower territory than that of the old Rzeczpospolita. 
Piłsudski, who was declared president and chief of the Polish armed forces, 
immediately started working on the project to establish the old historical bor-
ders by fighting the Russians. His soldiers succeeded in gaining vast areas of 
land to the east and more than doubled the territory that Poland had been 
assigned through the Versailles treaty. The war against the Russians has later 
been represented as a war that stopped the westward expansion of bolshe-
vism, thus the antemurale concept was invoked in terms of Poland being a 
bulwark against Communism (Crampton 1997: 39; Mach 1997: 37; 
Wilamowski et al. 1998: 114).  
The Polish Constitution of 1921 manifested the second Rzeczpospolita as 
a liberal democracy. The borders that were finally established in 1922 inclu-
ded 30% minorities, but with the new constitution all citizens were guaran-
teed legal equality and protection by the state irrespective of origin, national-
ity, language, race or religion. The head of state was to be an elected presi-
dent. Presidential powers were cut to a minimum and the strongest organ in 
the new body politic was the Sejm, to which the government was respon-
sible. The Sejm was elected by universal suffrage and elected the president 
together with the Senate. The constitution was designed after the desires of 
Piłsudski, with a strong democratic element and a weak presidency, and was 
supported by Gabriel Narutowicz, who was elected president in 1922, the re-
presentatives from Polskie Stronnowictwo Ludowe “wyzwolenie” (PSL) (the 
Polish People’s Party “liberation”), a party that argued for modernization 
and Europeanization of Poland, and the circle around Prime Minister Jan 
Ignacy Paderewski, who was educated in the West and a promoter of West-
ern idealism in terms of international cooperation for peace. The National 
Democrats strictly opposed the constitution and argued that it resembled the 
institutions of noble democracy and would throw the country into the same 
kind of anarchy that had led to the partitions. What was needed was a strong 
state and national integration.  
The presidential election in 1922 turned out a farce. The National Demo-
crats accused the victorious presidential candidate of having been elected by 
the votes of national minorities and Jews and called for a president backed 
by “Polish votes”. On the very inauguration day the president was murdered. 
The president’s killer stated that the historical tragedy of Poland was the re-
sult of weak government and that Poland needed an iron hand. After the re-
trieval of independence and the wars against the Russians that had made 
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Piłsudski a hero, the people had waited for dictatorship, “for a slogan, for a 
word of command that could lead them in heroic effort”. Instead of being 
ruled by “one head” there were “four hundred rulers” [the Sejm] and “the 
most complex matters of the state had been entrusted to stable boys and 
shepherds”. “Who needs soft rule?” he asked. “Honest citizens, people with 
a clean conscience, do not fear an iron hand.” Those who needed democracy 
and freedom were “thieves, profiteers, bandits, tax-evading peasants, Jews, 
plotters, traitors of the state” (quoted in Bojarska 1995: 340–341). 
Narutowicz’s killer was a National Democrat and called for the need of a 
strong centralized state or a strong ruler that could organize the nation and 
bring it out of chaos.  
After the murder on the president, Piłsudski retired from political life. In 
his last address he quoted what Narutowicz had told him after a ride they had 
through the streets of Warsaw after his electoral victory had been announ-
ced: “You are right, this is not Europe. These people felt better under those 
who trampled on their backs and punched them in the mouth” (quoted in 
Bojarska 1995: 344).  
The National Democrats formed a coalition government with PSL. In 
1926 a right-wing coup was expected, but instead Piłsudski mounted a coup 
d’état. The regime took the name Sanacja, which may be translated as return 
to (political) health. The main instrument of the regime was its parliamen-
tary caucus, the Non-Party Block for Co-operation with the Government 
(BBWR). Initially Sanacja gained large support in the Sejm and pursued an 
indulging policy towards the minorities. With the economic and political cri-
sis of the late 1920s and an increasing Ukrainian nationalism, the regime tur-
ned into a dictatorship that to a greater and greater extent based its policy on 
nationalism and repression of minorities.  
The initial weakness of Germany and Russia after the First World War 
spurred the representation of Poland as a great power. Even if it was evident 
that Germany and Russia were recovering incredibly fast, this representation 
dominated the discourse all through the inter war years. As late as in 1938 a 
pamphlet entitled Polska jest Mocarstwem (Poland is a great power) asserted 
that Poland was “representing the cornerstone of the political order in Cen-
tral Eastern Europe” and that “the fate of contemporary Europe depends on 
the policy of Poland no less than those of other greater powers” (quoted in 
Bromke 1967: 37). This text shows that, although the state had been in the 
‘abyss’ for 150 years, the precedent role of a great power was readily avail-
able and not too far removed historically (Neumann 1992: 123). Poland 
made its own non-aggression pacts with both USSR and Germany and made 
plans of creating a “third Europe stretching from the Baltic to the Balkans” 
(Crampton 1997: 38). These plans as well as the representation of Poland as 
a great power were brought to demise when German and the Soviet troops 
invaded the country in 1939. 
2.5 Second World War 
The Polish Government-in-Exile attempted to restore Poland of the inter war 
years and its hopes were based on the assumption that Russia would defeat 
Germany and that the West in turn would hinder Russia in expanding 
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(Bromke 1967: 47). During the Second World War the Poles were allies of 
the Western powers and 230 000 Polish soldiers were under British com-
mand reaching their greatest success by capturing the German stronghold at 
Monte Cassino in Italy in 1944. After the failure of the Warsaw uprising in 
1944 and the installation of the Communist regime, the Government-in-Exile 
split. One branch ruled out any suggestion of cooperating with Russia or the 
Communists and claimed that Polish freedom could not be based on an alli-
ance with the Western powers. With the Yalta agreement the West had 
shown no interest in keeping Russian hands off Poland. Nevertheless, the 
group decided to stay in exile believing that a conflict between the East and 
the West was imminent and that this conflict eventually would lead to Polish 
independence (ibid.: 48). The other branch was encouraged by the West to 
work actively to find a modus vivendi with Russia. This group advocated a 
conciliatory approach and returned to Poland to participate in the Provisional 
Government of National Unity together with the Communists. 
The Yalta agreement moved Poland two hundred miles westwards, four 
million people were relocated, and the Red Army was stationed on Polish 
soil. Inter war Poland had been multicultural, but in the Second World War 
and postwar period border-revisions, ethnic cleansing, and forced emigra-
tion, made it one of the most homogenous states in Europe. Moreover, large 
shares of the intelligentsia were executed or forced into exile. The first years 
after the Second World War saw the enforcement of the Communist regime 
and the implementation of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL). 
2.6 The Polish People’s Republic 
During the first decades of the PRL Europe was not frequently evoked as a 
political concept in Polish discourse. On the contrary the discourse on the 
East and the West was vivid. The West comprised Western Europe as well 
as the United States, and those who opposed the Communist regime pre-
dominantly represented the West in terms of the cultural sphere to which 
Poland belonged. On the other hand, the advocates of the Communist regime 
represented the West as a threat to the Polish nation.  
In the 1970s Europe was revived as a slogan in Polish discourse and took 
the shape of a concept that embodied the repudiation of the Communist re-
gime and Soviet decrees. The concept of Europe and the manifestation of 
Polish European identities may be regarded as an important rhetorical wea-
pon in the battle of the opposition. By representing Polish identity as a Euro-
pean identity, or as a Western European identity, the opposition attempted to 
prove that the Communist regime was foreign. Other weapons of the opposi-
tion were statements suggesting that the Communist regime was building a 
national identity that was neither respecting the historical heritage of the 
nation nor its culture, for example that the Communist regime did not repro-
duce Christianity as a national value. In the following I will look into this 
battle in more detail. 
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2.6.1 The Communist regime 
The home Communist faction, led by Władysław Gomułka, undermined the 
dominance of the Moscow Communists of the Polish United Worker’s Party 
(PZPR) in the course of the 1950s. The Polish Communist regime represen-
ted the West as antagonists to the idea of socialism. Gomułka stated that the 
West worked against Communism and that its adherents attempted to “push 
our country into the abyss of chaos and anarchy”. Only a socialist Poland 
could “remain on the map of Europe as an independent and sovereign state”. 
Poland would therefore have to pursue a foreign policy that was based on 
“fraternal neighborly Polish–Soviet relations” (quoted in Bromke 1967:120). 
Gomułka’s political reasoning became an integral part of the PZPR pro-
gram and was sustained by his successors: Gierek, Kania and Jaruzelski. At 
one moment or another they all underlined that the Polish-Soviet alliance 
was not only rooted in proletarian internationalism; it was an integral, and an 
unchangeable part of the postwar settlement between the great powers of 
Europe. The United States did not recognize the Polish western border as 
final, but the Soviet Union guaranteed it. This provided the Communist re-
gime with a persuasive argument for Poland’s close bonds with the East. In 
this way Communism and the eastern alliance was legitimized in terms of a 
political balance of power. 
2.6.2 Znak 
An opposition group of Catholic intellectuals convened in a political group-
ing called Znak (Sign). The group expressed their views in the periodicals 
Znak and Tygodnik Powszechny (The Universal Weekly) and ultimately ob-
tained representation in parliament. Znak promoted an  “open Catholicism” 
and argued that the existence of an irreconcilable, doctrinal difference be-
tween Catholicism and Marxism should not prevent Catholics and Marxists 
from cooperating on practical matters (Bromke 1967: 136–137).  
This was perhaps possible because, although Znak affirmed that Christi-
anity was a central element of Polish national culture, it was not believed 
that this was the channel through which the nation promoted itself. Znak 
built on the positivist tradition and defined patriotism in terms of the over-
coming of the “material, technical, and organizational shortcomings of 
everyday life”; this was “the only expression of heroism […] Patriotism is 
changing its content; it is less pathetic and less deceptive. […] Its ultimate 
substance will emerge only with major economic success (quoted in Bromke 
1967: 241).  
Znak built explicitly on the legacy of Dmowski and advocated an ethni-
cally and religiously homogeneous state that did not leave major Polish 
minorities outside of Poland. In contrast it distanced itself from Dmowski’s 
nationalism: 
 
We decisively reject Dmowski’s nationalism and we critically assess his social 
views as well as the totalitarian tendencies he revealed toward the end of his life. 
Yet, we accept Dmowski’s view of 19th century Polish politics and his general 
assessment of Poland’s position between Russia and Germany. These views of 
Dmowski we adopt as our own (Stomma [1960] 1987a: 144). 
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This statement distanced Znak from PAX, a group of Catholic intellectuals 
who expressed a strong nationalism and anti-Semitism, as well as from the 
fusion of the power state and the culture nation promoted by Dmowski.  
Znak insisted that Poland was part of the West in cultural terms, but repu-
diated the belief that the West would come to the political rescue of Poland.  
 
Emotionally I am closer to the people who fought against Russia and who sought 
assistance against the East from the West. Yet, the tragic events of 1939–1944 
demonstrated that such emotional predispositions do not consort well with ratio-
nal thinking. As a result, in international politics I have declared myself for 
Dmowski (ibid.: 144–145).  
 
Strategic concerns, not ideological, forced Poland to remain loyal to the 
Soviet Union. On the other hand Znak expected a gradual weakening of 
international tensions and hoped that this would pave the way for a genuine 
détente between East and West and the ultimate meeting halfway between 
the two worlds. Poland could play a particular role in this process because it 
served as a meeting ground of ideas from the West and the East, “the outpost 
of Christianity” and the “shop-window of the socialist camp”. This predes-
tined Poland to the role of a bridge between the two worlds  (quoted in 
Bromke 1967: 243).    
Znak institutionalized a reality in which Christianity was a central value 
of the Polish nation. Poland was also believed to be a Western European 
nation in the cultural sense of the notion. Znak represented the state in power 
terms, like Dmowski had done, and as detached from the nation. They 
expressed that it would be possible to reproduce these values even if the state 
was of another character. They represented economy and produce as means 
through which the nation justified itself. When the geopolitical climate of the 
present changed, however, it was believed that Poland could serve as a 
“bridge” between the East and the West. We remember that Czartoryski used 
this metaphor in the 19th century and the expression has been used on many 
occasions in Polish discourse. To Znak the expression was first and foremost 
used as a metaphor representing Poland as a meeting place of ideas from the 
East and the West. Znak did not repudiate socialism; it was the distorted 
shape socialism took in totalitarian Soviet Marxism that was perceived as 
repressive and foreign. 
2.6.3 European socialism 
In order to give legal and financial assistance to workers who had been arres-
ted after extensive strikes in 1976, the left-oriented intelligentsia established 
the Committee for Workers’ Defense (KOR). The same year Adam Michnik 
published an article called “A New Evolutionism”. Michnik’s article may be 
called a canonical statement and manifests a turning point in Polish dis-
course. He was indulgent to the policies of Znak but, referring to the failure 
of installing ‘socialism with a human face’ in Czechoslovakia, contended 
that it was unrealistic to count on the subversion of the PZPR. Inspired by 
the Helsinki process he claimed that an alternative and much more useful 
approach would be to start working for the expansion of civil liberties and 
Bulwark, Bridge or Periphery? 
nupi june 01 
47 
human rights. Gradual and piecemeal change was the road to independence. 
The most fundamental brick of the new evolutionism was “faith in the power 
of the working class” and the belief in a program for evolution “addressed to 
an independent public, not to totalitarian power” (Michnik 1985: 141). 
Michnik ended the famous article by propagating the building of a “frame-
work of democratic socialism, that would not be merely or primarily a legal 
institutional structure but a real, day-to-day community of free people” 
(ibid.: 148).  
The new evolutionism was not defined as an anti-socialist process, but as 
a movement wanting to bring socialism closer to Europe. Europe was repre-
sented as a democratic community of free people ruled by human rights, as 
opposed to the non-human totalitarianism of contemporary Soviet Commu-
nism, that it strongly opposed. In short Michnik’s article expressed the wish 
to humanize and democratize socialism or, as Stanisław Stomma, who adop-
ted the thoughts of a new evolutionism, expressed it, to bring socialism 
“closer to Europe” (Stomma [1981] 1987b: 180). Europe emerged as a sym-
bol of democracy, human rights, and a legal institutional structure. The Soli-
darity movement was to put the ethos of a new evolutionism into practice 
and joined the forces of the leftist and Catholic intelligentsia as well as the 
Church and the workers’ movements. The last groups tended to be more con-
cerned about the culture of the nation, did not place much emphasis on the 
geopolitical situation, and usually argued for a more radical approach than 
depicted by the new evolutionism.  
2.6.4 Christian Europe 
During Communism the Catholic Church was granted full autonomy as long 
as Party rule was not openly denied. In 1978 the Polish Cardinal Karol 
Wojtyła was elected Pope and the following year he made a pilgrimage to 
“his fatherland”. A note of recollection on the papal election reads: “It was 
the next morning […] that I felt for the first time the division between ‘us’, 
the people, and ‘them’, our rulers” (Sikorski 1997: 50). In the following I 
will explain how the Pope put up a border between the Communist regime 
and Polish national identity and reproduced Polish identity as a European 
identity. 
The homilies of the Pope heralded the concept of a Christian Europe and 
reflected the Vatican’s policy of uniting Europe on the basis of Christian 
values: 
 
Is it not Christ's will, is it not what the Holy Spirit disposes, that this Polish 
Pope, this Slav Pope, should at this precise moment manifest the spiritual unity 
of Christian Europe? We know that the Christian unity of Europe is made up of 
two great traditions, of the West and of the East. […] Yes, it is Christ’s will; it is 
what the Holy Spirit disposes, that what I am saying should be said in this very 
place and at this moment in Gniezno (John Paul II 1979). 
 
To the Pope, Europe was first and foremost a Christian community and he 
expressed that this one uniting feature might overrule all political and econo-
mic divisions. Moreover, his statement implied that his election as Pope was 
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no coincidence and that it gave the Poles a mission in uniting the East and 
the West.  
The speeches of the Pope worked as implicit and explicit attacks on the 
Communist regime in manifesting European unity within the framework of 
Christianity; he represented the Communist regime in terms of difference in 
relation to Polish identity. Continuously the Pope emphasized the long-
standing and intimately Catholic nature of Poland. He referred to the close 
bonds between the Polish nation and Catholicism and stated that the “exclu-
sion of Christ from the history of humanity is an act against man. Without 
Christ it is impossible to understand the history of Poland” (quoted in 
Wasserman 1979: 15). With these words the Pope represented religion as an 
integral part of Polish identity and, keeping in mind that Marxism philoso-
phically opposes Christianity by presenting a materialistic and atheistic inter-
pretation of human existence and that it accuses religion in general and 
Christianity in particular of alienating man, the Pope clarified the contradic-
tory nature of Communism and Polish identity. He represented the Commu-
nist regime as an institution creating a Polish nation based on values that 
were neither contingent with history nor with culture. On the other hand, the 
Catholic Church was contingent with the past, as it represented the nation in 
terms of history and culture as well as it reproduced Polish identity as a 
European identity. The Solidarity workers’ movement in particular picked 
up the ideas of the Pope. 
2.6.5 The workers’ Solidarity  
The workers’ faction of Solidarity was more reluctant towards a compromise 
with the Communist regime than the Catholic and leftist intelligentsia. The 
workers’ faction was more concerned about the culture of the nation and viv-
idly cultivated their ties with the traditions of the szlachta and the Polish 
knights, the legions, and the uprisings. Songs and poetry written and pro-
claimed during the strikes and manifestations represented Solidarity as the 
continuance of these traditions and created unity with the past (Törnquist-
Plewa 1992). Leaflets were spread calling for a “joint action of enslaved 
nations against Communism and Soviet imperialism” with the heading “for 
our freedom, and yours”, and the text reassured that the authors were ready 
to “sacrifice their blood, and, if need will be their lives, to that end” (quoted 
in Bromke 1987: 56). 
The workers’ faction also gathered inspiration from Catholicism and the 
belief in religious miracles. Many Poles referred to the election of a Polish 
pope as a miracle and believed that it was the first step towards Polish free-
dom (Törnquist-Plewa 1992: 56). The Pope talked of the Virgin of Często-
chowa in terms of the “Mother of the Polish Nation” and begged her to take 
Solidarity into her care (ibid.: 95). Lech Wałęsa always wore the icon of the 
Virgin of Częstochowa on his chest, and the Gdańsk strikers pinned the slo-
gan “The Madonna is striking with us” to the shipyard fence (Boyes 1994:3).  
The workers’ faction allowed for a stronger manifestation of the culture 
nation and had a stronger anti-Russian and anti-Communist rhetoric than 
Znak and the left. In this respect they often evoked Europe as a contrast. In a 
statement from the Polish League of Independence (1980) Europe was de-
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scribed as a definite scale of values: truth, justice, and human rights and “the 
freedom of the individual to pursue these ideals” (ibid.: 186).  Moreover 
Europe was the cradle “of the rights of nations and of respect for their inde-
pendence and integrity. It was also the birthplace of international under-
standing and cooperation” (ibid.: 188). Addressing the possibility of choos-
ing a path independently of Europe, the statement says: “Poland – as always 
since the eighteenth century – can be either European or Russian […]. 
Although we find ourselves in Moscow’s sphere, to some extent we can pre-
serve our European character, but we can lose it if we don’t struggle for 
it”(ibid.: 192).   
The statement reveals that the concept of Europe was linked to the fight 
for Polish independence and a strong contrast to Russia. The European val-
ues had been cultivated and preserved through the ages of Polish and Euro-
pean existence and had been fought for by generations of Poles and Europe-
ans. The culture of the nation was a more important aspect than it was to for 
instance the opposition of the left and the Polish nation substantiated itself as 
a European nation in manifesting European values on the international arena.   
2.6.6 Central Europe and Kultura 
The Paris-based magazine Kultura opposed the thoughts that Poland was in-
dispensable to Europe and that Europe would help Poland subverting the 
Communist regime. Russia was simply more important to Europe than 
Poland was in the geopolitical sense. Kultura advocated that Poland should 
exploit its heritage as a Roman Catholic and Slavic state and serve as a 
bridge between Russia and the West. Poland should devote its energies to 
‘Europeanizing’ Russia, since only a process of ‘Europeanization’ would en-
able Poland to escape its fate as a Russian satellite or keep it from being the 
object of Russo–German competition (Korek 1998: 219; Prizel 1998: 95).  
Kultura published a range of articles on the concept of the Polish nation. 
Jan Józef Lipski (1981) maintained that there were two ways of thinking of 
the Polish nation, or the ojczyzna, with both their ways of defining patriot-
ism. The first patriotism was defined as love for everything Polish and hatred 
against everything non-Polish. This cultivated hatred against neighboring 
countries, like Germany and Russia, as well as against minorities, like the 
Jews. This involved keeping Europe at a distance. This was patriotism to-
wards the ojczyzna defined in an ethnic and exclusive way. The other patriot-
ism was defined by Christian ethics, and involved the value to “forgive and 
ask for forgiveness”. This was the patriotism the Polish nation should relate 
to, a patriotism that involved a “return to our greater fatherland – to Europe”.  
The European ideals were represented in strict opposition to Communism 
and Russia, but Kultura also warned against a strict Western European orien-
tation. As an antidote to the Central European region’s obsession with the 
West, Kultura propagated it as a cultural bloc, rejected the West as an ideal 
and pursued the construction of a separate Central European identity. 
Kultura’s rejection of the West extended to the sphere of economics and 
reflected an aversion towards open market capitalism. Other opponents of 
the Communist regime also reflected such thoughts, ranging from Pope John 
Paul II to the founders of KOR (Prizel 1998: 97). 
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2.7 Europe and Polish identity throughout history 
In this section I have illustrated that Europe was functioning as a slogan for 
the opponents of the Communist regime in the way that Europe was repre-
sented in terms of the values of Christianity as well as humanism and demo-
cracy. The section also suggests that representing Polish identity as a Euro-
pean identity, or even as a Western European identity, was an important dis-
cursive exercise in this period. Another important discursive practice was to 
attack the Polish reality represented by the Communist regime as destructive 
to Polish values, history and culture, and instead manifested ‘our’ represen-
tation of Poland in terms of a specific historical and cultural tradition. We 
may suggest that discursive practices like these worked in a way that under-
mined Communism and a Polish alliance with Russia, or the Soviet Union, 
as a possible policy alternative for Poland.  
The chapter on the pre-history of the Polish discourse on Europe has so 
far showed that there have been many different ways of representing the Pol-
ish state and nation throughout history, just as there have been different ways 
of representing Europe and the relationship between Poland and Europe. The 
next chapter will present a categorization of the Polish layer of identity as it 
has emerged in the analysis of Polish history, as well as in more recent state-
ments that I will come back to in the next chapter. I will also propose how 
these constellations relate to Polish representations of Europe.  
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3.0 Polish identity and relations to Europe 
At the outset I asked: What kind of Europe do Poles promote? I decided to 
approach the question through a discourse analysis that will reveal how Pol-
ish identity, defined as representations of state and nation, is constructed in 
relation to Polish representations of Europe. The more precise formulation of 
the questions is: What are the Polish European policy positions and how is 
the discourse of which they are constitutive parts structured? This section 
will establish the identity layer, show how it connects to representations of 
Europe, and what changes this relation causes in the state–nation constella-
tion. It will refer to the legacy these representations and constellations have 
in the past discourse, which was covered in chapter two, and suggest how 
they are represented and have developed in the most recent discourse.  
Drawing on the theories of the Copenhagen School I made the assump-
tion that discursive spaces are made up of layered systems of concepts. The 
discursive space that is subject to analysis in this thesis is the one that dis-
cusses Europe in relation to Poland. According to the methodical assump-
tions the layer of Polish identity, which consists of the concepts of state and 
nation, is more sedimented and more difficult to politicize and change. Pol-
ish representations of state and nation may be studied in relation to Polish 
representations of Europe, and the ways in which these concepts relate to 
each other in discourse make up the second layer. The second layer is theo-
retically more sedimented than the third layer, which consists of concrete 
policy positions. The ways in which the concepts of the first two layers re-
late to each other in discourse, condition the third layer. 
It seems like the structures of the layers are relatively stable throughout 
the last decade, but this is not the only reason why they are presented already 
at this point in time. Presenting them before the actual analysis of the dis-
course in focus will make it easier for us to categorize and analyze state-
ments in the period from 1989 to 1999 in a sensible way and pose the questi-
ons that Wæver suggested: Do the actors argue that their opponents fail to 
offer an appropriate construction of level one? Do they argue that the 
‘Europe’ their opponents construct will pose a threat to the proper construc-
tion of the state–nation constellation? Do they claim that their opponents’ 
interpretation of the character of the EU is out of touch with the reality of the 
EU? As one of the objective goals is to indicate what shape Polish European 
policy may take in the future, it is important to be able to point out possibili-
ties of how the positions may change internally, not only how the discourse 
may change as a result of a shift of power between the positions in discourse. 
Establishing these categories now will also make it easier to see if there actu-
ally has been a modification of values, institutions, and realities – if the posi-
tions have changed – in the course of the last decade.  
The Polish layer of identity appears more complicated than the French 
and the German cases on which Ole Wæver bases his examples. First of all, 
it seems impossible to boil down the state–nation constellation to one. I be-
lieve that the Polish layer of identity is dominated by a constellation similar 
to the German constellation, but at times a constellation similar to the French 
challenges it. The dominant constellation defines the state in terms of power 
and the nation in terms of culture. I call it culture nation/power state. The 
culture nation has its legacy in the era of national romanticism, but may be 
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traced further back in time to Sarmatism and the culture of the Polish 
szlachta. The power state emerges first with Dmowski’s realism and 
Piłsudski’s irredentism and the belief in Poland as a great power. The other 
state–nation constellation has clear similarities to the French as it puts the 
state in the center and defines the nation as a political community of citizens. 
I call it political nation–centralized state. It has its legacy in the political 
institutions of noble democracy, the Enlightenment, and the revolutionary 
movements of the late 18th century.  
The second layer consists of the relational positions of the state–nation 
constellation at level one to representations of Europe. What has to be inves-
tigated at this stage is whether the relationship to Europe requires revisions 
of the first layer. This is particularly so in the case of the culture nation/pow-
er state. When this constellation relates to Europe in discourse it involves 
either a strengthening or a weakening of the power and/or the culture aspect. 
When it has been explored what revisions take place at level one, I have to 
investigate how this particular articulation of the state–nation construction 
relates to representations of Europe. 
3.1 Culture nation/power state 
The idea of the culture nation is separated from the idea of the power state. 
Thinking about the nation does not involve a conception of a state and the 
state may be thought of independently of the nation. This way of thinking 
about the relationship between the state and the nation emerged with the par-
titions that spurred the need to define the nation independently of the exi-
stence of a Polish state. The national romanticists often represented the state 
as the body, sleeping, while the soul, the nation, was alive and existed in a 
higher sphere as an ideal the Polish people carried within them.  
The first trace I have found of a representation of the nation in terms of 
culture, is Sarmatism. It represented the nobility, the Polish nation, as a com-
munity with a common descent and common cultural features, namely Polish 
language and Catholicism, that differentiated it from the other layers of soci-
ety. This challenged the broader representation of the nation that, although it 
was exclusive to the extent that it only embraced the nobility, did not take 
religion or language into account.  
Polish national romanticism cultivated the idea that each nation was an 
entity with its own specific features that it needed in order to perform its pre-
destined mission. The nation was represented as an ideal that people obliged 
themselves to. The ideal was Poland the way it actually is, the way Poland 
should be. Striving to reach the national ideal brought out the Polish values 
that built on the legacy of the Polish knights and the szlachta: great-hearted-
ness, truth, goodness, love, brotherhood, solidarity, and courage. Those par-
ticipating in the national uprisings were represented as descendants of the 
knights and as a group manifesting the national ideal and national values. 
Those engaged in the battle against the Communist regime, especially those 
taking part in open demonstrations against it, were represented as successors 
of the tradition of Polish national uprisings. At present Solidarity is provided 
with this special status.  
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Cultural factors are decisive in order to identify the nation and the most 
important ones are language and Catholicism. The moral commitment to the 
national ideal excludes Poles who do not work to realize the Polish ideal 
even if they are born in Poland, brought up there, and speak Polish. Peoples 
with other ethnic origins may be considered as Poles as long as they are mor-
ally obliged to the national ideal. We may, however, say that making the 
moral obligation towards the Polish ideal presupposes adopting certain Pol-
ish values and the assimilation into Polish cultural norms. Dmowski, for ex-
ample, denied that he was promoting an ethnic nation, but the way in which 
he defined those working against the national ideal made his representation 
work as ethnic nationalism anyway (see Porter 2000: 230).  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, much Polish thinking on the 
state has represented it as a threat because, in the wrong hands, it could be-
come a tool, purchasing minority or individual interests that could be harm-
ful to the nation. To avoid this situation the state had to be decentralized and 
moral principles had to make up the fundament of politics. Examples of such 
decentralized institutions ruled by a moral principle were the institutions of 
noble democracy. All members of the nation had the same right to oppose 
political decisions through the institutions of liberum veto and confederation 
and were morally obliged to pursue the national common good. The state 
institutions, like the king and the Sejm, were parts of a decentralized power 
system that dammed up against the possibility that individual interests would 
depose the common good as the ultimate policy goal of the Polish state. In 
the period of partitions thinking about the state was shaped by the fact that 
the state as such did not exist, that it was something to be created or recreat-
ed, an idea, an ideal, a higher goal, or a potential that waited to be realized. 
The power potential of the state was perceived as a threat against the com-
mon good of the nation and the state therefore had both to emerge from the 
nation and be controlled by it. The principle has manifested itself in later 
years in endeavors to reach consensus, build broad coalitions, and in 
Michnik’s statements that emphasize that one should build large civic move-
ments instead of political parties. 
In the late 19th century there emerged a representation of the state in 
terms of a strong centralized power. The state ranked above the individual 
and history was a struggle for power and self-expression. Dmowski repre-
sented the state as the incarnation of the cultural nation, its political repre-
sentative, and a medium through which the nation realized itself. The con-
struction of a power state gradually permeated the Polish discourse of the 
interwar years and became a dominating feature of Polish domestic and for-
eign policy. The power basis of the state is the ability it has to make supreme 
decisions concerning the interests of the nation. The power state represents 
the interests of the nation and it is believed that Polish foreign policy should 
be derived from Polish domestic policy and national interests should be sup-
erior to international goals. The guiding principle of international politics is 
maximizing power and securing national interest. International cooperation 
is perceived as a zero sum game that is possible only on the terms that some 
lose what others win. The power state engages itself in classical balance of 
power politics and raison d’état logic. Along the internal dimension the 
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power state protects the nation from chaos and disorder and represents the 
national interests. 
Ojczyzna (fatherland) is an important attachment to the Polish nation 
evoking Polish national culture and history. The concept may also represent 
all those generations of Poles (the fathers) who have fought to realize the 
Polish ideal. The members of the nation should feel an obligation to fulfill 
their struggle. A link between the nation and the state is embodied in the 
term Rzeczpospolita reflecting the idea of the common good of the nation. 
Rzeczpospolita refers to the Polish lands, but it is also a synonym of the Pol-
ish ideal state and every Pole should feel the moral obligation to work for its 
fulfillment.  
3.2 Europe and the culture nation/power state 
When the culture nation/power state constellation relates to representations 
of Europe, layer one is reshaped either strengthening or a weakening power 
and/or culture elements as ways of self-expression on the international arena. 
I believe there are four main ways that the culture nation/power state relates 
to representations of Europe. One relates to a representation of Europe as a 
meeting place of values and de-emphasizes both power and culture. Another 
relates to a representation of Europe that is under constant threat and invol-
ves rearticulating layer one in terms of culture as a way of self-expression. 
The third relates to a representation of Europe as decadent and in decay. This 
activates both power and culture. The fourth relates to a representation of 
Europe in terms of power, something that activates power as a way of self-
expression.  
In the structure of this layer we may recognize certain values that either 
distinguish Poland from Europe or unite Polish and European identity. At 
this stage I will only suggest what these values are, and relate them to positi-
ons that have reproduced them in the past. In the analysis of the third layer, 
which I will come back to later, I will show you how these values are mani-
fested in recent discourse, suggest how they are reproduced in feedback 
loops together with realities and institutions, and how other positions attack 
them and try to shatter or modify them. 
3.2.1 Europe acknowledges Polish Europeanness 
Some groupings represent European values as contradictory to the values of 
the Communist regime. European values are first and foremost Christianity, 
democracy, laws, human rights, tolerance, and international cooperation for 
peace. Europe is represented as a meeting place of values and in order to 
become European nations have to pick and choose the best European traditi-
ons and make them their own. 
Europe is represented as a sphere affirming or denying other countries 
Europeanness. When the culture nation/power state relates to this representa-
tion of Europe, Europe becomes an antidote both to a strong cultural expres-
sion of the nation as well a denial of a strong power demonstration. Poland 
manifests itself on the international scene by becoming/being/staying Euro-
pean and it is believed that Poland may become non-European if it does not 
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strengthen the European values of its identity. Picking out and focusing on 
the elements of Polish identity that correspond with the good European val-
ues may accomplish the Europeanization of Polish identity. As the next sec-
tion will show, some groupings argue that these elements are first and fore-
most to be found in the Jagiellonian tradition, when the nation was defined 
in broad terms and tolerance prevailed. 
Poland has to ‘return’ to Europe in order to rediscover its good values. 
Europe is represented as a sphere embodying both an Eastern and a Western 
tradition and both spheres are believed to comprise good and bad values. 
Poland is represented as a discursive field where these traditions meet. The 
contribution of Poland to Europe is to show both the East and the West how 
to build a national culture that is unique and European at the same time. This 
is a project that tags on the positions of Kultura, Znak, and the founders of 
KOR, like Adam Michnik.  
3.2.2 Poland defends European values 
Others too represent European values in terms of notions contradictory to the 
values of the Communist regime, like Christianity, democracy, laws, human 
rights, tolerance, and international cooperation for peace. Europe is, how-
ever, represented as a sphere facing major threats because the values that 
make up its fundament are threatened by the trends of secularism, consumer-
ism, and materialism. This might bring about a moral relativism that will 
throw Europe into decadence. This will destroy the European community of 
values as we know it and make it barely a distorted shadow of itself.   
This representation activates culture as a way of Polish self-expression, 
while the power factor remains inactive. Poland is represented as a state/ 
nation that always has lived at Europe’s frontier where it has defended Euro-
pean values. Poland has always defended Europe against onslaughts form the 
infidels and has also engaged itself in defending the European value of natio-
nal freedom from foreign oppression. The endeavors to protect Europe have 
caused the Poles great pains and sufferings as Poland time and time again 
has fallen victim to the uncontrollable forces of history, like the partitions at 
the end of the 18th century and the Yalta agreement. However, much be-
cause of their continuous struggles to defend European values, the Polish na-
tion has managed to preserve them much better than any other country. 
Today Poland once again has the potential of protecting European values in 
working against the effects of trends such as secularism, consumerism, and 
materialism. This will be done by leading Europe back to its roots, to its 
common heritage of Christianity.  
This construction of Poland in relation to Europe entails that Christianity 
and solidarity become the most important features of Polish national culture 
and the means through which the Poles express themselves on the internatio-
nal arena. Being a Pole means being a European, it includes a European ele-
ment. Being a Pole requires a moral commitment to the Polish ideal, but it 
also requires a moral commitment to the European ideal in terms of a unified 
Christian society of free nations. 
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3.2.3 Poland manifests its interests outside of a decadent Europe 
Another position represents Europe as a decadent sphere in decay lost in a 
game of power politics, consumerism, individualism, and democratic and 
liberal experiments. The beliefs in money and material goods have replaced 
the Christian belief and the European economy is moving towards the edge. 
This representation of Europe activates both culture and power as means of 
self-expression.  
The state is represented as the incarnation of the nation. The state stands 
above the nation and has to do so in order to prevent chaos. Poland is repre-
sented as morally superior to the rest of Europe and should have a non-rela-
tionship with it in order not to be infected with its decadence. The alternative 
is to endeavor at constructing a Christian international community. Self-suf-
ficiency and independence in the economic sphere have to be preserved. 
Sovereignty in the narrow sense of the world, national interests, and raison 
d’état, are important values manifesting the culture of the nation and the 
power of the state.  
3.2.4 Poland manifests its power in a European power sphere 
The last variant represents Europe as a geopolitical sphere of power. The 
Polish nation expresses itself through the power of the state. This redefines 
Poland as a power state that primarily engages itself in classic balance of 
power politics and raison d’état logic. As Poland is a country with only a 
medium range of power and a geographical position that makes it exception-
ally exposed, it needs allies. Both Eastern and Western Europe stand out as 
too powerful partners to become Polish allies. Western Europe is represented 
as economically more developed and politically more powerful than Poland. 
If Poland seeks partnership with this block of countries, foreign investors 
will “buy” the country and will have the opportunity to intervene in Polish 
internal affairs. In this way Poland will lose its independence and sover-
eignty and the power of the state will decline. The Eastern block convenes 
around the states of the former Soviet Union and is regarded as an impos-
sible partner for Poland to cooperate with, not because of its economic pow-
er, but because of its size, population and military capacity. Both the East 
and the West are too powerful blocks for Poland to cooperate with in the 
political sphere because cooperation will erode the power of the state as a 
Polish means of self-expression on the international arena. The alternative is 
the construction of a third power block in Central Europe. The idea has its 
legacy in the state traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Union and Piłsudski’s 
idea to create a third Europe as a counterweight to Russia and Germany.  
3.3 Political nation–centralized state  
The constellation of the political nation and the centralized state has always 
been marginal in Polish discourse. This may partially be explained by the 
fact that the Polish state more or less did not exist for 123 years, but also 
because the position has been silenced by the dominant discourse of state 
and nation. The constellation has been revitalized after the crumbling of the 
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Communist regime in 1989 and is, on the political arena, first and foremost 
represented by the deputies of the post-Communist parties. 
The political nation is tightly coupled to the centralized state. The state 
and the nation are fused. There is not necessarily a concept of a specific state 
or a specific nation, but there is the idea that these entities stand in a mutu-
ally constitutive relationship that is important.  
The political nation – centralized state may be traced back to the Polish 
enlighteners who tried to construct a modern Polish state that would lead 
Poland out of what was perceived as being a situation of political and econo-
mic backwardness. It was argued that weak state institutions caused the eco-
nomic and political crisis by impeding the reforms necessary for develop-
ment and modernization. If the Polish state was to regain the ability to direct 
its own political destiny, it had to become centralized, strong and interven-
tionist. The nation would have to be integrated into the state through central 
administrative units and a joint system of education based on the Polish lan-
guage. A main goal of this education was to teach the nation how to become 
active citizens of the state as well as to increase the general level of know-
ledge in order to spur social, political, and economic progress.  
The nation consists of all individuals that are citizens of the state and is 
without restrictions concerning culture and moral consciousness. This makes 
the nation open to the assimilation of new members through the institution of 
citizenship. 
Along the external dimension the state is thought of as highly interdepen-
dent with the outside world and it is assumed that it needs a high level of 
external communication and cooperation. Strong ties to the outside world are 
important in order to develop and modernize, but also in order to ensure 
national security. In addition to threats against state borders and state institu-
tions, threats against national security are first and foremost constructed in 
the spheres of development and modernization. If these processes stagnate 
or, more seriously, are reversed, something that may be caused by the turn to 
a nationalistic or religious rhetoric in domestic and foreign policy, the politi-
cal, economic, and social situation will destabilize. Another matter is that 
Poland will be looked upon as a backward country by the outside world. 
This is believed to cause a decline in the external will to include Poland in 
international cooperation. Considerations on international relations are 
guided by the idea that cooperation increases the welfare and security of all 
countries participating and that cooperation promotes peace and stability. 
Along the internal dimension the state is thought of as a means of orga-
nizing society into active citizens of the state. The social order is based on a 
legal document, in the shape of a constitution, between a group of individu-
als and the state. The institution of law secures freedom and ensures politi-
cal, economic, and social development. Development and moderni-zation 
make up the rationale of the state. A state that does not ensure the nation 
economic and political progress has low legitimacy in the nation. 
Rzeczpospolita is an attachment to the political nation – centralized state 
that refers to an emotional bond to the past as well as cultural roots. It is the 
embodiment of the history and traditions of the Polish state, its territory and 
the people who have inhabited it.  
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The Polish nation consists of the members of the Polish state. Another 
way of saying this is that they are obywatele (citizens) of Rzeczpospolita. 
Citizen is a concept that is used interchangeably with nation and implies the 
responsibility every member of the nation has in relation to the state and the 
state in relation to the citizen. Another concept that links the nation to the 
state is społeczeństwo (society). These words are believed to be more neutral 
than nation, as they are void of connotations to religion, language, moral, 
and culture.  
3.4 Europe teaches Poland Europeanness 
There is a centuries-long tradition in Polish discourse of representing Europe 
as the cradle of modernization and progress. This goes back to the period of 
the Enlightenment when Europe was represented as the ideal of good states-
manship, laws, rational thinking, education, and political and economic de-
signs. Today this representation of Europe goes together with ideas of it as a 
symbol of liberalism; the free play of economic and political forces, a variety 
of traditions, values, cultures and moral systems and of individual freedom. 
The plurality of Europe is based on tolerance among people and the institu-
tion of universal law and well-proven institutions. Europe is a modern civili-
zation leading the process of development. Europe is also represented as a 
supranational community that eases tensions and conflicts between the states 
that are comprised by it.  
This representation of Europe does not involve a redefinition of the poli-
tical nation – centralized state. In relation to Europe, Poland is represented as 
a country in transition from backwardness to Europeanness, from dwelling in 
the European periphery, to become a part of Europe. The relationship that is 
established is that of learning. Poland has to learn from Europe how to 
become a European state with European citizens. Europe is the ‘teacher’, 
Poland the ‘student’. If Poland does not do its ‘homework’ it will be punish-
ed, either by the other European countries, or by the results that will follow 
if Poland does not take the natural path of development. Poland has for a 
number of reasons been kept at a lower developmental stage and is now in 
the process of ridding itself of the remnants of feudalism and step into the 
rows of developed, civilized, and modern states. Such states are liberal-capi-
talist ones. An important role of the state is to administer the process of 
transformation and inform and educate the citizens in democratic and liberal-
ist-capitalist behavior.  
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a categorization of layer one and two of the dis-
cursive system. It has been argued that the Polish layer of identity consists of 
one constellation that may be though of as dominant, the culture nation/pow-
er state, and one that challenges this, the political nation–centralized state. At 
the second layer there are five main representations of Europe that in differ-
ent ways redefine layer one and establish certain sets of values that create 
borders between and/or unite Polish and European identity. The next chapter 
will analyze the Polish discourse on Europe in the first decade after the dis-
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solution of the Communist regime. It illustrates how the actors attempt to 
break down the values, realities, and institutions of other positions in dis-
course, as well as it identifies concrete European projects that are promoted 
by Poles. I will also illustrate how discourse draws on history and how the 
actors attempt to establish continuance with the past. Throughout the analy-
sis, the statements will be connected to the categories that I have established 
above.  
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4.0 The Polish discourse on Europe 1989–1999 
This study investigates the preconditions for Polish European policies. In 
order to do this it locates different representations of state, nation, and 
Europe in Polish discourse, looks into the ways in which these concepts re-
late to each other, and how they condition the sets of possible foreign poli-
cies that Poland may pursue in relation to Europe, or, more specifically, in 
relation to the EU. Chapter two offered a cut into the pre-history of the dis-
course and located different representations of state, nation, and Europe, 
throughout Polish history. Chapter three provided a categorization of the first 
two layers, the layer of Polish identity and the relational layer to representa-
tions of Europe. This chapter analyzes the Polish discourse on Europe from 
1989 to 1999 according to the set of categories that I have established and 
relate them to the concrete policies suggested in relation to the EC/ EU pro-
cess.  
4.1 The policy layer 
The chapter on the pre-history of the discourse revealed that there have been 
certain continuities in the ways in which Poles think about their own identity 
and of Europe. However, there have also been shifts and brakes with previ-
ous discourses, like with the encounter with the Enlightenment, that may be 
thought of as an event where a changing context (Europe) provided for a re-
definition of values (e.g. universal law), something that produced new reali-
ties (e.g. a centralized state strongly linked to a political nation), and ultimat-
ely made some institutions perish (e.g. the noble democracy). This is one 
explanation of the phenomenon. In the following sections I will search for 
continuity and breaks with history, ask how continuance is kept, and how 
breaks occur. I will also investigate what values certain institutions, mainly 
political parties, reproduce that contribute to the reproduction of the repre-
sentations in question: Poland and Europe. This project addresses the materi-
ality of discourse, allows for changing representations and positions with the 
reformulation of values, realities, and institutions, and provides a post-struc-
tural supplement to the structural design of the Copenhagen School. 
The third layer is made up of more specific policies pursued by the actors 
in discourse. The question we have to ask here is: Do the actors argue that 
their opponents fail to offer an appropriate construction of level one? Do 
they argue that the ‘Europe’ their opponents construct will pose a threat to 
the proper construction of the state–nation constellation? Do they claim that 
their opponents’ interpretation of the character of the EU is out of touch with 
the reality of the EU? By studying the discourse at this level we may dis-
cover certain positions in discourse that define what kind of European politi-
cal project is promoted and what role Poland should play in it.  
The chapter will provide concrete policy statements and analyze in depth 
statements from the Sejm, as well as articles from newspapers and journals. 
The purpose of the readings is to locate Polish European policy positions, the 
ways in which these positions clash and coincide in discourse, and how con-
tinuance with the past is sought and kept. Doing this I will also locate the re-
presentations of Europe, state, and nation on which these positions rest and 
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how the different positions attempt to displace the values, institutions, and 
realities of the other positions.  
The last section of this chapter provides statements from the last three 
years of the period, from 1997 to 1999, and links these to specific policy 
positions. These policy positions define the third layer as it appears in this 
period in time and attempt to define some central values and realities that 
certain institutions reproduce in discourse. In this period I believe that we 
may spot a change in one of the positions, one that rests on the culture na-
tion/power state, represents Europe as a sphere of moral decay, and reprodu-
ces values separating European and Polish identity in terms of Catholicism, 
sovereignty, and national interests. A variant of this position emerges 
towards the end of the period producing statements maintaining that it is 
possible to lift out economy as a sphere of cooperation with Europe without 
the culture of the nation being infected or the sovereignty of the state being 
weakened. This involves a reconstruction of the value of sovereignty, repre-
senting it in terms of independence through interdependency, at least in the 
economic sphere.  
4.2 A post-Communist Poland in a new Europe 
In 1989 the Polish Communist regime agreed on roundtable talks with a uni-
ted opposition consisting of Solidarity activists, independent intellectuals, 
and representatives of the Catholic Church. The compromise allowed for the 
establishment of a presidency, a bicameral legislature, and semi-free electi-
ons. The opposition won 99% of the freely elected seats and founded the 
Citizens’ Parliamentary Committee (OKP). Tadeusz Mazowiecki, editor of 
the Solidarity Weekly (Tygodnik Solidarność) and one of the front figures of 
Znak, became Prime Minister of a coalition government. The Sejm granted 
General Jaruzelski renewed confidence as President of Poland. In this sec-
tion I will present and analyze statements from political debates after the 
inauguration of the Mazowiecki government in the autumn of 1989.  
4.2.1 The Polish “return to Europe” 
 
Europe is changing. We do not negate these changes; we wish for them, take part 
in them. At the same time we have to take care of the interests of our state. I 
think that they play together with the European interest. The present Polish gov-
ernment under the leadership of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki has 
brought about the Polish return to her place in Europe […] We support the idea 
of a united Europe and the execution of that idea through cooperation and inte-
gration between the European states (Skubiszewski [1989] 1997: 29).      
 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski made this statement in the Sejm just after he had 
been inaugurated as Foreign Minister. The statement established a different 
relation between Poland and Europe than that of the former regime. 
Mazowiecki promoted a Europe that emerged as a unified political commun-
ity of states pursuing their individual interests and cooperating in common 
interest. It is worth noticing that he emphasized the state and state interests. 
Hege Haaland 
nupi june 01 
62 
Skubiszewski put the state in the center as the organizing principle, also in 
international politics, just as the Communist regime had done. 
Another element that highlights the change of position is that while the 
Communist regime had represented Germany as a great, perhaps the great-
est, enemy, the new government presented the support of a united Germany 
as one of the cornerstones of its European policy:  
 
There cannot be a united Europe with the preservation of a divided Germany, 
and we all want a united Europe. The unity of Germany will lead to its inclusion 
into the integration process, the continuation of the Helsinki process, the destruc-
tion of the gap between the poor and schizophrenic East and the rich and rational 
West (Skubiszewski [1990] 1997: 47–48).  
 
The government promoted a Europe without dividing lines and the symbol 
of European unity was the unification of Germany. According to the govern-
ment a united Germany could not have a neutral status because this could 
make the European Community (EC) become a tool of German domination 
or alternatively disintegrate under German hegemony and pose a threat 
against Polish security (Prizel 1998: 117–118). European unification and 
integration was thought of as a solution to this problem as this would elimi-
nate the “poor and schizophrenic” features of Europe and make Germany 
and Poland partners of the same “rich and rational” political community de-
fined according to the standards of the Helsinki process. The statement sug-
gests the Europe that the government promoted: a Europe united under a set 
of social and political values, the belief that cooperation on the basis of such 
values would undermine strong culture and power politics, and that this 
would lead to peace and affluence. 
A later statement of the Foreign Minister provided Poland with its place 
in the process of European unification. He emphasized that Poland was firm-
ly situated in the culture of Western Europe, but that the country also had the 
attribute that it “understands and knows the East” better than any other 
Western or Central European State. Poland was also better understood in the 
East because of close relations and long-lasting mutual influence of values. 
He concluded that Poland has the best potential of all European states to 
serve as a “bridge between the East and the West” (Skubiszewski [1990] 
1997:72). Skubiszewski represented Poland as a meeting ground and a medi-
ator between the East and the West and as a country that could have an 
important position in the process of European unification. 
The statements of Skubiszewski show great affinity with statements from 
Znak, some from Kultura, save those who promoted a Central European 
identity with a strong anti-Russian rhetoric, and with new evolutionism. The 
government adopted the policy of conciliation, with Russia as well as with 
Germany, for which Znak and Kultura and the secular left had argued. They 
represented the years of Communism and Soviet dependency as the result of 
the difficult geopolitical situation of Poland. Now that the geopolitical situ-
ation had changed, integration, and a ‘return to Europe’, to a ‘normal’ situ-
ation, was possible.  
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4.2.2 Post-Communist Europe 
The PZPR had included a section of so-called ‘reformers’. This group was 
sympathetic to the position of Znak and the secular left and mainly argued 
for alliance with the Soviet block in terms of geopolitical considerations. 
The PZPR was dissolved in January 1990 and fragmented into several small-
ler political parties. The largest fraction founded the Democratic Left Alli-
ance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) (SLD) that agreed with the govern-
ment that Poland had its rightful place “in the common European home”. 
However, they advised the government not to construct political slogans that 
would cultivate the belief that Poland would arrive at European standards 
automatically when it ‘entered Europe’. On the contrary, the process of Pol-
ish integration with Europe would be  
 
…long, and our country will have to fulfill a lot of demands and regulations be-
fore it obtains a proper status […] only the strength and aptness of our economy 
guarantee a true partnership, respect and recognition. The economy depicts the 
status of the country and the efficiency of its foreign policy (Oleksy quoted in 
Pasierb 1996: 86).  
 
The representatives of the SLD did not agree with the manner in which the 
government represented the relationship between Poland and Europe and 
was concerned that the slogan ‘return to Europe’ produced expectations that 
the Poles would become European without working for it. The slogan ‘return 
to Europe’ would have to be replaced with the encouragement of economic 
activity and modernization and Poland would have to fulfill Europe’s set of 
demands and regulations before it could call itself European. Polish integra-
tion with Europe had to be a slow and considerate process.  
The last sentence of the statement situates it in a category that defines 
international status in terms of economic success and modernization. The 
SLD is not representing the nation in terms of culture. Neither does it repre-
sent the state in terms of power. This does not mean that it occupies the same 
position in discourse as does those de-emphasizing culture and power in the 
relationship with Europe. I will argue that the SLD deputies have revitalized 
the constellation political nation–centralized state and that they mainly repre-
sent the relationship between Poland and Europe as one in which Poland 
learns from Europe.  
4.2.3 Two roads 
Adam Michnik was a representative of the OKP and the editor of Gazeta 
Wyborza. He argued that Communism had repressed the Polish national 
culture and that the fall of Communism requested that it be revived. On the 
other hand, the revitalization of the Polish national culture had to be done 
according to a particular set of European values. The national identity had to 
be revived as a European identity. Michnik defined the ‘return to Europe’ as 
a   
 
…commitment to certain attributes of European culture. It means replacing the 
totalitarian dogmas of Communism with an attitude that presupposes a critical 
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distance toward oneself, and it means respecting tolerance in public life and 
skepticism in intellectual endeavors (Michnik [1990] 1998: 146). 
 
Michnik indicates that not all aspects of Polish identity are good and that 
some have to be redefined. In Kultura Krzysztof Gawlikowski (1990: 5) mir-
rored Michnik’s ideas: “Wanting to enter the Europe of our dreams, we have 
to bring our national conscience to effect and revise our historical views,” he 
wrote. But there were forces that contradicted this and turned to the rhetoric 
of nationalism, populism, and religious fundamentalism. “In Poland the 
European spirit is struggling with a narrowly nationalist one,” Michnik 
stated. He described the future of Poland and “our newly freed neighbors” as 
the choice between two roads: 
 
…one road leads to border wars, the other to minimizing borders, reducing them 
to little more than road signs; one leads to new barbed-wire fences, the other to a 
new order based on pluralism and tolerance; one leads to nationalism and isola-
tion, the other to a return to our ‘native Europe’ (ibid.: 149–150).  
 
In the statement Michnik produced a dichotomy between Europe and a 
strong promotion of the nation in terms of culture linked to a strong promo-
tion of the state in terms of power. Both Gawlikowski and Michnik represen-
ted Europe as a sphere of particular values and to be European as a value 
through which the nation justified itself. Michnik portrayed Wałęsa as a 
figure that could fuse the European spirit with the need to recover the roots 
of Polish national identity. He was soon to be disillusioned. 
4.2.4 War on the top 
 
It is painful for me to observe Wałęsa’s evolution from the symbol of Polish 
democracy to its present grotesque caricature. The decision to deprive Gazeta 
Wyborcza of the Solidarność logo for criticizing Wałęsa was the first shibboleth 
of what will happen to Polish democracy when these people reach for state 
power. […] [H]e [Wałęsa] will not be president of a democratic Poland. Rather 
he will become a destabilizing factor, creating chaos and isolating Poland from 
the rest of the world […] The harm done by Wałęsa to the Polish cause through 
his utterances is based on this: on giving the impression of a country which is not 
stable, which is torn by constant conflicts. […] What path do we wish to follow? 
Is it a path to the Europe of contemporary, democratic standards, or, on the con-
trary, a path of a return to bygone traditions symbolized by authoritarian regi-
mes, the hell of national conflicts, and extreme cases of religious intolerance? 
The position of Poles in Europe depends on the answer to this question (ibid.: 
160–164).  
 
Michnik’s statement was a comment to the presidential campaign of Wałęsa. 
The statement portrays Wałęsa as a possible dictator who will bring about 
totalitarianism, censorship, national conflicts, religious intolerance, chauvin-
ism, fundamentalism, chaos and isolation, bring Poland down the path that 
leads away from Europe, away from democracy and stability. The article 
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more than suggests the scenario of the interwar years and the chaos and 
nationalism that are connected to it. In the same period Michnik published 
articles with references to the interwar period and the subsequent dictator-
ship of Piłsudski, “…the man who fought and won freedom for Poland, the 
father of Polish independence, also laid the foundation for dictatorship in 
Poland”  (ibid.: 154). The parallel to Wałęsa was more than evident. 
The prelude to the dispute was that Wałsa had expressed impatience with 
the pace of reforms promoted by the government fraction. He argued for a 
clear break with the former regime and immediate free elections of both par-
liament and president. Gazeta Wyborcza and Tygodnik Solidarność criticized 
Wałęsa’s impatience and Wałęsa answered by dismissing the editor of 
Tygodnik Solidarność, who was no other than Prime Minister Mazowiecki 
himself, and depriving Gazeta Wyborcza of the right to use the Solidarity 
logo. Wałęsa referred to the government fraction as the architects of a “pink-
red” accord between the “secular left” and the Communist party designed to 
circumscribe the influence of the political right (Vinton 1990b: 24). Poland 
needed the development of a right, left and center, a strong government and 
a powerful presidency “as a force for balance and political innovation” 
(quoted in Vinton 1990b: 19). Wałęsa defined democracy as a “war on the 
top”: “I am for a continuous political unrest; a continuous public discharge 
of conflicts. To me parliamentary democracy is a peaceful war of all against 
all” (quoted in Wilamowski et al. 1998: 161). In May Wałęsa split with the 
OKP and established the Center Alliance (Poruzumienie Centrum) (PC).  
Mazowiecki contended that freedom had opened the way to a “Polish 
hell, a tendency to disregard the common good in a mass of conflicting inter-
ests”. Poland’s situation required “a broad democratic consensus” and 
“refraining from demagogic bidding contests” (quoted in Vinton 1990a: 20). 
The Mazowiecki fraction accused Wałęsa of being a “primitive despot” who 
was prone for a coup d’état and called his supporters “Jacobins” and “revo-
lutionaries”. They declared themselves carriers of European ideals and repre-
sented these in opposite terms of the totalitarian, autocratic, nationalist, 
chauvinist, populist, and fundamentalist degeneration of the Wałęsa camp. 
The government fraction adapted the slogan “freedom without chaos” 
(Vinton 1990b: 24) and founded Democratic Action (ROAD), later turned 
into the Democratic Union (UD). The dispute provides an example of a clas-
sical discourse. Wałęsa argued for a state so powerful that it could be more 
apt for action and carry through reforms. The Mazowiecki faction argued for 
a state constructed as a safeguard against compiling power. 
On the occasion of the inauguration of the first freely elected parliament 
in 1991, Wałęsa, who had been elected president in December the preceding 
year, held a speech on Polish identity and the ‘return to Europe’: 
 
We know where we are going. Without looking back we know where we are 
coming from. That tradition gives us an identity different from others. It allowed 
us to stand years of partitions, occupation and exploitation. While the fatherland 
[ojczyzna] was language and speech, the Church was our national institution. It 
was and it stays that, because Poland grows out from the Christian circle, its val-
ues remain strong in us, from centuries, in culture and in daily life. They are our 
roots.   
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We often talk about our return to Europe. We have always been there, not only 
geographically. Then, after Yalta, the Iron Curtain […] divided it. The Curtain 
fell and the wall was put in ruins. Nothing divides us, people and ideas are roam-
ing. We remember that if Poland managed to attract the attention of nations, it 
concerned the issue of our culture. That culture always created values growing 
out from the stem of Mediterranean civilization, with the Christian spiritual com-
munity, but at the same time gave the world original and non-repeated values, 
our own, Polish. Thus, in moments as difficult as the present, we also have to 
hold on to the efforts of the creators and workers of culture. We should attempt 
to make the culture overcome the threats in the financial sphere; allowing it to 
enrich the nation with its fortune, and in front of the world witness of Poland’s 
greatness (911125/ 001). 
 
Wałęsa emphasized the nation as an entity justified in its culture. He repre-
sented the fatherland, the ‘attachment’ to the nation, as “language and 
speech”, and the Church as a national institution, a community that organizes 
the nation. Furthermore, he talked about the return to Europe in the terms 
that the Poles had always been there. To Wałęsa Europe was first and fore-
most Christianity and Mediterranean civilization and Poland had always 
been a part of this. It became a popular statement of the Polish right to claim 
that, in contradiction to the ‘return to Europe’ slogan, Poland has always 
been in Europe, even during Communism. This was a possible statement 
because the nation always had been a Christian nation and Europe was repre-
sented in terms of Christianity. Wałęsa suggested that the nation justified it-
self in the world through its culture and that the greatness of Polish culture 
took precedence over the more difficult economic situation. Wałęsa repre-
sented the Catholic Church as the institution that reproduced and was repro-
duced by the Polish culture nation. The most important value when relating 
to Europe, what unified Polish culture with Europe, was Christendom.  
4.3 The Sejm debate on the Europe Agreement 1992 
The Europe Agreement on Polish association with the EC was signed 16 
December 1991. It was a legal framework on the cooperation between the 
EC and Poland and was to be used to help draw up schedules for incorporat-
ing the Community’s acquis and transposing its legal rules into national law 
prior to Polish accession. In the following I will present the position of the 
government as it emerged in the Sejm debate on the Polish Europe Agree-
ment, and subsequently give an overview of the alternative positions.  
4.3.1 The government position 
 
Discussing our relations to the Community we talk mainly of economic matters. 
[…] Our association, our accomplishment of membership, is primarily of a poli-
tical character. It is about […] once and for all distancing ourselves from the 
ghost of totalitarianism and securing the democratic future of our country. […] 
On the other hand it is about ensuring our country a secure place in Europe. This 
goal is more important to us than to the countries that are members of the Com-
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munity today. We must not forget that throughout the last two hundred years not 
only our borders were threatened, not only our independence, but also our natio-
nal existence. Association with the Community will for us be a guarantee […] 
not only for economic and civil development, but first and foremost a guarantee 
for the conservation and promotion of our national existence (920521/ 009).  
 
Skubiszewski represented the Agreement as a choice between the two extre-
mes of totalitarianism and democracy, but also in terms of security. This 
may be considered a response to the security vacuum that had emerged due 
to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the insecure situation in the Soviet 
Union, and the refusal of Polish NATO membership, but it is important to 
note that he defined national existence as more important than state security 
as such. On several occasions he called on the “indivisibility of Christianity 
from the Polish national existence”. He represented the EC as a unification 
process that was building on the two thousand-year-long project of unifying 
Christian Europe. He reminded the Sejm that the Pope supported the EC pro-
cess because it was in line with the Vatican’s efforts to “gather all the nati-
ons of Europe in one spiritual and cultural society…”. This way of arguing 
suggested that working against the ratification of the Agreement and Polish 
membership in the EC was a denial of the Christian element of Polish iden-
tity.  
We remember that the former statements of Skubiszewski had not repre-
sented the nation but rather put emphasis on the state. Neither did he speak 
of Europe in terms of Christianity. This statement suggests an amendment of 
the representation of the government, probably as a result of the final disso-
lution of the remnants of the Communist regime and the free elections in 
1991 that had produced a coalition government more in line with Wałęsa’s 
position.  
4.3.2 SLD 
A representative of the Social Democratic Union (SLD) did not completely 
agree with Skubiszewski and maintained that the Europe Agreement was: 
 
…a chance, not a guarantee, a proof, not of our often naïve expectations, but 
rather of our responsibilities and abilities. Poland is going to consider if it is to 
become a stable state and politically predictable, respecting laws and civic 
duties, offering good products, a country open towards European partners, and 
not xenophobic and engaged exclusively with itself […] Europeanness is not 
only a question of geography, history or political declarations. It is simultaneous-
ly and first and foremost the ability of giving a practical answer to the question, 
what we offer Europe, [interruption] if we are serious, creative and responsible. 
Today the answer to that question is […] negative. Unified action is needed in 
order not to lose this historical chance (920521/ 015). 
 
The delegate represented the Europe Agreement as an acknowledgment from 
the outside of Polish responsibility and abilities. Implementing the Agree-
ment Poland would have to become a stable, predictable, open, and produc-
tive state, respecting laws and civic duties. The Poles would have to be seri-
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ous, creative, and responsible if they were to prove themselves European. 
Today this was not the case.  
In the 18th century Potocki introduced the concept ciemnogród (Ignor-
anceville) as a word that describes the prejudice and parochial backwardness 
of the conservatives and the Sarmatist nobility. The word was later adopted 
in Polish colloquial language as a notion that describes “a place to which 
culture and progress do not reach” (Sobol 1997: 94). Another word with a 
similar meaning and an equally full of historical connotations is zaścianek, 
which literarily describes a residence in the countryside inhabited by the 
petty nobility (ibid: 1127) but that, in the same manner as its derivative 
zaściankowość, is used as an abstraction describing backwardness and dis-
tance from intellectual life. In the debate on the Europe Agreement an SLD 
representative stated that “Poland has to decide whether she wants to be an 
island by herself […] cultivating her particularity, a kind of enlarged 
zaścianek, or rather find herself in the mainstream of development of the 
modern world, in modern Europe” (920521/ 045).  
Turning to the asymmetry of the Agreement, that some argued was a 
negative feature, the SLD delegates described it in positive terms, as a capi-
tal of knowledge that Poland could benefit from: 
 
The agreement makes it possible for us to access a lot of new, to this time not 
accessible to us, conquests on the field of technology, science, education and cul-
ture. This makes valuable terms for a quicker and better knowledge for us of 
Europe, making use of its leading conquests in the world…(920521/ 067). 
 
The SLD represented the relationship between Europe and Poland as that of 
learning. Europe teaches Poland how to become European and Poland is not 
yet European. SLD resembled the Polish enlighteners who described Poland 
as backwards compared to Europe, indicated a linear and progressive under-
standing of development; a development that Europe was leading while 
Poland was following a couple of paces behind. Europe is the modern: laws, 
science, technology, culture, and education. At the same time the SLD oppo-
ses power and culture as elements that should be applied in domestic and 
international politics and Europe is also a symbol opposing these trends: 
human rights, democracy, tolerance, and cooperation based on such values to 
gain peace and prosperity. In the following sections we will see that the SLD 
constructs Polish identity in terms of a political nation and a centralized state 
at the first layer, and a relationship of learning between Poland and Europe. 
They promote Polish EU membership through a slow and considerate pro-
cess that allows for education and information, teaching the Poles how to 
behave as conscious and responsible citizens and economic individuals of a 
democracy and market economy. 
4.3.3 UD 
A representative of the Democratic Union (UD) argued that not to strive for 
membership would  
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…send an unambiguous signal to the world that Poland resigns from the road 
that the developed countries once chose, that she once again engages herself in 
experiments of political designs, as she decides to go her own way and close up 
against other countries, that her choice is isolation and autarky (920521/ 014). 
 
The statement is very similar to the ‘two road’ metaphor of Michnik and 
represents membership as development while any other strategy conveys a 
regress of which the interwar chaos is a lurking threat. Striving for member-
ship shows the rest of the world that Poland chooses development.  
The delegate represented the Europe Agreement as “a challenge, addres-
sed to the whole nation, which for all of us is going to be a strict exam in our 
national abilities of self-organization, responsibility and capability of making 
use of the arising occasion”. The picture of Europe as a teacher evaluating 
the work of Poland is a common feature in parliamentary and public debates, 
and was also common in the language of the Polish enlighteners that repre-
sented Poland as a ‘pupil’ who had to do ‘homework’ in order to become the 
‘best in the class’. Europe gave the homework and Poland had to comply 
(Jedlicki 1999: 16). In the Sejm debates in the early 1990s bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation projects in Eastern and Central Europe were often 
represented as tests in Europeanness. A UD delegate termed the Visegrad 
cooperation between Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia a “test of the sta-
bility of our European region and a strengthening of the position of our 
countries as partners of the European Community and as candidate coun-
tries” (920710/ 027).  
The UD representatives tended to point out that Poland was not yet Euro-
pean and that the Poles would have to work continually in order to achieve 
the goal of reaching such a status:  
 
European is also the nation that has learnt to brush its teeth and have clean 
fingernails. This is also connected to the idea of Europeanness, and in that re-
spect I am afraid that we have to aspire for Europe continually, we cannot be-
have like we already are Europeans (920508/ 027).  
 
This way of representing the relationship between Poland and Europe illu-
strates how Europe was represented as a superior and Poland as an inferior. 
Playing on the metaphor of personal hygiene the delegate invoked the image 
some Poles seem to have of their own nation as dirty, filthy, and primitive 
opposed to European cleanness and civility (see e.g. Janecki 1998). The 
statements above also underline that although the UD, as I will show below, 
recognized that the nation existed through its culture, it did not represent cul-
ture as a means through which the nation justified itself on the international 
arena. The nation justified itself in striving for development and European-
ness. 
To this point the rhetoric of the UD resembles that of the SLD. Associati-
on and membership were a signal to the outside world that Poland was on 
the ‘right road’, being offered association through an Agreement was an 
acknowledgement that Poland should be grateful for, and striving for mem-
bership a means to make Poland European. Europe stands above Poland and 
teaches it Europeaness. But at one important point the positions divide. The 
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same UD delegate called on the two thousand-year-long tradition of unifying 
Christian Europe. In this process the bishops and popes had been active, and 
Schumann, Gasperi, and Adenauer, all great European and Christians, had 
after the disasters of the war felt the responsibility to carry on this tradition: 
 
The key to their vision of a unified Europe was a common historical, cultural, 
and religious identity, but also equality between the nations and respect of sepa-
rate features. This strongly commensurate with the commitment repeated so 
many times in the speeches of John Paul II about European unity. […] The Euro-
pean Agreement is a tool that may lead to the fulfillment of the vision of such a 
Europe that gives her nations the feeling of accomplishing its centuries long mis-
sions (920521/ 014). 
    
We see that the position of the UD rests on a different constellation of the 
first layer and that Europe is represented not only as a sphere of technology 
and economy, but also as a community of values that have their source in 
Christianity. The culture nation manifests itself in the statement as the Euro-
pean project has to make the nations fulfill their own separate missions, and 
it was stressed that the EC would have to be “the fulfillment of the great visi-
on of Europe built on common culture, rich in experiences and separate fea-
tures, made up of fatherlands [ojczyzn]” (920521/ 014).  
The notion Europa ojczyzn (Europe of fatherlands) has become a com-
mon concept in the debates on Polish EC/ EU membership. It should not be 
confused with the French l’Europe des patries, because the French patrie is 
an ‘attachment’ that corresponds with another concept of the nation, namely 
the political nation (see Wæver 1998; 1999). Europa ojczyzn as the members 
of the UD represented it, is a Europe that respects national culture, traditions, 
history, and territory, and that builds on the common heritage they have in 
Christendom and civilization.  
4.3.4 ZCHN 
“A country of the size of my fatherland must find its place among the large 
wolves in this world, where wolves’ laws apply,” said a delegate of the 
Christian National Union (ZChN) in Parliament. With these words, and the 
reference to homi homini lupus, he anchored his statement in the realism of 
Hobbes and Dmowski. He continued:  
 
Seeking such a place, and seeking always demands certain sacrifices, we cannot 
betray the values that comprise our national identity. A nation ready to betray the 
values that decide what it is and what it was, serves under the same conditions as 
a person who is ready to erode himself serving someone more powerful, strong-
er, and richer, in order to win material advantage (920521/ 026).   
 
The statement attacked those who argued for European integration in terms 
of modernization and development, like the SLD and the UD. The represen-
tative accused the government and Skubiszewski of being “driven by illusi-
ons, wrapping things in cotton, and drawing pink visions of the agreement”. 
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However, “in this terrible, cartelized world” Poland had to conduct tough 
negotiations with a basic strategic goal.  
 
That strategic goal cannot be any myth of a united Europe. There are different 
ways of uniting Europe and different visions of it. If it is to be Europe in line 
with its traditions and in line with those great civilizational values that have […] 
created it and that it brought to the world, it has to be a Europe of fatherlands 
[Europa ojczyzn]. And we want to find ourselves in that kind of Europe. In a Eu-
rope of free, independent and self-governing sovereign nations. And I hope that 
shoulder to shoulder with the Irish we will build such a Europe…(920521/ 026). 
 
While Skubiszewski had emphasized the indivisibility of Polish national exi-
stence and Christianity, the ZChN representatives highlighted the indivisibil-
ity of Catholicism and Polish identity that was a more exclusive representa-
tion. The statement suggests Polish moral superiority over the rest of the 
world as Poland guarded the original European values while the rest of the 
world had become terrible, absorbed in materialism and applying the laws 
“of wolves”. The rhetoric of the ZChN may be described as basically realist 
and nationalistic, also playing on the sufferings of the Polish nation and the 
decadency of Western Europe. The paraphrasing of Hobbes and Dmowski 
highlights the layer one construction of cultural nation–power state which 
when relating to the outside world emphasizes both. The state organized the 
nation in order to make it strong enough to handle the outside.  
The core of the original European values was based on Catholicism and 
the nation-state. On several occasions ZChN representatives accused the 
SLD and the UD of regarding “the liquidation of nation-states as the aim of 
the integration process”. They asserted that their “so-called European ideo-
logy” was applied to combat the Catholic religion whose social and national 
role allegedly “posed a barrier to the loudly advertised ‘return to Europe’”. 
According to ZChN representatives Poland was “already a part of Europe 
and had always been there”. They called on patriotism as a necessity, as 
capitalism was not sufficient “to appeal to the patience and selflessness of 
the citizens” and maintained that the “core of Polish patriotism, the most im-
portant feature of Polish identity, and the truest of all universalisms that link 
Poland with other countries, is Catholicism” (Polish Western Affairs 1992: 
258–259). 
We see that the ZChN argued that their opponents did not offer the 
appropriate construction of layer one, or that they tended to de-emphasize 
the culture and power aspects as well as the necessary strong link between 
the state and the nation that were so essential if the nation-state was to sur-
vive. They also attacked the representation of Europe in terms of develop-
ment, modernity, and affluence, instead of culture. Lastly, they argued that 
the EC posed a danger to the constellation of Polish identity and they were 
therefore reluctant regarding membership. 
4.3.5 KPN  
Representatives from the Confederation of an Independent Poland (KPN) 
were pro European integration, but insisted that it had to be a project seeking 
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to integrate the whole of Europe, not only its western parts (920521/ 021). 
Instead they promoted an alternative project: a federation of all the former 
vassal states of the Soviet Union including Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithu-
ania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, the Balkans 
and the Yugoslav sphere. All of these countries were considered too weak 
alone to implement a powerful foreign policy, but if they integrated and for-
med a political system, they could launch the kind of developmental project 
experienced by the Western European countries after the Second World War. 
“Only in this way may the countries in this region become equal partners to 
Western Europe, to what may develop in the Russian sphere, and moreover 
to the Far East and America” (920508/006).  
The statement reveals that the ultimate goal of the KPN was a powerful 
foreign policy. Poland justifies itself on the international arena through the 
power of the state. The philosophy of the KPN emphasized power politics 
and geopolitics. Europe was represented as a power sphere divided into two 
blocks: Western Europe, convening around the EC and NATO and Eastern 
Europe and the CIS countries. If Poland went into an alliance with the West-
ern European countries, and this was the prospect of the Europe Agreement, 
it would become victim to an asymmetric alliance. Western Europe was too 
powerful in terms of economy. Neither was an alliance with the East an 
alternative, because it was too powerful in terms of population and territory. 
Poland therefore had to launch its own project of integration, built on the 
model of the Western European project, but with exclusively Central Euro-
pean countries taking part. The project of the KPN was called Międzymorze 
(Middelsea) and built explicitly on the legacy of Piłsudski’s dream of a Cen-
tral European federation. 
4.4 An ordinary Poland in an ordinary Europe 
While the government’s European policy priorities were met with general 
approval, disillusionment with the “return to Europe” grew. The bulk of the 
problem was probably economic reforms bringing with them unemployment 
and declining real income. As the EC imposed numerous restrictions on Pol-
ish agricultural imports, Europe was also increasingly represented as arro-
gant. Skubiszewski felt compelled to remind the EC to “remain faithful to 
the ideas of its founders and not transform itself into a fortress closed off to 
the rest of Europe” (quoted in Vinton 1995: 63). In 1992 a sociologist pre-
sented a report maintaining that to most people the “return to Europe” had 
been replaced with “compliance to Europe” (Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 1992: 
101). This might have been a result of the rhetoric of for example the SLD 
and the UD that tended to represent the relationship between Poland and the 
European Community in such terms. This language was also reflected in 
Polish media. 
After the 1993 elections, the conservative parties failed to establish a coa-
lition and were marginalized in Parliament due to higher thresholds. The 
post-Communist parties SLD and PSL established a government coalition. 
The outcome of the election was called the “velvet restoration” (Michnik 
[1993] 1998: 306) and was by some observers regarded as a restoration of 
the Communist regime. Michnik, however, welcomed the new government 
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as a “symbol of gray and ordinary Poland” (ibid.: 314), and the government 
as “people proposing a conversation of an ordinary Poland in an ordinary 
Europe” (ibid.: 316). To him the fact that this faction could come to power in 
ordinary elections was a sign of Polish political stability, a democracy that 
worked, and of Europeanness.  
There were no major Sejm debates on the Polish relation to Europe during 
the SLD-PSL government period. In 1994 the Sejm unanimously decided to 
formalize the aspiration for EU membership as a part of Polish foreign pol-
icy after a short debate in which conflict level was low. In the following sec-
tion I will present the position of the government. In the subsequent parts I 
will describe alternative positions as they appeared in Kultura and in 
Tygodnik Sollidarność. 
4.4.1 SLD-PSL 
In his first exposé as Foreign Minister (940512/ 001), Andzej Olechowski 
declared that “the straightest road to a Europe without divisions is the en-
largement of the well assessed structures of the North Atlantic Association 
and the European Union”, the latter which he described as “the most Europe-
an of all European institutions”. He expressed satisfaction with the good 
neighborly relationship with a “democratic and European Germany” that 
Poland could look to with trust and he followed up by claiming that if 
Poland had any mission at all in Europe, it had to be to keep good relations 
with Germany so as to “liquidate serious threats to a potential conflict in Eu-
rope”. The road to achieve this was to “link Poland and Germany to the same 
community of nations, to the European Union”. He considered the relation-
ship to the East as too frail and called for more cooperation politically, eco-
nomically, and culturally. He summed up the main tasks of the new govern-
ment’s foreign policy in three terms: “durable security, favorable conditions 
for development, and individual personal contacts.” The greatest threats 
against accomplishing these tasks were: “intolerance, conservativism, pro-
tectionism, and stereotypes.” 
Olechowski revealed that he regarded Poland’s position between the new 
states in the East and Germany as the chief determinant of its security and 
that the relations between Poland and Germany were crucial for European 
security. He defined the chief enemies as intolerance, conservativism, pro-
tectionism, and stereotypes, values that, as we have seen earlier, were repre-
sented as contradictory to the European values by this party. Europe and the 
EU were represented as communities that dampened power and culture poli-
tics and thus also conflicts between nations. The SLD-PSL government pro-
moted a cautious approach to integration with Europe and emphasized that 
the Polish people would have to learn how to become active citizens of the 
Rzeczpospolita as well as responsible actors on the European market. Be-
cause of the cautious approach the coalition was criticized from the opposi-
tion in that it impeded reform and slowed down the process of integration.   
The position of SLD-PSL was reflected in the statements of Jerzy 
Jedlicki, who maintained that Poland always had been a “Suburb of Europe” 
(Jedlicki 1993; 1999). In an article called “Poland’s Perpetual Return to 
Europe” (1993) he made the argument that there had always been a gap be-
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tween Poland and the Western part of Europe on the civilizational level, 
“even in the ‘golden age’ of its political and cultural history, Poland could 
not close the gap that separates it from centers of European civilization” 
(ibid.: 81). Communism itself did not create the problem of the European 
peripheries. “But whatever their ideological visions, the Communists aggra-
vated this centuries-old problem and deepened the civilizational gap in 
Europe” (ibid.: 84). “At present Polish prospects are not very bright. Those 
who hoped that the collapse of Communism would mean the end of the 
troubles of the nation were naïve” (ibid.: 87). Neither was free-market demo-
cracy nor political solutions enough. “Indifference and despondency will be 
the worst enemies. Regaining self-confidence is the first and foremost condi-
tion for progress. A major spiritual and psychological revival is needed to 
overcome adversities and to open new vistas to the future. In this task the de-
sire of Poland to return to Europe may once again prove instrumental: not in 
order to return anywhere, but to move ahead” (ibid.: 88).  
Poland was not European but it should aspire towards Europeanness. 
Europe was represented as a sphere of development, progress, and education. 
The rhetoric resembles that of the Enlightenment. The Poles have to become 
educated if they are to enter Europe. The article anchored the position in his-
tory and created continuance with the past. If we compare Jedlicki to the 
subsequent sections, we will see some major differences in how the ‘Golden 
Age’ and Polish history are represented.  
4.4.2 A European Polishness 
The writers of Kultura emphasized that there was a Polish distinctiveness in 
drawing on both Western and Eastern European culture, that Poland should 
use this heritage politically by integrating the East and the West, and that the 
revitalization of a Polish national identity should tag on the political tradition 
of Dmowski’s realism mixed with the cultural tradition of the Jagiellonian 
period.  
Jan Maria Bocheński (1993) identified three existing traditions of defin-
ing the Polish nation, the classical, the national and the Messianic. Messian-
ism was the ideology of the post-partition period; the idea of Poland as the 
Christ of nations who was bleeding for Europe’s sins. Messianism regarded 
Europe as a decadent area of moral decline as opposed to Poland’s spiritual 
highness. If Poland was to become an open, European nation, it was impera-
tive that this ideology was eliminated.  
The national ideology defined the Polish nation in a narrow, ethnical 
sense and thus excluded lingual and cultural pluralism. The state was cen-
tralistic and the good of the nation was defined as the highest good. Catholi-
cism was interpreted in a nationalistic and intolerant way and for a non-
Catholic it was impossible to be considered a Pole. The practical conesquen-
ces of adopting a national ideology would involve reluctance to give up 
claims on Vilnius and Lwów. Intolerance and anti-Semitism would grow 
stronger and, even if the national ideology acknowledged that Poland was a 
country building on Western European tradition and values, relations with 
the community of Europe would not be favored since the good of the nation 
was put in front of the good of the community of Europe. What Bocheński 
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describes here is a Polish identity that emphasizes the power state and per-
haps also the culture nation. Such groupings in Parliament are, as we have 
seen, first and foremost the KPN and the ZChN.  
Bocheński argued that the Polish nation was beyond doubt anchored in 
Western Europe, first and foremost because Poland had adopted Christianity 
from there and since then adopted the Western traditions. “[T]he Polish 
nation is and remains a Western European nation, or it will not exist at all” 
(ibid.: 15). But in order to stay Western European the Polish nation would 
have to revise parts of its identity and turn to the classic definition of the 
nation that entailed the broadest possible definition of Polishness, a turn to 
the Jagiellonian national tradition. The classical ideology promoted a federal 
model of the state and the Polish nation was defined in a wide and pluralistic 
sense as anyone living in Poland or anyone acknowledging her- or himself to 
the Polish nation. Catholicism was an important feature of Polish identity, 
but in contrast to the national ideology there was also room for other religi-
ous traditions. 
Bocheński argued that one of the original features of the Polish nation 
was its Europeanness, and defined Europe as the “group of nations confes-
sing themselves to the Christian faith”. Moreover, he contended: “the Euro-
peanness of classical Poland is without comparison deeper than in most other 
nations. For them it is more about economic gains, while the Poles are 
attached to Europe by years of bloody battles for her defense” (ibid.: 13). 
With this statement Bocheński demarcated a clear diacritic border between 
Poland and the rest of Europe defined by Poland being more European than 
the rest and that Polish Europeanness was to a larger extent anchored in mor-
al values than in economy. Although Bocheński repudiated Messianism, he 
still emphasized the cultural aspect, only this has to be a European culture 
according to certain Western European standards. The anchoring of Poland 
in Western Europe was regarded as a means to fight nationalism and narrow-
mindedness, anti-democratic tendencies and intolerance while Europe was 
defined in terms of a larger community of Christian values. The practical 
consequence of applying the classical ideology would be that Poland became 
“a bridge between the East and the West” (ibid.: 15). 
Kultura de-emphasized both the culture aspect and the power aspect. 
Although they acknowledged the deeper Europeanness of Poland in terms of 
more profound moral values and Christendom, they did not endow Poland 
with any mission in enforcing these values in the rest of Europe. Instead 
Poland should function as a bridge, as a means of transferring understanding 
between East and West and bringing Europe to unity. This was a normative 
assignment that Poland should take. Poland’s role in the process of European 
unification was not indispensable. 
4.4.3 A Polish Europeanness 
In 1996 Zdzisław Najder published a series of four articles in Tygodnik 
Solidarność under the headline: “Pole, become who you are” (Najder 1998: 
23–30). The heading drew on the thoughts of the Greek poet Pindar, who 
argued that man carries a potential self within him and that he becomes a 
real man only when this potential is realized, when he becomes his sub-
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stantial self. Najder transferred this idea onto the Polish nation. Due to the 
serious hits the national image received during Communism, the contempo-
rary image was not a reflection of the nation’s substantial self. However, 
there still was a chance to rebuild the real image. Najder defined “real 
Polishness [polskość]” by paraphrasing the Polish romantics to whom it was 
“a kind of obligation, not only the right to the heritage of certain goods. A 
real Pole is the one who serves Poland as it should be: independent and just” 
(ibid.: 29).  
Najder exemplified the Jagiellonian period as one when Polishness was 
defined according to this idea, when the Polish nation was a multicultural 
community made up by Jews, Lithuanians, Germans, Ukrainians, Byelo-
russians, and other peoples. What united the national consciousness was a set 
of values that Najder related to the ethos of the Polish knights: great-hearted-
ness, brotherhood, solidarity, courage, and the strength to forgive and ask for 
forgiveness. “If we do not regain those virtues, we will not fulfill the chal-
lenge that I introduce in the title [Pole, become who you are]” (ibid.: 26). In 
short, Najder evoked the Jagiellonian period, with its tolerance and multicul-
turalism, as a symbol of real Poland, and the knight as the symbol of real 
Polishness.  
Najder attacked those who throughout history fled the country or avoided 
taking part in the real national uprisings, like Mickiewicz, and honored those 
who put their lives at risk, or even suffered death, for the sake of real Poland, 
like Piłsudski and Krzysztof Kamil Baczyński, a Polish poet who died in the 
Warsaw uprising at the tender age of 23. Najder’s ideal was the poet, the 
intellectual, and the heroic insurgent who help building national solidarity 
beyond the dividing line of social class. Real Poles must have the will to stay 
Polish and if necessary die for the sake of national freedom “…[t]he real 
death of the nation is not even the loss of independence, but the loss of the 
belief that the battle of independence is worth the sacrifice of life. That be-
lief has been and still is connected to Poles, just as it was connected to the 
knights” (ibid.: 27). Najder represented Poland in terms of the traditions of 
the knights and the szalchta and drew lines from this to the traditions of the 
national uprisings. His statement resembles that of Pilsudski, who maintain-
ed: “each generation must demonstrate with its blood that Poland is alive and 
that she will not reconcile to foreign bondage” (quoted in Bromke 1967: 24). 
Claiming the existence of a ‘real’ Poland implies the existence of the 
opposite. In Najder’s eyes the ‘unreal’ Poland was the kind of image that 
was created during Communism. The Communists constructed a distorted 
image of Polish identity that was determined by blood and biology instead of 
moral obligation and the PRL wanted a return to the real Poland of the Piast. 
Xenophobia and hatred were cultivated internally, as well as externally to-
wards the West. Through this ‘false’ image, the Communists kept Poland 
from becoming what it is, contended Najder. In his eyes the Communists 
were barely “Poles” (ibid.: 30), the inverted commas signifying the falseness 
of their Polishness. From Najder’s point of view Solidarity represented the 
‘real’ Poland’s uprising against the ‘false’. 
Najder described real Polishness while continually highlighting differen-
ces between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between the real Poles and the false Poles, and 
ascribed them two contradictory value patterns. ‘We’ are pluralistic and 
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democratic; ‘they’ are totalitarian and despotic. ‘We’ are tolerant; ‘they’ are 
xenophobic nationalists. ‘We’ are Christians; ‘they’ are atheists. Najder 
admitted that the ‘false’ image of Poland had a great impact and that a lot of 
hard work had to be done in order to recreate the ‘real’ image. What was 
needed was the reconstruction of Polish identity based on the model of ‘real’ 
national images. These images were to be found in the Jagiellonian period, 
in historical literature, in the shape of Polish heroes who fought for the ‘real’ 
values of the nation, and through the history of national insurrections. In his 
numerous texts on Polish history, Najder recalls and honors these moments 
and personalities. Contrary to Bocheński and Kultura, Najder did not go to 
the Jagiellonian era to pick out aspects from Polish history and culture that 
linked it to Europe in order to enforce these and strengthen Polish European 
identity. To Najder the Jagiellonian tradition was Polish identity in its unique 
sense. As genealogical endeavors, Najder’s articles may prove to be good 
examples of how to construct continuance with the past and make order of 
disorder, for example in defining Communism as ‘false’ Polishness and thus 
mark it as an anomaly in Polish history. 
Najder placed Poland “in the heart of Europe”, but he emphasized that it 
is well situated within the culture and traditions of the western part of the 
continent. “From the point of view of the whole culture of Europe, Poland 
was a co-creator and co-contributor to the western civilization.” Situated at 
the “borders of Latin Europe”, the Poles had from the very beginning the 
mission to “develop, strengthen and represent Western culture as well as to 
defend their own culture against Eastern despotism”. Another mission was to 
teach the Polish “neighbors to the east, south and north what a national cul-
ture can and should be. If we manage to recreate that role, we will become 
what we were in our best times…” (ibid.: 28). With this statement Najder de-
fined Poland’s place in (Western) Europe as a bulwark against the negatives 
of the East and as a missionary teaching its own national and Western values 
to its neighboring countries. He communicates that Polish culture should be 
promoted on the European scene and that in doing this the Polish nation jus-
tifies itself because promoting national culture is a part of ‘real’ Polishness’.   
In Najder’s view Poland needed to enter the EU in order to protect its 
sovereignty, especially in the light of the uncertain situation in the east, but 
also in order to secure internal democracy and to fight nationalism. Najder 
wrote that if Poland does not enter the EU, one could not guarantee against 
the repetition of history in terms of the scenarios of the Communist and the 
interwar period (ibid.: 98). On the other hand, Najder believed that Europe 
also needed Poland because the continent is threatened by “soullessness”: 
Money is becoming more important than moral values and ethics, internal 
authorities and ties are being destroyed, people are exposed to the temptati-
ons of consumerism and permissiveness, and the markets are flooded with 
pornography, aggressive commercials and cultural trash. The economy is 
threatened by the process of globalization, “the unwanted child of liberal-
ism”, something that will ruin it totally if it is not counteracted. The EU was 
a means of fighting the unwanted tendencies and Poland was an important 
element in this process:  
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…the bishops recall that the culture of Europe is a Christian creation, and that 
the uniting of Europe and the ‘return of her Christian soul’ is the natural task of 
the Christian. I add to this message that if the Poles in reaching Europe do not 
make use of their Christian inspiration – that will be the same as supporting the 
Union as a soulless supranational supermarket (ibid.: 128).  
 
Europe needed, and expected, Polish help in fighting “the deluge of cosmo-
politan, ‘global’ mass culture ”. In this sense the real Poles of today were not 
only fighting for the sake of their own nation, but also in terms of having the 
potential of saving the whole European civilization from cultural destruction.  
According to Najder the possibilities of future developments were the fol-
lowing: “Either Poles manage to develop their real image, fulfill the require-
ments, put up with the past and the present and ‘become who they are’ – or 
the cosmopolitan civilization of the global market will wash over us” (ibid.: 
23). In other words, the nation manifests itself in its culture and through its 
mission in saving Europe from evils or it perishes. Poland should justify 
itself as a nation by manifesting Christian values and fighting the decline in 
moral values for the sake of material goods. Poland is provided with the role 
of a bulwark, not only to the evils in the East, but also against globalization 
and cosmopolitan mass culture where money replaces moral values. 
4.5 Polish European policies at the turn of the century 
The purpose of this analysis is to locate Polish European policy positions 
and show how the discourse of which the positions are constitutive parts is 
structured. Chapter three categorized the representations and the relations 
between layer one and two. The analysis so far has confirmed these cate-
gories and revealed that there are disputes between the actors occupying the 
different positions in discourse and that one result of this is that different 
European policies are being promoted. The statements and the analysis of 
them have made suggestions of the structure of the third layer. This section 
categorizes the policy layer more explicitly in relation to concrete statements 
from the most recent Polish debates on the relationship with Europe. 
An important project is to point out how the positions may change inter-
nally, not only how the discourse may change as a result of changing power 
between the positions. In order to assess the persistence of the positions, I 
decided to locate the values, institutions, and realities of different positions 
in discourse and look into how the different actors attempt to displace the 
values, institutions, and realities of other positions. I argue that what kind of 
relationship is promoted depends on the values that evaluate Polish identity 
in relation to Europe. If the political discourse reproduces Polish identity as a 
European identity, the markers defining this identity will define the Polish 
European project. If there is a border between the two identities, with dia-
critical markers, the assessment of these markers define the relationship. An 
important aspect here is whether diacritical marker for Poland is negatively 
evaluated and the European positively, or if it is the other way around. It will 
be shown that the relationship with Europe is promoted in a way that repro-
duces values that correspond to, or at least do not contradict; the values that 
reproduce the constellations of layer one and two. The most important values 
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that the Europeans reproduce – the most crucial values that the actors repro-
duce in order to sustain the position – are those that define how the different 
constellations of nation and state are promoted on the European (internatio-
nal) arena. These feedback loops will be defined and some scenarios of how 
they may change, as well as an example where I believe it has changed in 
the course of the decade, will be suggested.   
Before I turn to political parties and opinion makers, I will illustrate an 
example of how there have been made attempts to silence the position occu-
pied by the more hard line Catholics, like the ZChN. This could be the rea-
son why, as I will show you later, there has been an internal change in the 
position of the ZChN in the recent years modifying the values and realities 
of the feedback loop in a way that has opened up for Polish EU membership.  
4.5.1 A European Church 
After the parliamentary elections in October 1997 the Solidarity Election 
Action (AWS) formed a coalition government together with the Freedom 
Union (UW). The AWS was a broad alliance of rightwing parties, the ZChN 
and KPN included, which had managed to join forces under the leadership of 
Marian Krzaklewski. The UW had been established in 1994 unifying the for-
ces of the UD and some other smaller parties. 
Partly due to opinions that have been expressed by some Catholic facti-
ons, efforts have been made by the AWS-UW government to convince the 
Poles that the European Union is an organization built on values correspond-
ing with the Christian fundament and a project that is working to obtain the 
goals of the Catholic Church. In 1997 the Polish episcopate sent a delegation 
to Brussels in order to inspect the condition of the Union. The response of 
the delegation was overwhelmingly positive and the event received great 
media coverage. After their return they expressed unison support to Polish 
integration with the European structures and, seing in it no threats against 
Polish identity. In a comment to the event Jerzy Turowicz (1997) foresaw 
that the joint statement would have great influence on the public opinion and 
that ‘euroscepticism’ eventually would fade away. 
In 1999 the Pope was invited to the Sejm for the first time. He made it 
clear that the Vatican supported Polish integration with the European Union.  
 
The Holy See has from the beginning supported Polish integration with the Euro-
pean Union. The Polish nation’s historical experience and its spiritual and cultur-
al wealth can contribute effectively to the common good of the entire human 
family, especially in consolidating peace and security in Europe (John Paul II 
1999).   
 
The Pope also expressed concern about the present development in democra-
tic states: 
 
the Church warns against a reduced vision of Europe which would see it solely 
in its economic and political aspects, as she does against an uncritical attitude to-
wards a consumerist model of life. If we wish Europe’s new unity to last, we 
must build on the basis of the spiritual values that were once its foundation, 
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keeping in mind the wealth and diversity of the cultures and traditions of indi-
vidual nations. This must be the great European community of the Spirit. Here 
too I renew my appeal to the Old Continent: Europe, open the doors to Christ! 
(John Paul II 1999). 
 
Not all the Catholic organizations were convinced by the offensive cam-
paigning of the government. In the following I will present statements from 
the Sejm and from printed media on Polish EU-relations from 1997 to 1999.  
4.5.2 AWS 
 
Entering the European Union does not bring about the rejection of our national 
and Christian identity. The Holy Father John Paul II said during his Homily in 
Gniezno in 1997 that the framework of European identity is built on Christianity. 
I would like the Polish contribution to the process of European integration be the 
reminder of these fundamental principles. […] I would like to underline that our 
contribution to the European process of integration may be the fulfillment of the 
values that have been the mark of Polish politics for the last 20 years, and name-
ly the fundament of solidarity. It is actually that fundament that led to the victory 
over the past symbolized by totalitarianism and the iron curtain. Today the fun-
dament of solidarity, both between countries that already are members of the 
Union, and between the Union and other countries, especially those that are 
aspiring for membership, may become one of the fundaments of a real European 
unity (990908/ 004). 
 
Buzek rejected the representation of the EU as a threat to the Polish identity 
and to the value of Christianity and Catholicism. He gave the Poles a mis-
sion in the process of European integration in reminding Europe of the 
framework of its identity – Christian values. Suggesting that this was need-
ed, indicated that Europe was threatened by secularization and moral decay 
and needed help from Poland in overcoming these threats. Europe was repre-
sented as a collection of values being threatened and Poland was represented 
as a country that could work against these threats.  
Buzek gave the Poles the honor of having lifted the iron curtain and pre-
sented the achievements of the resistance movement as a contribution to the 
European process of integration. With this he strengthened the feeling of 
having been a part of Europe and the process of integration, even if situated 
at the other side of the wall. The feeling of solidarity was presented as a spe-
cial Polish value that, included into the general European pattern of values, 
could unite Europe in its natural shape. 
Europe would appear in its natural shape when it included all of the coun-
tries that belonged to the European tradition of culture and values. Buzek 
gave Poland the role of a European missionary in these territories. The 
remedy to a continued artificial division of the continent was the Polish role 
of being a “bridge between the ones who are aspiring for Europe and the 
ones who belong to Europe”. With this statement Buzek rejected that the 
countries to the east of Poland were European. It has to be underlined that 
the ‘bridge’ metaphor was not used in the sense of a meeting place of values, 
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but as a way of transmitting Western European values from the West to the 
East.  
Marian Krzaklewski represented Poland as a victim of history:  
 
More than half a century ago – not of our own wills – we were placed behind the 
iron curtain, on the totalitarian side of the divided Europe. Because of this, and 
only because of this, we did not take part in the process of reshaping the free 
states of Europe that took place from the forties to the eighties. The verdict of 
history gave us another role – to crush the walls put up by Communist totali-
tarianism. We passed the exam (990908/ 008). 
  
The statement underlines that to be a part of Europe is the natural condition 
for Poland while the Communist period is described as an anomaly. Further-
more, the statement represents Poland as a bulwark against Communism and 
manifests that Poland served the task of defending Europe from this destruc-
tive and non-European trend. This way of describing the history of the 
country gives Poland the status of a passive victim of uncontrollable forces 
that work against the free wills of the Poles, but it also gave them a mission. 
That mission was to crush Communism and the walls that were dividing 
Europe. Suggesting that the Poles performed this task successfully, 
Krzaklewski invoked the self-sacrificing Pole who saves Europe from the 
dangers threatening to destroy its institutions and its values. Thanks to the 
heroic struggle of such brave Poles, Europe had the chance to regain its 
natural unity. “It is thanks to Solidarity, thanks to the wish of freedom of 
millions of Poles, that Europe again is one.” When Poland becomes a mem-
ber of the European Union, he continued, this would be the “final victory 
over the artificial divide of our continent and the final victory of Solidarity, 
who already in 1980 reminded us of the responsible place of Poland in 
Europe, changing the face of Europe and the world”.  
With the “responsible place of Poland in Europe” Krzaklewski had in 
mind the slogan “there is no united Europe without an independent Poland”, 
referred too earlier in his speech. This slogan, painted on the banners of the 
striking workers in Gdansk in 1981, forced through Polish freedom and inde-
pendence by indicating the European necessity of a free and sovereign Polish 
state. It also added yet another heroic feature to the Solidarity movement: it 
was claimed that at the same time as Poland fought for its own freedom, the 
nation also fought for the sake of the freedom of all of Europe. Krzaklewski 
highlighted that it is not the first time Poland defends Europe; Poland has 
always defended Europe. The reasoning resembled the idea of Poland as a 
bulwark of Christendom protecting Europe and the European values but also 
as a promoter of these values. “Poland, in the measure of her strength, may 
enforce the identity of the whole European community, supporting the 
fundament that was laid by the Christian democrats: De Gasperi, Adenauer 
and Schuman” (990908/ 008).  
An important aspect for the AWS delegates was the concept of national 
identity. Addressing worries of some groups that this would become an 
empty concept if Poland entered the EU, Krzaklewski stated that:  
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…Poland is not limiting her identity as she goes into the European Union, rather 
the opposite. Integration within the framework of the Union is a chance to build 
and strengthen our identity and the threats against this are all the extremes, void 
of respect for traditions, the moral relativism promoted by some of the organiza-
tions of the left (990908/ 008). 
  
The last sentence was an attack directed at the SLD and the values that their 
representations of Europe and Poland were reproducing. The Prime Minister 
and the leader of the AWS represented the EU as an organization in which 
Poland could strengthen its culture by promoting and enforcing Polish val-
ues. The rhetoric is quite different from that of the SLD and some of the UW 
delegates that tended to talk about European integration in terms of Polish 
compliance to European standards. In this case the relationship is the oppo-
site, Poland brings with it values to Europe and Europe is supposed to imple-
ment them. 
4.5.2.1 Policy: Poland integrates with the EU as part of its moral mission   
The AWS and the Catholic Church represent Europe predominantly in terms 
of a cultural community of Christendom. On the other hand, Europe at pre-
sent is believed to be lost because of the influx of trends such as liberalism, 
globalization, and secularization. When this representation of Europe is lin-
ked to the representation of Poland it activates the culture of the Polish nati-
on and deactivates the power state. The Polish nation has always been a part 
of Europe in the cultural sense. Throughout history it has lived at Europe’s 
frontier where it has defended European culture against onslaughts form the 
infidels. Much because of this the Polish nation has managed to preserve its 
European culture much better than any other country and has the mission to 
bring Europe back to its roots. The relationship that is created is one where 
Polish culture is superior to European culture.  
The statements of the AWS repudiated the option of the EU as a future 
federation. The EU will function as a framework of cooperation on the basis 
of common denominators of European culture, civilization, economy, and 
politics. But the essential components are and will be nations. The national 
traditions have to be conserved because all nations have their own values 
and their special mission adding to the completeness of Europe and the 
world. A commonly used denotation of this framework is Europa ojczyzn 
(Europe of fatherlands). The EU also has to aspire towards the east with the 
purpose to include new nations. Poland should be assigned the task to trans-
mit European values to its neighbors. A EU that is based on a Western core, 
or that supports differences between the nations that it comprises, is against 
the nature of the European ideal. The value of solidarity is represented as a 
unique Polish value that should be guiding the unification process. This indi-
cates a kind of egalitarian status of the members. A Europe of several speeds 
is not a policy that will gain support from this fraction.   
The EU is represented as an organization founded on the basis of Chris-
tian values and idealistic principles and as the major instrument in fighting 
the demoralizing and deteriorating processes that threaten Europe. The EU 
wants and expects Poland’s help in doing this. The position attacks those 
who define the EU in terms of a liberal political and economic organization 
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that is not interested in the Polish mission and neither in Polish moral inten-
tions. It also attacks those who regard the Union as a threat against Polish 
identity. It is, on the contrary, argued that Poland is strengthening its identity 
by entering the EU. This is because entering the Union Poland may fight the 
lack of respect for traditions and moral relativism. The reason for this may 
be traced back to the identity layer and the relational layer. According to this 
position the Polish nation depends on a certain mission in Europe consisting 
of moral principles and this identity is depending on acts of representing Pol-
ish values on the European arena. The feedback loop may be illustrated like 
this: 
 
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5.2.1 Bulwark 
 
If Poland ceases to promote its culture, Christianity and solidarity on the 
European arena, the values, institutions, and the reality will perish, or alter-
natively be redefined so that the loop will be modified. With the prospect of 
entering the EU, statements that EU membership is a way for Poland to ex-
press its culture, an arena where Poland will protect Europe, sustain the loop. 
A scenario that could make the loop break or be modified is for example if 
the context, Europe, changes, or does not confirm the Polish European iden-
tity (value), for instance if Poland is denied EU membership on an equal 
footing, if the EU is taking explicit distance from the Christian foundation, 
or if the EU will not enlarge further to the east. I refer here to the model in 
the first chapter of this thesis, that illustrated the three layers in relation to 
the context, Europe. If the context changes, this would lead to a redefinition 
of representations and policies. 
The position constructs continuity with the past in representing the posi-
tion as a continuation of the traditions of the Polish knights, the values of the 
szlachta, and the many uprisings against oppression and inequality. It repre-
sents EU as a project that is built on a Christian fundament as they call on 
the founding fathers who were all “great Europeans and Christians”. This too 
constructs continuance with the past on the part of the EU and merges it with 
the values of the feedback loop. The EU wants to reproduce the same values 
as Poland. It only needs Poland’s help in doing so. 
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4.5.3 UW 
Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek from the UW gave a lot of interviews 
on European integration and European history, both as Foreign Minister and 
as a professor of European medieval history. In an interview with the weekly 
Wprost (1998) on Poland, Europe, and the EU, he interpreted the concept of 
Europe as the “rejection of one truth and one ideology, the rejection of in-
tolerance”, a definition that resembles Michnik’s definition. Furthermore, he 
stated that the “national cultures are the wealth of Europe. If she integrates, 
she should unite under the standard unity within variety, without losing what 
up too this moment has made up her wealth”. He also emphasized that the 
process of integration should “proceed with respect for national traditions 
and sovereignty”.     
 
I also think that the old Rzeczpospolita was on a miniature scale the prefiguration 
of the European community – in the Polish landscape there was a place for the 
Catholic Church, as well as the temple of the Greek Catholics, the liturgy of the 
Orthodox, Jewish synagogues and Tartar minarets. This should also be the pan-
European vision (Wprost 1998). 
 
The statement endeavors to link the concept of Europe to the heritage of the 
Jagiellonian period and thus represents it in unity with Polish history. We are 
familiar with such thoughts from the article of Bocheński. The UW occupies 
a position in discourse that resembles that of Znak and of the leftist intelli-
gentsia during Communism. The UW consists of many of the same people 
who were central in the leftist intelligentsia and former vital members of 
Znak, like Mazowiecki. In Parliament Mazowiecki (990908/ 009) acknow-
ledged that Europe had “problems with the development of its soul” but 
emphasized that these problems would have an impact on Poland even if it 
did not enter the Union. He expressed the hope that the words of the Pope, 
which the Prime Minister too had referred to in his speech, would also have 
an impact on the debate on Polish national consciousness. Mazowiecki dis-
tanced the UW from the position of the AWS. Christian values were regar-
ded as important national values, but the nation did not express itself by pro-
moting these values.  
4.5.3.1 Policy: Polish identity is Europeanized with EU membership 
The UW, as well as periodicals, newspapers and organizations such as Kul-
tura, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Znak, represent Europe as a sphere of values 
that are antidotes to both a strong cultural representation of the nation as well 
as the denial of strong power politics. Poland has to Europeanize its identity 
continually by picking out the values of its identity that confirm its Euro-
peanness. Such values are particularly to be found in the Jagiellonian tradi-
tion. With this continuance with the past is preserved and the traditions of 
the European Union are linked to them. 
Europe is made up of an Eastern and a Western tradition and Poland is 
situated between these spheres. The Western sphere is represented in terms 
of political, economic, and societal designs, and it is underlined that Poland 
should not endorse to this uncritically, but rather find its own solutions and 
work against the negatives that are produced by e.g. a free-market economy 
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and extensive liberalism. Both Europe and Poland have trends that work 
against European values and they have to cooperate in order to fight them.  
The contribution of Poland to Europe is to show both the East and the 
West how to build such a national culture that is unique and European at the 
same time. Europe is represented as a unity that incorporates the East and 
Poland lies in the middle and is a meeting place of Western and Eastern val-
ues. This means that room is given for the possibility that the West might 
learn from the East as well. Europe is also Christianity, but Poland has no 
mission in Europe.  
Based on this construction is a policy that regards the EU as a community 
that has a democratic, egalitarian and tolerant foundation. The EU is consid-
ered to be a suitable channel for promoting the reconstruction of a Europe 
based on these values. The position promotes a Europe that is unified, incor-
porating both the East and the West on equal terms. This repudiates a West-
ern-based Europe as well as a Europe of several speeds. Europe also has to 
be made up of fatherlands with the nations as the central elements.  
Polish membership in the EU is believed to be a way of strengthening 
Polish identity because it manifests Poland’s Europeanness. The EU is also 
looked upon as an organization that ensures Polish national security, as it 
anchors Poland in a community where the values of tolerance and demo-
cracy are central. Polish EU membership is thus regarded as necessary in 
order to secure Poland within the European sphere and avoid that it dis-
appears into the chaos of nationalism, totalitarianism, and isolation. 
Although these institutions reproduce a Polish reality where it does not ex-
press itself through power or culture, the nation justifies itself internationally 
by showing that it is European – stable, predictable, tolerant, and coopera-
tive. Confirmation of its Europeanness from the outside is important when it 
comes to the external dimension. EU membership is a strong symbol of the 
acknowledgement of Polish Europeanness from the outside.   
 
 
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5.3.1 Bridge 
 
A possible scenario that may cause a modification or a break of this feed-
back loop is if Poland is denied membership in the Union, or if the rest of 
Europe (context) contradicts the values constituting the Polish European 
identity, for example if Poland is not acknowledged as a European nation.  
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4.5.4 Nasze Koło 
In April 1999 Jan Łopuszański was expelled from the ZChN because of an 
increasing dissidence on the European policy of the coalition. He founded a 
separate parliamentary caucus called Our Circle (NK) and a political alli-
ance, Polish Agreement (PP), which enjoys support from the political orga-
nization Polish Family (RP) and the chief ideologue of this organization, 
Piotr Jaroszyński. This fraction consists of the most outspoken opponents to 
Polish EU membership. The RP is associated with Radio Maryja (Radio 
Mary) which is part of the most conservative wing of the AWS. A daily 
newspaper representing the views of these groups is Nasz Dziennik (Our 
Daily). 
These groups link the representation of a decadent and decayed Europe 
directly to the EU. The constellation is perceived as the source of the spread 
of evils and an institution that upholds the continuous process of deteriora-
tion. In an interview with Gazeta Wyborcza (1998b), Piotr Jaroszyński de-
scribed the EU in the following terms: “What kind of creation is it? If there 
are to be no nations but only some societies, if abortion, euthanasia and 
homosexual marriages are to be legitimate, is that a formation, or a malfor-
mation?” In the Sejm Łopuszański contended that in the EU “organized anti-
Christian forces dominate, and their overarching domination consequently 
increases” (980319/ 009).  
The groups represented the EU as a conspiracy aiming at destroying 
Poland’s status as a free and independent country. “The plans of the EU con-
cerning Poland are to weaken our position, to strip us of independence and to 
cut the people down to the size of laborers working for the West” (Gazeta 
Wyborcza 1998b). Statements like this have strong parallels to the partitions 
and also the to Soviet period. Fears like this have similarities to the thinking 
of Dmowski, who believed that Poland would be too weak in an alliance 
with Germany because it would be dominated by its culture and its economic 
potential. 
The fear that Polish sovereignty will evaporate if Poland enters the EU is 
in opposition to representations claiming that Polish sovereignty will in-
crease once it becomes a member. This has in great part to do with the way 
in which these groups define Polish sovereignty. A fully sovereign country 
cannot be dependent on another country, not even in the economic sphere, 
according to the groups affiliated with Nasze Koło. Łopuszański maintained 
that it was “part of the essential functions of a sovereign state that its foreign 
politics are derived from its domestic politics. Our own goals are superior 
and the international goals are secondary”. In the European Union, however, 
“the international unity seems to be superior while the national life has to go 
through a process of adjustment to international standards […]. Attaching 
Poland to the European Union in its present shape would be suicide for 
Poland” (980319/ 009). Jaroszyński accused the government of working 
against Polish objectives: “The goal of the government coalition is non-Pol-
ish. Unfortunately, it is international. They want to incorporate us into the 
European Union” (Gazeta Wyborcza 1998b).  
Jaroszyński and Łopuszański rejected the possibility of being both inter-
national, a member of the Union, and Polish. In their eyes there was a per-
manent clash between these concepts that could not be united. Voices claim-
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ing that the concept of sovereignty was changing and contending that enter-
ing the Union Poland will have a say in matters essential to her development 
in a changing reality, something that in turn will strengthen her sovereign 
position, were accused of making use of pure rhetoric.  
 
Before we used to hear those kinds of arguments when the secretary of the Polish 
United Workers’ Party took the word, maintaining that the strengthening of the 
so- called friendship with the Soviet Union led to the strengthening of Polish in-
dependence. I would like to make the organizers of Polish integration with the 
EU aware that they are about to repeat the accomplishment of the Targowica 
[confederates], only that the direction of the international engagement, the geo-
graphical direction, is different (990908/ 011). 
 
By evoking the event of Targowica, Łopuszański accused those who want to 
integrate Poland into Europe of collaborating with forces intending to disin-
tegrate Poland. Piotr Jaroszyński drew parallels to the period of Commun-
ism:  
 
The European Union is the USSR à rebours. It is supported by an antidemocratic 
system.  The bureaucracy of Brussels devours the structures, the independence 
and the sovereignty of the member states […] Today the Communist ideology is 
no longer threatening us, but the threat is the domination within the EU of a soci-
alistic-secular ideology (cited in Bogusz and Stachura 1998: 32). 
 
The alternative of NK, PP and Radio Maryja is the Polish way.  
 
…instead of continuously turning to the West, we should seek our own solutions 
that should be in line with our tradition, culture, civilization, faith. The Polish 
way will be a way to fight conformism and dependency and remain an example 
of the true European values […] We will teach Europe what a Christian nation is, 
a nation that does not allow to be forced into financial slavery and that is capable 
of managing its own affairs. Thereby we will contribute to a collapse of world 
globalism, just as we halted the expansion of the Germans, the Mongols, the 
Swedes, the Turks, or the Soviets. It may be in Poland that the fall of the New 
World Order will begin (Nasz Dziennik 1998). 
 
While we have seen that the ZChN have reformulated the concept of sover-
eignty to mean cooperation in the economic sphere, this fraction strongly 
correlates economy and sovereignty. Tadeusz Rydzyk was concerned that 
the EU was a place where “the land of the peasant is being bought by for-
eigners, and the farmer himself dies from hunger” (cited by Surdykowski 
1998: 28). A representative from Solidarity Ursus, a workers’ movement, 
maintained that in this sense the EU was even worse than the former regime. 
“The Union is taking measures to complete what not even Bierut or 
Gomułka managed to do: to liquidate 90 percent of Polish agriculture” (cited 
by Surdykowski 1998: 28). The reasoning of the groups is based on a strong 
state with an autonomous economy of self-subsistence. 
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4.5.4.1 Policy: Poland defends its autonomy outside of a decadent Europe  
The position represents Europe as a lost culture decaying with games of 
power politics, consumerism, individualism, and democratic and liberal ex-
periments. The state is thought of as an incarnation of the nation. The state 
has a solid power element and stands above the nation, and has to do so in 
order to prevent chaos. An important reason why the state has to be strong is 
because the outside world is threatening the culture of the nation as well as 
its state. Poland is represented as culturally superior to contemporary Europe 
and should have a non-relationship with it in order not to be infected with its 
decadence. The alternative is to endeavor to construct a Christian community 
of cooperation.  
The EU is conceived of as a strategic tool in the hands of the greatest 
European powers. The main intention of its existence is to gain political, cul-
tural, and economic superiority. These strategies involve the project of dis-
integration of Poland. The EU is represented as a step in this process, that 
leading to the ‘fourth partition of Poland’ and as the embodiment of the pro-
cesses of secularization and moral decline; the turn from spiritual to material 
goods; from family values to individualism and egoism.  
It is believed that the laws of the EU are undergoing revisions continu-
ously lowering their standard and that this is being brought to Poland. Ex-
amples of juridical standards not wanted in Poland are abolition of capital 
punishment, legalization of abortion, and homosexual partnership. The EU is 
regarded as a threat to the national culture and the policy option is thus not to 
cooperate with it. Poland could take part in a European project of coopera-
tion, but this has to be a project that preserves the nation-states, a project that 
does not challenge Polish national sovereignty in the narrow sense. Besides, 
it has to be a European project of cooperation that preserves the original Pol-
ish and European values – it has to be a Christian project.      
Those who promote this policy position argue that the supporters of Pol-
ish EU membership, who often underline the Christian basis of the EU, are 
out of line with reality. Moreover they argue that the European project of 
integration that is promoted by the opposition is posing a threat to national 
freedom. 
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For the feedback loop to modify or break, there has to be a redefinition of 
the values that Poland justifies itself as a nation through its Catholicism and 
through strong state that is sovereign (autonomous) and that has the power to 
enforce national interests. In the following I will describe a variant of this 
position where I believe that exactly this has been done, thorough a redefini-
tion of the value of sovereignty. 
4.5.5 ZChN 
 “We, the Polish nationalists, look at issues concerning foreign policy 
through the prism of two criteria: national interest, that marks the range of 
politics, and realism, that points at the concrete possibilities and conditions 
of pursuing our national foreign policy” (980319/ 026). The delegate of the 
ZChN represented Europe as a troubled continent in moral decline: “There is 
no way around noticing the ideational crisis of many Western European so-
cieties, a crisis that according to the ZChN is caused by leaving fundamental 
values on which Europe was built in the historical and civilizational sense.” 
The delegate formulated European integration as a great challenge to the en-
tire Polish nation, a challenge to bring forward their national interests in the 
process of negotiations and to introduce their own concept of European inte-
gration. This concept will replace the idea of integration that exists in the 
present.  
 
Europe of cathedrals, Europe understood as Europe of fatherlands [Europa 
ojczyzn], and the model of Europe as a Christian community of free nations; this 
is the model we support. We do not support a Europe of abortion, a continent of 
nihilism, a continent of the legalization of deviations. We will never support 
such a vision of integration (980319/ 026).  
 
When it came to the question of sovereignty, the delegate agreed that  
 
in the reality of the present it is necessary to formulate the definition of sover-
eignty anew. In a situation where a considerable percentage of Polish trade and 
the Polish economic relations in general rely on the European Union, where the 
existence and successfulness of the Polish family rely on the state of those ex-
changes and on the economic and political situation of the Union, entering the 
Union and gaining influence on its politics will in praxis extend our sovereignty 
(980319/ 026).  
 
In an interview with the daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza (1998a) the same 
delegate expressed that he regarded the EU exclusively as “a common mar-
ket” and a “technical creation that makes it possible to solve certain pro-
blems at the technical level”. He thought Western Europe was an area of de-
Christianization, but noted that such developments were not identified with 
the EU: “The great transformation of the civilization is of a global character. 
It would have been taking place also if there was no Union. It is the result of 
mass culture, media, democratization – One must oppose the negative ef-
fects, but that cannot mean combating EU.” If we see these statements in re-
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lation to earlier statements by ZChN deputies, we get the picture of an insti-
tution that represents the EU as a structure purely for technical bargaining.  
4.5.5.1 Policy: Technical integration according to national interest within a 
Europe of nation-states 
The value of promoting national interests through a powerful national-state 
is sustained, but isolating the economic sphere has modified the position. 
This has been made possible through a redefinition of the value of national 
sovereignty as independence through interdependence, as well as a redefini-
tion of the representation of the EU. The EU is no longer the source of all 
evils. These evils are a universal problem. I believe these redefinitions and 
the modification of the position may partially be explained by the campaign-
ing of other institutions attempting at subjugating the position held by the 
ZChN. Relating this to model which I introduced in the first chapter, we may 
say that foreign policy has influenced identity directly, without taking the 
path through the context, Europe. The modified feedback loop may be illu-
strated like this: 
 
 
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5.5.1 Island redefined 
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4.5.6 KPN 
 
It looks as if the government promises that right after entering the European 
Union every one of us gets a Mercedes. They only forgot to add, that every one 
of us gets a Mercedes to wash! (990908/ 012). 
 
The KPN entered the AWS in 1996. From 1997 to 1998 a KPN representa-
tive, Adam Słomka, was the deputy of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as chairman of 
the Sejm Committee on European integration. But the KPN did not agree 
with the government in European policies and later it split with it and re-
established a separate fraction. KPN continued arguing for the construction 
of Międzymorze. “Entering the European Union has nothing to do with the 
geopolitical position of Poland; it has to do with the financial bill – gains and 
costs” (990908/ 012). The deputies accused the government of lying as it 
claimed that Poland would gain by entering the European Union. It would 
only lose as the European Union is much stronger economically and Poland 
will become a “second class member”. The KPN would continue to promote 
the “Piłsudskian vision of the ’Middelsea’, the vision of those nations that 
have the same faith, history, and economic condition as us, the countries 
between Russia and the European Union” (990908/ 012). 
In 1999 Leszek Moczulski, the leader of the KPN, published a book en-
titled Geopolitics. Power in Time and Space (Moczulski 1999), where he 
manifests the tradition of the ‘Middelsea’ in history and thus constructs a 
continuance with the past.  
 
This geopolitical mega region always distinguished itself in Europe. Several de-
cades of Communist rule have burdened it with political, economic, social, and 
mentality problems, already unheard of Western Europe. The size and the geo-
political weight of the Middelsea are nevertheless substantial (ibid.: 638).  
 
In addition to giving a thorough presentation of realist international political 
theory, the book is a thorough analysis of the power potential of the eco-
nomy (GNP), population, and territory, of the three European blocks. 
4.5.6.1 Policy: Poland balances power between East and West by construct-
ing the ‘Middelsea’  
The position rests on a representation of Europe as a sphere of power that is 
divided into the East and the West. Poland exposes itself through the power 
of the state and the state has to be powerful in order to safeguard the interests 
of the nation on the international arena. Because both the East and the West 
are too powerful blocks for Poland to cooperate with in the political sphere, 
since cooperation will lead to a relative power loss for Poland, the alternative 
is the construction of a third block. This will take the shape of a political and 
economic cooperation zone between the Central European states in which 
the central zone will be Warsaw–Kiev. The constellation has its legacy in the 
state traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Union and the idea of Piłsudski to 
create a third Europe as a counterweight to Russia and Germany. 
The EU is regarded as a threat, not because of its decayed culture, but be-
cause its economic power is too great for Poland to handle. The integration 
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of Europe is regarded a well functioning project and the EU is perceived as a 
success, but entering the Union at this moment in time will bring about a 
major relative loss of power for the Polish state so that it will be unable to 
assure the interests of the nation. In order to survive as a state in Europe, 
Poland has to pursue a strong foreign policy to obtain a sufficient amount of 
power and resources so that it can cooperate with the EU, as well as with the 
other power blocks of the world. Such a policy may be performed within the 
structures of a Central European federation that together aim at obtaining the 
same level of development as the Western European states.  
This is the foundation of the policy line of the KPN that promotes the 
construction of the Międzymorze region to include all the former vassal 
states of the former Soviet Union. The integration project that is pursued 
through the present institutions of the EU is criticized because it does not in-
clude the East and the Central blocks as equal partners of the West. The de-
fenders of this position attack their opponents first of all because they claim 
that the opponents do not pay enough attention to what makes the basis of 
the state, that according to them is the possibility to pursue an offensive for-
eign policy without any other state intervening. Secondly, they argue that the 
character of the cooperation between the EU and Poland that is argued by 
members of the opposition is not on terms with the real character of this co-
operation. The EU is a construct based on asymmetry and the Central Euro-
pean states can, if adhering to it, only lose while the Western European states 
will gain due to their superiority in political and economic power. Claiming 
that it will take on an all-European character if the Central European states 
integrate is therefore false. Central Europe must first obtain a higher level of 
development and compile enough power in order to be able to face the EU in 
negotiations as equals.   
 
 
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5.6.1 Middelsea 
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distribution) changes, if Poland is believed to have a sufficient amount of 
power, the position will theoretically allow for Polish EU membership. 
4.5.7 SLD 
 
…I have not noticed that the European states, in the process of connecting us to 
the European structure, bestowed on us the mission of creating one moral 
system. On the contrary, the postwar shape of Europe is supported by tolerance, 
plurality, and coexistence of different moral systems, on the free play of political 
and economic forces. […] They are going to ask us for economic contribution, of 
the renewal of laws, of the compatibility of the army, of respecting the constitu-
tion and the democratic procedures. […] I am a Pole, an inhabitant of Europe. 
And as a citizen of the Rzeczpospolita, under any Government and in any politi-
cal situation, I want to benefit from the whole humanistic heritage of Latin Eu-
rope that is made up of antique philosophy, law, the culture of many nations and 
religions, Slavism, orthodoxy, Judaism, and the reformative stream of Christen-
dom. I want to benefit from that heritage, and not teach others, because Western 
Europe will manage without us, even in the moral sphere (971110/ 025).  
 
“We thank Mrs. Waniek for reminding us of all of the European values on 
which her political organization built its identity for 45 years” (971110/ 
026), stated the next speaker, a UW delegate, ironically.  
While some delegates attacked the SLD on the grounds of its ‘non-Euro-
pean heritage’, the SLD delegates on their side attacked the right wing for its 
ideologically uniform conception of Europe and Poland’s place in it. Poland 
was not to moralize Europe, because Europe was made up of a variety of tra-
ditions, values, cultures, and moral systems. Instead, plurality, individual 
freedom and tolerance were emphasized as the foundational features of the 
European construct, as well as democracy, freedom, and political and econo-
mic liberalism. In this way, the AWS was made the tyrant that wanted to en-
force the straitjacket of uniformity and deny the European citizen the funda-
mental European value of freedom, while the SLD became the guarantor of 
preserving it. The political and economic standards that the EU comprised 
should become the main goals of Poland, not trying to make the rest of 
Europe adjust to any Polish moral norm.  
 
A modern European state that is friendly towards its people does not get invol-
ved in philosophical disputes. It is a secular state which effectively guarantees 
the freedom of all its citizens, a state in which the law is not used to serve any 
philosophy, in which one’s attitudes towards religion do not constitute the basis 
for neither preference nor discrimination, where the dignity of women is respec-
ted and no legal obstacles are placed against conscious parenthood (971110/ 010) 
 
We see that once again the debate on free abortion is brought into the debate, 
now as a symbol of Europeaness. Another feature of the right-wing rhetoric 
that the representatives of the SLD attacked was the idea of Europe as a 
Europa ojczyzn. 
 
Hege Haaland 
nupi june 01 
94 
We respect the views of those who talk about Europe of fatherlands, but we do 
not always know what is to be understood by this idea. Some think that the 
democratic standards of Europe threaten Christian values. At the same time these 
values are believed to be specifically Polish, not remembering that the Western 
democracies do not conceal their ties to Christianity (980319/ 017).  
 
This too was a hit at the AWS and its practice of representing the Polish nati-
on as more European than other European nations. The SLD delegate con-
tinued with suggesting his representation of the EU that he though was an 
example of a global process changing the basic functions of the state and the 
concept of sovereignty in itself. Taking part in this process, that Poland 
would have to deal with no matter what relations the country would have to 
the EU in the future, it was important not to get lost in ideology or emotional 
debates.  
 
Supporting the road of Poland to the Union we are not led by emotions, we are 
making use of neither pathos nor doubts. […] the SLD conceives common 
Europe as an answer to the present challenges of civilization and as the protector 
of a high standard of democracy and human subjectivity (980319/ 017).  
 
A gap of civilization and entering the EU as a means of overcoming this gap 
were often-appearing features in the debate. “There is no doubt that problem 
number one for Poland consistently is to decrease the gap of civilization 
segregating our country from the highest developed states, and that integra-
tion into the European Union is an enormously important means to make this 
possible,” a SLD representative said (990908/ 018).  The SLD frequently 
underlined the need for education. “For our own future and for Europe we 
are going to be useful only if we become a society of educated people, en-
lightened, presenting our best national features. A Poland of poor people 
may still be tolerated in Europe, but a Poland of poorly educated people – no 
more” (990408/ 020). 
4.5.7.1 Policy: The EU teaches Poland how to become European 
SLD occupies a position where the constellation political nation–centralized 
state relates to a Europe represented as the key to modernization and deve-
lopment. Europe embraces good social, political, and economic designs, uni-
versal laws, high-level education, responsible citizens, and the values of 
humanism and democracy. Europe is also a supranational community that 
eases tensions and conflicts between the states it is comprised of. Poland is 
not a part of Europe and the relationship established between them is that of 
learning. Poland has to learn from Europe how to become a European state 
with European citizens. We remember that this is the relationship that was 
established during the early Enlightenment with the constriction of a civili-
zational gap between Poland and Europe.  
The EU is represented as the promoter of European progress and deve-
lopment. Polish membership is a chance to decrease the civilizational gap 
that divides Poland from Europe. In order to do this, Poland will have to 
adapt to the institutional design of the EU and follow the policy provisions 
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of the latter. Strong promotion of national interests in negotiations with the 
EU is not encouraged as national interests is against the nature of the univer-
sal principles of development. The EU is not promoted as a federal project. 
The state-nations have to be preserved as fundamental entities of a Union 
that is built under an overarching supranational framework of universal law. 
At present Poland is lagging behind and has to adapt to these laws.  
The position opposes those who argue that Poland should enter the EU in 
order to remind Europe of its Christian roots. First of all, the representation 
of the EU as a Christian organization is mistaken. The EU is quite conver-
sely built on the coexistence of several moral systems. The EU will manage 
perfectly well without Poland. On the contrary, Poland will not manage that 
well without the EU. The EU is perceived as an organization that will help 
Poland become a modern country, politically and economically. However, 
Poland cannot enter the Union at once. It has to adapt slowly and in a con-
siderate manner. This is exactly because the civilizational gap is so large that 
the Polish economy will need time to adapt to the common market. Quick re-
forms will cause setbacks that in turn spur skepticism against the process of 
integration. Another aspect is that the state and the nation need time in order 
to learn about the political and economic mechanisms at work within the 
framework of the Union.  
 
 
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5.7.1 Periphery 
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positions may change internally, not only how the discourse may change as a 
result of changing power between the positions, I have located what I believe 
are the most central values, institutions, and realities of different positions in 
discourse, and looked into how the different actors attempt to displace the 
values, institutions, and realities of other positions. I have argued that what 
kind of relationship that is promoted depends on the values that evaluate Pol-
ish identity in relation to Europe and that the most important values are those 
that define how the different constellations of nation and state promote them-
selves on the European (international) arena. The feedback loops have been 
defined in terms of the metaphors bulwark, bridge, island, redefined island, 
Middelsea, and periphery and in the following chapter these will be the noti-
ons used describing the corresponding policy positions.  
The feedback loops illustrate how the positions may change. I have also 
exemplified a position that has changed in the course of the last years and 
have argued that this may be explained by a redefinition of the value of sov-
ereignty. In the next and final chapter I will summarize and draw some tenta-
tive conclusions. 
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5.0 Bulwark, bridge, or periphery? 
 
Words have a force of their own; it is they that create the world in which we live, 
the intellectual climate and spiritual air we breathe. Each of us chooses the lan-
guage that suits us (Michnik [1993] 1998: 292). 
 
This thesis has analyzed the precognitions of Polish European policies from 
the perspective that discourses condition what can be meaningfully said and 
done. It has revealed how we may derive Polish European policy positions 
from the ways in which the concepts of state, nation, and Europe, are and 
have been represented in Polish discourse. The purpose of the analysis has 
been to provide an overview of European policies in Poland, to explain these 
policies, and to make some tentative predictions on the basis of the findings. 
I think such an analysis is important because most analyses on the relations 
between Poland and Europe generally seem to neglect the fact that there is 
an internal Polish debate on the content of Europe and what relations should 
be established between Poland and Europe.  
5.1 Identity, relation, policy 
The study has answered the central question of what kind of Europe Poles 
promote through a categorization of different policy positions. The analysis 
has linked these positions to a relational layer that defines Polish identity in 
relation to representations of Europe, and to the identity layer on which the 
positions rest. It has been argued that the dominant constellation at the iden-
tity layer is the culture nation/power state and that the constellation political 
nation–centralized state is challenging it. Moving up to the second and third 
layers, however, I find it difficult to distinguish a dominant position.  
In the period between 1989 and 1993 the Polish government promoted a 
policy closer to the position of the UW and Kultura. It was indicated that 
Poland would become acknowledged as a European country through integra-
tion with the EC/ EU. Acknowledgment of being European seemed especi-
ally important and the bridge metaphor was used extensively as a way of de-
scribing the Polish place in Europe. The Europe that was promoted was a 
Europe that would consist of free and equal nations and include countries to 
the east of Poland.  
In the period from 1993 to 1997 the emphasis was more on learning and 
the periphery metaphor is perhaps a better characteristic of the way Poland 
was represented in relation to Europe. The Europe that was promoted was a 
Europe that consists of a center and a periphery where the center pulls 
Poland closer to the nucleus through the process of learning. 
Policies indicating that Poland should integrate with the EU as part of a 
Polish moral mission have been more visible after 1997. Central government 
spokesmen have tended to represent Poland as more European than Europe 
itself in the cultural sphere and argued that Poland should come to Europe’s 
rescue. However, I doubt that this position is dominant. Generally there 
seem to be three dominant positions in the discursive space and I believe that 
they may be described in terms of the metaphors bulwark, bridge, and peri-
phery. The other positions, the island and the Middelsea, seem to be more or 
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less successfully subjugated by the more dominant positions. The modifica-
tion of the island position, the redefined island, seems to be doing well, has 
at the present a strong voice in official Polish European policy, and should 
be observed in the future. The modified position can for the time being not 
be classified as an independent policy position, as it overlaps substantially 
with the island position.  
The analysis discloses that there is a dispute on what kind of Europe 
Poland should promote and that the different policy positions may be derived 
from the structures of the discursive system. It also reveals that the third 
layer generally corresponds with the positions of the second layer. This indi-
cates that there is mainly layer two and three that are politicized in the Polish 
discourse on Europe. This is exemplified by what I have argued is the redefi-
nition of the value of sovereignty as a value that reproduces the reality of 
Poland as a nation-state for e.g. the ZChN. The redefinition of this value has 
probably been the result of clashes with other positions in discourse that 
attack the particular values reproduced by the particular representations of 
e.g. the ZChN.  The change serves as an example where layers two and three 
have been politicized. The values that define Poland in relation to Europe 
have been recast and the position has been modified. 
The analysis suggests that there are some traits that unite across some of 
the different positions. The content of Europe predominantly includes the 
East and underlines the primacy of an all-European political project.  It is 
also evident that Europe is always promoted as a project that conserves 
either the nation or the state as primary units. All positions also, in one way 
or another, includes the representation of Poland as European. This indicates 
a strong discursive power in the practice of representing Polish identity as a 
European identity. Europe is represented both as an ‘other’ as well as Europe 
is included into the ‘Polish self’. Language builds both borders and bridges 
between the inside and the outside.    
What prospects for the future may we draw from the analysis? The analy-
sis allows us only to make a few negative predictions. We may suggest 
which scenarios that are not likely. First and foremost it is not likely that 
Poland will promote a Europe that takes the shape of a federation that under-
mines the state as the constituent international actor. Even if some groupings 
seem to think about the concepts of the Polish state and the Polish nation in-
dependently, as an overall trend in Polish discourse the idea of national free-
dom seems to be strongly connected to the idea of a state. Poland is also un-
likely to promote an international project of several speeds, as egalitarianism 
between international actors is a strong principle in discourse. The SLD 
seems to be the only political party upholding a position that allows for a 
Europe consisting of a center and a periphery and thus allows for this kind of 
project. It is also evident that largely the positions promote a Europe that is 
open to include the countries to the north, south, and east of Poland.  
5.2 History 
The chapter on the pre-history of the discourse has been important in many 
ways. First and foremost it has revealed the roots of the present discourse. 
Doing this it has strengthened the argument that discourses are historically 
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contingent. Statements that define Poland as a bridge between the East and 
the West, as a bulwark protecting Europe from evils, as the last outpost of 
moral and Christianity, as a great power, and as a European periphery, are 
not at all new and may be traced back to the 19th century or even further 
back in time.  
Throughout history the discourse has changed. The surge of Sarmatism, 
the impact of Enlightenment thought, the philosophy of the Romantic Move-
ment, and the representations of the realist movement of National Demo-
cracy and Roman Dmowski, may serve as examples of moments in which 
the discourse has changed substantially. Much thinking on state and nation 
in Poland has been dedicated to explaining why the Poles have been de-
prived of freedom, how the nation should be organized in order to regain 
sovereignty and independence, as well as how to regain Polish statehood. In 
this respect Europe has often been a central concept either embodying free-
dom or on the contrary been the antithesis of it.  
Without the chapter on the heritage it would have been difficult to illu-
strate how present positions endeavor to preserve continuity with the past by 
presenting the past in terms of the realities on which the position rests. It has 
for example been showed that the position of the SLD represents Poland as a 
country that always has been behind the modern and developed Europe and I 
have showed that Jagiełło and Piast are often evoked as historical paradigms 
of the concepts of state and nation. History is subject to representation in 
light of the present and becomes part of the discourse of today. 
5.3 Theoretical and methodical remarks 
The genealogical approach suggests that one studies how the actors conserve 
(or create) unity with the past. Throughout the analysis I have provided you 
with many examples of how this has been done. It has in particular been 
pointed out that there is an ongoing project of anchoring the post-Communist 
Polish identity in the ‘European’ traditions of the Jagiellonian period and 
that this is explicitly done in order to subjugate the positions that uphold a 
Polish identity that, according to this position, involves ethnic nationalism 
and religious fundamentalism. On the other hand a moral foreign policy in 
which Poland brings Europe back to its Christian roots has also been repre-
sented as building on the heritage of the Jagiellonian period. This position 
also has a strong historical anchorage in wars Poland has fought against the 
Russians, the Mongols, the Tatars, the Swedes, and the Turks. It builds on 
the tradition of the uprisings, the legions, and Solidarity. All these endeavors 
are represented as events when Poland fought for the freedom of the whole 
of Europe. The Middelsea position builds on the legacy of Piłsudski and the 
island position on the legacy of Dmowski. 
The position of the SLD is not so solidly founded genealogically and this 
might be one of the problems the position meets in the battle of discursive 
power. The position argues that Poland always has been a periphery and re-
jects the historical analysis of other positions that represent the Jagiellonian 
era as a period when Poland was on par with, or even ahead, of the general 
European development. From the point of genealogy, the more recent history 
works against the position of the SLD as the Communistic heritage and the 
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lack of foundation in Polish identity, history, and tradition, is often used 
against it in discourse.        
In the introduction I criticized neorealist and neoliberalist approaches 
because they study identity as an objective reality and as a variable among 
many other variables that has a measurable effect on foreign policy. I do not 
reject these theories and acknowledge that studies applying them may pro-
duce useful insights. What I do believe this study has showed, and the more 
conventional approaches do not allow for, is that Polish identity cannot be 
studied as an objective fact because there are several coexisting projects of 
what Polish identity is. These projects compete with each other but they also 
influence one another.  
The thesis has showed that European policy positions are constructed in 
ways that do not challenge the layer of Polish identity. The state-nation con-
stellation at layer one is always preserved when moving up to layer two and 
three. Showing this, I have strengthened the assumption that Polish identity 
has an effect on Polish foreign policy. But the analysis also strengthens the 
assumption that foreign policies are not results of a certain identity, but inte-
gral to its constitution, as I also have pointed out how foreign policies influ-
ence identities. The foreign policies of Polish nationalist groupings have for 
example motivated an identity project among layers of the Polish intelligent-
sia of creating a European Polish identity based on some traditions of Polish 
national culture and history that are regarded uniquely Polish but yet Euro-
pean. Furthermore contextual changes, changes in Europe as such, may have 
an effect on Polish identity, but only through the ways in which these chan-
ges are represented in discourse.  
The Copenhagen School argues that one should not only study identities 
through a set of diacritical markers, as the construction of the ‘self’ through 
the construction of a border towards the ‘other’. This study has confirmed 
the theoretical assumption that foreign policies are political practices that 
make certain events and actors ‘foreign’. On the other hand it does not sup-
port that foreign policy is a bridge between two distinct realms, but rather 
that foreign policy is something that both divides and joins the inside and the 
outside. For example, the thesis has revealed that Europe often appears in 
Polish discourse as a way of thinking about the Polish self and I believe that 
the prevalence of representing Polish identity as European indicates that re-
presentations that fail to include Europe as a part of the self are not viable. 
The thesis has offered an analysis of values, institutions, and realities in 
discourse, suggested how certain positions have changed throughout the 
period, and identified certain core values that have to be modified for the 
positions to change in the future. The thesis has provided an example where 
a position has been modified. I believe that this strengthens the assumption 
that foreign policies may change identities directly and that this may result 
from the ways in which positions clash with other positions. If I had not ex-
tended the analysis with the post-structuralist loop, I would not have manag-
ed to explain the emergence of this modified position.  
The turn to values, realities, and the materiality of discourse (the instituti-
ons) has disclosed how the concepts in discourse are in a process of constant 
redefinition. However, the positions (institutions) tend to sustain continuity 
with past statements. In addition to text, the primary unit of study of the 
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Copenhagen School, institutions should also be considered as elements that 
add a certain stability to discourse, as they tend to resist change. 
5.4 Concluding remarks  
A problem I have wrestled with throughout the analysis is the process of 
change. I have managed to show that discourses change, and that they 
change as the result of redefinitions of values, realities, or institutions, and 
that this again may be explained through clashes with other discourses. It 
seems, however, that to locate where the impulses that cause such redefiniti-
ons come from, it is necessary to enlarge the analysis to the European, or 
even the to the general international discourse. 
It may be asked if the Polish discourse in fact reflects more general Euro-
pean or international discourses. To a certain extent I believe this is true. The 
Polish discourses on the Enlightenment, modernism, civilization, romanti-
cism, and realism, all reflect greater European discourses. Today the debate 
on globalization and the evils contra the goods this brings with it is a part of 
the Polish as well as the general European discourse. However, I believe that 
I have managed to show that these discourses take on particular traits when 
they are included into Polish discourse and that they are adapted to particular 
domestic sets of representing reality. This means that these discourses cannot 
simply be reduced to mere components of larger international discourses. At 
the same time it has to be underlined that Polish discourse is not different 
from discourses in other European countries in all respects. 
I will leave aside the question if the approach taken in this thesis is pri-
marily structuralist or post-structuralist. What it has managed to show is that 
the approach has not resulted in a study that challenges modernist categories. 
The findings of the thesis show that in Polish discourse the state is still per-
ceived as the central actor on the international scene. 
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Summary 
After the Communist regime started crumbling in 1989, the official foreign 
policy of Poland has been redefined. A central characteristic in this process 
has been Polish involvement in the process of European integration and an 
application for membership in the European Union. These policies have not 
been undisputed in Polish political debates. Analyses of Polish European 
policy tend to concentrate on the official foreign policy of Poland and the 
strategies of cooperation and integration proposed by EU member states. 
What they seem to forget is that debates on Europe and what shape the rela-
tions between Poland and Europe should take exist within Poland as well. 
This thesis is an attempt to fill in this gap. The central question is what kind 
of Europe do Poles promote? 
This report investigates the preconditions for Polish European policies 
using the theoretical and methodical framework of the Copenhagen School. 
It locates different representations of state, nation, and Europe in Polish dis-
course, looks into the ways in which these concepts relate to each other, and 
how they condition the sets of possible foreign policies that Poland may pur-
sue in relation to Europe, or more specifically, in relation to the European 
Union (EU). In addition to this rather traditional Copenhagen approach, the 
article also investigates what values certain institutions, mainly political par-
ties, reproduce that contribute to the reproduction of the realities in question: 
Poland and Europe. This project addresses the materiality of discourse, 
allows for changing representations and positions with the reformulation of 
values, realities, and institutions, and provides a post-structural supplement 
to the structural design of the Copenhagen School. 
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